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ABSTRACT 
In 1998 Intermountain Healthcare instituted a mental health integration program 
in its primary care clinics. Mental health patients typify complex customers: those who 
supply multiple inputs into service processes whose inputs can expand across multiple 
service providers or multiple service visits. In this study, customer complexity is 
measured on a continuum by the number of co-morbidities of the patient (customer). 
It is hypothesized that complex customers receive better service from integrated 
service offerings than modular service offerings because complex customers have the 
most difficulty coordinating and combining services. The intensity of service integration 
is defined by the amount of coordination and combination of disparate service processes 
done by the service provider on behalf of the customer; in this study integration is 
measured by the practices' compliance to Intermountain Healthcare's mental health 
integration program. This study tests the hypothesis that integrated clinics decrease 
patients' healthcare asset usage, which is assumed to also correlate with better care. 
The theory is tested by contrasting two patient cohorts: one serviced in integrated 
clinics and the other serviced in nonintegrated clinics. The patients' medical records are 
followed for 3 years, and the hypothesis tests are performed using hierarchal models 
based on the Negative Binomial Regression for count outcomes. These findings offer 
support for the hypothesis that more integrated service offerings require complex patients 
to use fewer medical assets. 
The main study reveals two important theoretical contributions to the service 
management literature: an examination of integration and modularity of service design 
and recognition of the complex customer. While integration and modularity of product 
design are prevalent in the literature, this study examines integration and modularity in 
service design. Services can be integrated along both location and coordination, 
potentially offering swifter and more even flow through the service process. In 
attempting to coordinate disparate service processes, the complex customer acts as co-
designer of the service supply chain. Recognition of the complex customer requires 
service management to look at service supply chains as part of a natural service supply 
chain that requires coordination with other service's processes outside the firm before the 
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Healthcare delivery in the United States is a two-trillion-dollar business 
(Hackbarth, Reischauer, & Miller, 2007). Despite the vast sums that are spent in 
healthcare, visiting a hospital or healthcare provider can expose a patient to risks; nearly 
100,000 people a year die because of medical errors. Many more who do not die are 
significantly harmed because of errors (Chassin, Galvin, & Quality, 1998). The need to 
find healthcare solutions that increase quality and decrease costs is urgent and pressing. 
In 2006 Newsweek spent an entire issue on the subject of health care improvement, but 
lasting improvements and a subsequent decrease in the cost of care is rarely seen or 
written about. 
Books and numerous papers record and recite the problems ailing the American 
healthcare system (Chassin et al., 1998; Christensen, Bohmer, & Kenagy, 2000; 
Herzlinger, 1997, 2007; S. J. Spear, 2005). My purpose is to focus the discussion on 
healthcare improvement in one small segment of the two-trillion dollar morass: mental 
healthcare and process service management. Mental health providers service some of the 
most difficult and complex patients in healthcare; thus, studying mental health services 
provides a window for viewing improvement processes in one of the most difficult 
service environments. 
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I hypothesize that the more complex the customer, the better (and more efficient) 
care will be provided via an integral service design rather than modular design. In the 
context of my study, my measure of customer complexity is the number of co-morbidities 
of depressed patients; my measure of integrality of design is the degree to which a clinic 
has adopted Intermountain Healthcare's (IH) process of "mental health integration." My 
measure of care outcomes includes cost, visits to the ER, visits to the primary care 
doctors, and the use of pharmaceuticals. I find support for my hypothesis by measureable 
differences in decreased visits to the ER by those in the mental health integration 
program and by lower or neutral use of the other healthcare resources. These findings 
lead to managerial insights about the reasons for and against implementing integrated and 
modular service designs, and about how using a cascade service model can assist service 
providers in offering integrated care in capacity-constrained situations. 
1.1 Studying Mental Health 
There is value in studying the extremes of the customer service environment 
because in these extremes we often find the customer service frontier and the innovation 
that comes out of necessity. It is no surprise that healthcare in general is fraught with 
difficult customers, but even within healthcare, the frontier of difficulty is found in caring 
for patients with mental disabilities. 
According to a study by the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
leading source of disease burden, unipolar major depression was ranked as 
the second most disabling disease in developed economies. The WHO 
Global Burden of Disease study ranked diseases according to disability-
adjusted life-year, which combines the measures of mortality and 
morbidity, including disability, into a single measure for the purpose of 
comparing various illnesses and their impact on the population. But when 
only disability was considered, unipolar depression was the leading cause 
of years lived with disability for all sexes and all ages. (Pincus, 2006, p. 
S3) 
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In other words, mental health-related diseases constitute a serious threat to the US 
healthcare system; current news items, such as a front-page article in USA Today entitled 
"Mentally ill wait unduly long in ER" (Appleby, 2008), seem to support the notion that 
the US struggles under its current architecture to adequately serve the depressed customer 
segment. These long delays are especially disconcerting when one considers that nearly 
10% of all ER visits have depression listed as a primary or secondary diagnosis. The 
costs associated with these visits have accounted for nearly 8% of all hospital costs 
(Russo, Hambrick, & Owens, 2005). 
The majority of patients seeking mental healthcare seek care from their primary 
care clinics (Schulberg, Katon, Simon, & Rush, 1998). These patients exhaust primary 
care providers (PCP) because of their overutilization of medical services and because of 
their nonadherence to care, which leads to inefficient processes for both the patients and 
the providers (Ford, 2006). Even when referring patients to a mental health specialist is 
an option, estimates show that only 50% of those referred out of clinics visit the specialist 
more than once; many patients avoid the mental health system, returning to their PCP at a 
later date, showing no improvement (Ford, 2006). 
This study is important precisely because it studies primary care patients. Most 
healthcare studies in operations management focus on hospital care (i.e. Berk & 
Moinzadeh, 1998; Black, Carlile, & Repenning, 2004; Butler, Keong Leong, & Everett, 
1996) because it is repeatable and because hospitals provide a uniform reporting 
mechanism. Studying primary care across multiple clinics, however, is more difficult 
because tracking patients and uniformly reporting on them is difficult at best. 
Intermountain Healthcare's information system and its program of integrated mental 
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health services presents a unique opportunity to study an increase in service integration in 
the primary care arena. 
Additionally, this study also contributes to the literature by defining and studying 
integration and modularity in service provision. Up to this point, integration and 
modularity have mainly been defined through their application to the design and 
assembly of products (Salvador, 2007); this dissertation's application of integration and 
modularity is a small but significant extension of the literature. This study tests the 
hypothesis that integrated services are beneficial to complex customers and that as 
customers' complexity increases, the benefit of integration also increases. Through 
studying service integration, I highlight its necessity by also defining the complex 
customer and demonstrating how the capability of the complex customer affects the 
benefits the customer is likely to receive from the integration of services. 
1.1.1 IH's Efforts and How They Relate to My Study 
Starting in 1998, Intermountain Healthcare (IH) began a courageous and 
dedicated fight to restructure the way primary care delivers mental healthcare. (Because 
of the barriers to receiving mental healthcare, primary care has become many patients' 
sole provider of mental healthcare (Schulberg et al., 1998; Simon, VonKorff, & Barlow, 
1995).) This program has been led by world-renowned researchers like Dr. Brent James, 
Dr. Lucy Savitz, Dr. Brenda Reiss-Brennan, Dr. Wayne Cannon, actuary Pascal Briot, 
and countless other dedicated staff and clinicians. To launch the program, IH applied for 
and received a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, which funded the first 
clinic's testing and development of the Mental Health Integration (MHI) program. From 
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that first clinic, the process has spread to numerous other clinics and partners in more 
than four other states. 
IH's information system tracked information regarding both its integrated clinics 
and its traditionally run primary care facilities, allowing for comparisons of integrated 
versus modular care for depressed patients. The opportunity to gather and analyze this 
rare data set makes this study unique and compelling. Additionally, IH's eagerness to 
engage in this study and examine MHI from an operations perspective also facilitated the 
study's success and feasibility. 
1.2 Dissertation Roadmap 
The remainder of the document will proceed as follows: Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation consists of the empirical model and study. First, I contrast IH's Mental 
Health Integration process with the traditional care for mental health administered in 
primary care clinics. Second, I define integrated services and contrast this definition with 
the literature on product integration. Third, I outline my hypotheses for studying the 
benefits of an integrated healthcare model. In the penultimate section I describe the data, 
the testing procedures for the data, and summary of the data results. In the final section, I 
discuss the limitations of the study and how the results apply to managers, the field of 
operations, and service management theory. 
In addition to the main study, this dissertation introduces theoretical propositions 
and important connections to the service management literature. These writings are found 
in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3, "Service Integration and Modularity," discusses in detail 
the theoretical ramifications of integrated versus modular services, including a 2 x 2 
matrix mapping service industries according to the manner in which they integrate. In 
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greater detail it maps and contrasts product modularity to service modularity and 
integration. Chapter 4, "The Complex Customers and Their Effect on the Service Supply 
Chain," discusses the theoretical ramifications of complex customers and why their role 
in service design predicts the success of integration for less able customers. 
After the three main chapters, there are also a number of Appendices, which 
approach literature and other theoretical ideas at greater length. Appendix A connects this 
study to the service design literature. Appendix B discusses the additional complexity 
that results from integrating services. Appendix C goes into greater detail about the 
statistical tests and records programming results for the empirical tests. Appendix D takes 
ideas learned from the study and relates them to a teaching philosophy and presents a 
paper to be submitted to an operations teaching journal. 
CHAPTER 2 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MENTAL HEALTH 
INTEGRATION AT INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTHCARE 
2.1 The Traditional Model of Mental Healthcare Versus 
Mental Health Integration 
To explain the uniqueness of Intermountain Healthcare's (IH) Mental Health 
Integration (MHI) model, I will first describe the system of treatment at a traditional non-
MHI primary care clinic. In a non-MHI primary care clinic, the process of care for a 
patient with depression follows a typical pattern. A patient enters the service system by 
visiting the primary care clinic, where she waits in the office until she can be seen. After 
a period of time, the patient follows a nurse or physician assistant into an available 
examination room. The nurse records all the vital signs and takes preparatory notes for 
the primary care physician (PCP). Typically, the patient waits a second time after the 
nurse finishes for the arrival of the doctor. At the arrival of the PCP, a conversation about 
the patient's symptoms and health problems begins as the PCP attempts to diagnose the 
patient's malady. 
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If the patient does not recognize her own symptoms, the doctor (who usually has 
had minimal training in mental health) may or may not recognize that certain outward 
physical maladies the patient is suffering (often called somatic complaints) are symptoms 
of an underlying mental health problem. Possibly after multiple visits, the PCP correctly 
diagnoses the patient with depression. After the diagnosis, the doctor either prescribes a 
medication or refers the patient to an external mental health provider. If the PCP refers 
the patient to an outside clinician, the PCP will receive little to no feedback from the 
mental health specialist on the progress being made by the patient because of the state of 
fragmentation between medical and behavioral services. A typical patient in Utah will 
wait up to 4 months to see a mental health provider, during which time her mental health 
needs often worsen due to neglect. Additionally, if the patient has multiple aliments (co-
morbidities), she will require care from multiple doctors, and she will be required to 
coordinate the care she receives between the disparate providers of service for each 
illness. In essence, the traditional primary care clinic requires the patient to manage her 
long-term care for her chronic disease and to coordinate her care across multiple 
specialties. The care design supports those who are adept at navigating a modular service 
systems, but the system lacks structure to support those who struggle to manage such a 
system (see Figure 1). 
In contrast to the non-MHI process, MHI clinics focus on offering integrated care 
to those who suffer from mental health sicknesses and other chronic diseases. The 
beginning of the process is similar to the process at the traditional primary care clinics. A 


















Modular care system, where the patient (customer) is expected to 
coordinate service needs between the disparate service providers. Note: 
in this scenario the PCP diagnoses the patient and refers the patient out 
for treatment for both her diabetes and depression, but other scenarios 
are also plausible such as where the PCP performs all three tasks or 
where the PCP also refers out the diagnosis. 
Figure 1: Traditional primary care 
the office until she can be seen. After a period of time, the patient follows a nurse or 
physician assistant into an available examination room. The nurse records all the patient's 
vital signs and takes preparatory notes for the PCP. After the nurse finishes, the patient 
waits for the arrival of the doctor. At the arrival of the PCP, a conversation about the 
patient's symptoms and health problems begins as the PCP attempts to diagnose the 
patient's malady. At this point, the two processes begin to diverge as mental health 
integration engages. In the MHI program, PCPs receive extra basic training in mental 
health, giving the MHI PCPs additional skill in recognizing symptoms and conditions of 
depression. Additionally, the PCPs are supplied with a mental health packet consisting of 
validated survey instruments prepared by mental health specialists. The packet assists 
doctors, giving them diagnostic tools to assist in measuring the severity of a patient's 
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mental illness. Once the doctor has gauged a patient's severity, the doctor sorts the 
patients according to the severity of their mental health symptoms and other chronic 
conditions, using IH's "Treatment Cascade Model (TM—Intermountain Trade Mark)." 
If the patient is sorted into the severe category, the entire mental health team will 
be activated, and the patient may also be referred out to mental health facilities. If the 
patient is sorted into the moderate category, the whole team will be activated, but the 
patient will most likely not be referred to outside resources. Patients in the mild category 
will be monitored by the PCP and only be referred to other team members if their 
condition escalates. The important differentiating factor between MHI clinics and 
traditional clinics is who is responsible for the integration of care between the PCP and 
other providers: in MHI clinics, integration is done by the clinic's staff in partnership 
with the patient as described below. 
Patients sorted into a care group begin to receive integrated support (i.e., 
treatment from different team members) according to the severity of their needs. The 
MHI model integrates all the disparate groups needed to support a mental health patient 
using three additional tools not found at non-MHI clinics: the mental health packet, the 
care manager, and mental health providers in the primary care facility. 
The mental health packet mentioned previously acts as the first tool of integration. 
(The packet contains self-assessment evaluations the doctor can give to patients to 
complete.) By using the tool, PCPs gain understanding of the severity of their patients' 
needs and direction in how to sort patients into treatment pathways. The packet, in effect, 
serves to provide a base of understanding of the patient's overall mental health condition 
that the entire MHI team can use to rally around and to support the patient. Furthermore, 
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integration from the packet is augmented through physician training. For example, the 
PCP receives continuing education on the treatment of mental health conditions via 
training seminars and case reviews conducted by mental health specialists such as 
Psychiatry APRN and/or psychiatrists. 
The care manager, the second tool of integration, is a registered nurse who acts as 
an extension of the doctor. Most primary care physicians have only 15 to 20 minutes to 
spend with a patient, adequate for the most routine checkups but insufficient for visiting 
with a patient who exhibits undiagnosed and complex symptoms. The care manager acts 
as an extension of the doctor by meeting with the patient at the doctor's request, 
providing education about the chronic disease, making appointments with mental health 
professionals, and introducing patients to community resources like the National Alliance 
on Mental Illness (NAMI). Essentially, she acts as the coordinator of care for those who 
most need assistance, becoming the relationship manager for chronically ill patients and 
increasing their access to care. 
To achieve full integration, MHI clinics bring mental health providers into the 
primary care clinics: this comprises the third tool of integration in the MHI program. 
These mental health specialists include APRN psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatrists, 
and licensed social workers. Hired by the clinic and receiving hourly pay, they are 
incentivized to be full team players who consult with PCPs and see patients. The 
advantage of this arrangement comes from the teamwork achieved by the entire MHI 
team working together rather than as independent contractors. In the best clinics, they act 
seamlessly with the clinic as equal partners and in the best interest of the patient. This 
also has the important impact of reducing the waiting time for patients to see a mental 
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health specialist. One PCP I spoke with said his clinic would fall apart without the MHI 
program because it had become so integral to his clinic. He said having the mental health 
specialists in the clinic allowed the doctors to "rub shoulders" together, to collaborate in 
the hallway, and to quickly address immediate patient needs. 
The MHI program's increased integration addresses two weaknesses traditional 
care systems demonstrate when serving chronically ill patients. MHI addresses these 
weaknesses by coordinating both the long-term and the cross-discipline care needed for 
chronically ill or complex patients; for example, the care manager coordinates the care of 
chronically ill patients, tracking them, organizing their appointments, coordinating visits 
with mental health specialists and disparate specialists for co-morbid patients, and 
working as an extension of the primary care doctor (see Figure 2). 
IH's redesign of services to support mental health patients displays its 
organization's commitment to excellent patient care. The system parallels the 


















An integrated care system, where the service providers assist the patient 
in coordinating service needs between the disparate service providers. 
Note: in this scenario the PCP diagnoses the patient , the care manager 
and PCP jointly educate about and treat the patient for diabetes, and a 
mental health specialist treats the patient for depression jointly with the 
PCP. The box denotes all the providers reside in the same clinic. 
Figure 2: Mental health integration 
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In her book Who Killed Health Care?, Herzlinger (2007) describes her ideal for the care 
of diabetic patients: 
The 20-plus million diabetics in the United States illustrate the problem. 
Many suffer from several diseases at the same time. Among diabetics, 
nearly half also suffer from high blood pressure and up to a tenth from 
asthma, heart disease, and behavioral problems. Diabetics require a team 
that devises and provides appropriate plans for their complex medical 
care—endocrinologists, cardiologists, nephrologists, dermatologists, 
podiatrists, and behavioral support specialists, among others. Yet even 
though this integrated team represents the most sensible way to deliver 
treatment to diabetics, most victims of the disease cannot find it. Instead, 
they are treated by many different specialists spread out in several 
different offices and practices. As a result many diabetics receive 
inadequate care. For example, only 36 percent of fully insured elderly 
diabetics had a crucially important test that measures long-term levels of 
sugar in the blood. These abysmal results are even worse for African-
Americans and poor people, (p. 168) 
In a similar manner to Herzlinger's recommendation for diabetic care, MHI 
organizes resources around the physician to help care for mental health patients. MHI co-
locates a mental health specialist in the PCP's clinic as a paid team member, and MHI 
provides a care manager who connects patients with community resources, mental health 
professionals, and other medical specialists to provide seamless relational care. 
In addition to Herzlinger, Christensen also advocates for different forms of 
integration. Christensen, Grossman and Hwang (2009) highlight two examples of what 
they label "solution shops." In Colorado and also in Minnesota at the Mayo Clinic, 
groups of specialists meet together to discuss diagnoses and treatment options in real 
time. These joint meetings integrate the care across specialties and increase the level of 
care and accuracy of diagnoses, which leads to a faster resolution and treatment plan for 
the patients. 
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In summary, there is a case to be made that IH's integrated approach to treating 
mental health should lead to better outcomes for patients. This settlement maps to the 
product architecture argument stating that in theory integrated products perform at a 
higher level (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). The next section will define the difference 
between an integrated and a modular service and will explain theoretically why integrated 
services like integrated products lead to positive outcomes for patients. 
2.2 Integrated Versus Modular Service Design 
2.2.1 Why Differentiate Between Integrated Versus Modular 
Service Design? 
If the choice between a modular versus an integrated service system boils down to 
customer preference or customer convenience, the choice becomes nothing more than a 
marketing tool for service providers to differentiate themselves from other providers. But 
if the choice between modular and integrated design affects the quality of the service 
offering for all customers or even just certain niche customer groups, the choice becomes 
a vital service design issue for those service providers who serve these customer groups. 
This paper hypothesizes that complex customers receive benefits from integration 
because they are required to navigate disparate service offerings. 
A complex customer is defined to be one who: 1) demands multiple 
processes, 2) experiences interactions between these processes, and 3) 
could benefit from assistance in managing the interactions and interfaces 
between these processes. Customer complexity increases with the number 
of processes, the extent of interactions, and the degree of customer 
ineptness in managing service interactions and interfaces. 
A patient with a single need (i.e., needs only a physical) is simple and not complex, but 
once a patient has at least two needs, complexity can be measured on a continuum. As the 
number of needs increases, so does the patient's complexity. Because modular service 
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offerings require that the customer coordinate and combine the service offerings, those 
customers who find this coordination process the most arduous will benefit the most from 
service process integration. As the complexity of the customers' needs increase, the value 
of service process integration for these customers will also increase; thus, understanding 
integrated versus modular service design is vital for the care of a large portion of the 
customer population (complex customers/patients). 
Frei (2006) noted that customers introduce capability variation into service 
processes, or in other words, some customers are more capable of performing tasks than 
others. This paper hypothesizes that customers become less capable of performing their 
role of coordinating and designing their service supply chain (see Chapter 4) as their 
needs become more complex, and thus integrated service offerings, which carry more of 
the coordination burden in behalf of customers, offer a higher level of service. 
It is important to note that complex customers can be mapped on a continuum of 
capability. Some complex customers (on the high-end of the continuum) "ably" possess 
the requisite knowledge and ability to coordinate and compile all the needed independent 
service processes into a complete package, reaching optimality with little or no 
assistance, but they may still benefit from integration. For example, a financial 
professional may be perfectly capable of coordinating all the services to sell her home, 
but she may still derive benefit from hiring a real-estate agent to coordinate the services 
in her behalf. Other complex customers (further down the continuum of ability) possess 
insufficient knowledge or skill to coordinate and bundle all the needed independent 
services into a coherent service package, failing to reach an optimal outcome without 
service provider assistance. 
16 
Unlike the less complex patients, who complete their service in a single visit to 
the PCP, complex patients will require multiple visits to the same PCP or visits to 
multiple specialists to be fully served. Because complex patients will require service from 
disparate providers or visits, they can seek care from an integrated service provider or a 
more modular provider. In the next section, the continuum between service modularity 
and service integration will be defined. 
2.2.2 Integration Versus Modularity 
Service literature says little to nothing about the idea of integration versus 
modularity in service design and delivery. One partial reason for this absence could be 
because, as Sampson (2000) noted, service supply chains are short because of their JIT 
nature, and thus it is easier to differentiate service steps as separate processes instead of 
integrating them as a whole. Another reason could be found in Tsai, Verma, and 
Schmidt's (2007) book chapter, which details the literature on service design. The authors 
and the literature they cite never mention modularity and integration by name, but they 
do comment on factors in the service design process, which would affect a service 
process's ability to integrate. (In Appendix A, I discuss how the concepts of modularity 
and integration build on the literature of service design.) A third reason why the concepts 
of modularity and integration are not mentioned often in service management comes from 
a misunderstanding of the service the complex customer is trying to accomplish or a 
misunderstanding of the complex customer's "service concept" (Goldstein, Johnston, 
Duffy, & Rao, 2002). For example, it is safe to assume that patients visit a doctor seeking 
the "service" of getting better; thus with chronic disease, multiple visits are required to a 
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single primary care doctor to accomplish the "service" and all the visits in totality 
constitute a single service transaction. 
Some may argue this distinction of multiple visits being a single service 
transaction is trivial or unimportant. In order to demonstrate my point more clearly and to 
counter these arguments, one need only compare a patient to a student. Segregating each 
doctor visit would be like selling a student a semester long course but treating her as a 
new customer at each class period because each class is treated as a separate service 
transaction; or it could be likened to an accident victim going to the hospital with 
multiple organ failure and assuming each doctor who sees the patient constitutes a wholly 
unique service process having nothing to do with the service processes that came before. 
An article by Goldstein et al. (2002) criticizes service management literature for 
forgetting the "service concept" in service design; likewise if each doctor visit is not 
combined, it would be in effect separating the service concept from the service design. In 
summary, there are valid reasons why service integration and modularity are not 
commonly found in the service literature, but when the multiple needs of the complex-
customer are considered, it becomes clear there is a need to describe and define 
integrated service processes. Because of the absence of integration in the service 
management literature, the product design literature where the discussion of modularity is 
pervasive will be used to build a theory of integration and modularity in service 
processes. 
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2.2.3 Applying Modular Versus Integrated 
Product Design Theory to Services 
There is extensive literature on modular versus integrated design as it relates to 
physical products. Recently two surveys of the research have been published (e.g., 
Fixson, 2007; Salvador, 2007). A discussion about modules or components lies at the root 
of all the papers on integrated and modular design because modules have been 
inconsistently treated in the product design literature (Salvador, 2007). For example, 
some authors suggest modules are like chemical compounds and physically nonseparable 
parts of larger products (Pine, 1993); others allow simple component parts to be 
considered potential modules (Kusiak & Huang, 1997) while others suggest modules 
must have some complexity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Finally, some suggest that only 
discrete components and subassemblies, which are separable parts of larger products, 
should be considered as modules (Lele & Karmarkar, 1983). Out of the many definitions, 
I prefer Ulrich's definition of a component because it could easily describe service 
process and is synonymous with module. 
I define a component as a separable part or subassembly.... a component 
can be thought of as any distinct region of the product, allowing the 
inclusion of, for example, a software subroutine in the definition of a 
component. (2007, p. 2) 
McClelland and Rumelhart's definition is also similar: 
A module is a unit whose structural elements are powerfully connected 
among themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements in other 
units. Clearly there are degrees of connection, thus there are gradations of 
modularity, (as cited in Baldwin & Clark, 2000, p. 61) 
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For the remainder of the paper I will borrow Ulrich's definition of a component/module 
and liken it to an independent service routine, which can be separated from a larger 
service routine and be performed by the customer or an additional service provider. 
In one sense almost every service process can be defined as modular since almost 
any product or process can be broken into separate parts or "components" (Schilling, 
2000). Because all service systems consist of components, the important question to 
answer is, "When do segmented services processes constitute a modular versus integrated 
service system?" 
As it applies to physical products, modularity is viewed as follows (e.g., Baldwin 
& Clark 2000): A modular product architecture is one where there is a well-defined 
interface connecting different modules (or components). Within any given module, a 
change in the design of one part can have a big impact on the performance of each other 
part (there is a high degree of interaction between the parts inside that module). For 
example, if you change the diameter of the pistons within the engine of a car you may 
also have to change the design of the piston rings, the connecting rods, the crankshaft, 
and a host of other parts. But across modules, a change in the design of a part in one 
module has little impact on the performance of a part within a different module (there is 
little interaction between parts across modules). Again referencing the car example, 
changing the piston diameter may not significantly impact the transmission design. The 
modular design requires that tight specifications be developed to define the interface 
between modules—these specifications define exactly what each module is supposed to 
"deliver" in terms of output and performance. At the interface between the engine and the 
transmission there is a standard flywheel interface. 
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In contrast, an integral product architecture is one where the components have a 
high degree of interaction. Ulrich defines it this way, "An integral architecture includes a 
complex mapping from functional elements to components and/or coupled interfaces 
between components" (2007, p. 3). It is generally accepted that an integral architecture 
offers the highest possible level of performance, as every component in this design can be 
tailored to deliver the very best performance for the product as a whole. Some research 
suggests that innovation breakthroughs happen most often in integrated products 
(Fleming & Sorenson, 2001) because in a modular design, it may be necessary to 
compromise on any one part in order to make that part independent from parts in some 
other module. But an integral design has disadvantages, in that it may not be flexible 
enough to handle different customer preferences and needs. If you had a fully integral car 
and wanted to offer both 4-cylinder and 6-cylinder engines, each version of the car would 
have its own entirely unique design, whereas a modular design would allow you to 
simply swap one engine for the other (see Figure 3). 
Modularity relates to primary care in the following way: In a normal "modular" 
care setting, the primary care physician (PCP) gives the initial diagnosis and sends the 
patient to another module (e.g., the psychiatrist). The PCP writes a prescription and sends 
the patient to yet a different module (the drugstore) to get the prescription filled. The 
patient must manage the interface between these modules, shouldering the responsibility 
for the continuation and coordination of care. Thus in a modular service the 
customer/patient shoulders most of the burden of coordination of care and serves as a 
necessary interface between service processes (components). As suggested earlier, the 
















Figure 3: Modular product design versus integrated product design 
of the appointment and the communication of the disease symptoms done by the patient, 
with no direct communication between care providers. This research hypothesizes that as 
the responsibility of integration increases in difficulty, service quality of the entire system 
will deteriorate. The literature suggests self-coordination of care in a modular service 
environment is difficult for depressed patients. 
Moreover, while referral to a mental health specialist may be one option 
for getting patients the right treatment, it is estimated that only 50% of 
those referred actually have more than one visit. Most patients will never 
engage in the mental health system and instead return to the PCP at a later 
time without any improvement in symptoms. (Ford, 2006, p. S10) 
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The typical modular care provided by primary care clinics contrasts starkly with 
integrated care offered in an MHI clinic. To care for depressed patients, MHI clinics rally 
entire teams, which display complex communication patterns. For example, the doctor 
and the care manager carefully coordinate patient care options and build bridges between 
community organizations and mental health specialists; they create multiple 
communication routines between service providers and the patient; and the process 
creates a coupling of services as mental health specialists, care managers, and primary 
care doctors share office space. In an integrated service offering, disparate providers 
communicate and coordinate care for the customer and (possibly) share location 
(customer/patient takes on a lesser burden of coordination). An integrated healthcare 
service process is one where the patient takes on a lesser burden of care coordination and 
where disparate providers are linked by coupled communication routines and shared 
location (see Figure 4). 
The basic ideas from product architecture also apply to service design, but there is 
a subtle difference in service design, which creates problems when a direct transfer of 
terminology is attempted: customers! Customers are a necessary and sufficient part of 
every service (Sampson & Froehle, 2006). But while Baldwin and Clark (2000) claim 
modular products have well-defined interfaces between modules, in modular services, on 
the other hand, the main interface between service processes is the customer. Customers 
are anything but a well-defined interface (Frei, 2006). They are generally a very 
heterogeneous interface and they introduce significant variation into service processes 
(Frei, 2006). The fact that customers function as the integrating interface causes the large 
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Figure 4: Modular services versus integrated services 
To continue the analogy of the automobile, to create an end-use vehicle, both the 
modular vehicles and the integrated vehicles must do two things: first bring together 
Figure 4: disparate modules and second determine how they will communicate. The 
difference between modular and integrated vehicles lies in the way the modules 
communicate. Because customers are an integral part of the service supply chain, two 
scenarios are possible in services that are unthinkable in vehicle product design. First, in 
services disparate modules might never be brought together, because the customer is in 
charge of this process and can, if needed, traverse long distances to link the service 
supply chain such as between an airport and a hotel on a business trip. Imagine a car sold 
to a customer where all the parts were connected by long wires, but the parts were 
scattered across suppliers' sites in multiple states. Second, imagine a vehicle in which the 
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modules are brought together, but no plans are made for how each module will 
communicate with the other modules because the customer will be in charge of 
communication and coordination. Imagine a vehicle where none of the internal parts are 
connected but they are all there. While both of these scenarios are unthinkable in car 
production and design, they happen daily in services because a customer is a co-designer 
(see Appendix B) and supplier (Sampson, 2000) in the service supply chain, and in most 
cases the customer is a very able provider of coordination and the combination of 
services. Indeed, in many instances the customer insists on having the autonomy to fit 
pieces together in the order and manner she pleases. Car companies would not dream of 
giving customers the power of deciding when and how modules in automobiles operated. 
Likewise, iPhone customers have been begging for years for the ability to swap batteries 
out, but Steve Jobs has not yet felt the need to comply. 
It is important to note that integration for services is rarely black and white; it is 
better defined as a continuum. Just as Schilling (2000) warned in the product design 
literature that on some level all products can be considered modular, so also services are 
best understood as integrated versus modular when they are compared one to another. For 
example, a PCP office with mental health integration might be considered modular when 
compared to a full service hospital because of its large staff and more complete service 
offerings, but in comparison to traditional PCP offices it is more integrated. Thus a truly 
modular service occurs when the customer collects and communicates between all 
service processes without assistance (the customer coordinates her entertainment on a 
Friday night between the restaurant and the movie theater or coordinates her care 
between multiple doctors' offices). While a comparatively more integrated process 
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brings services together and performs part or all the communication and coordination on 
behalf of the customer (the Alamo Drafthouse in Austin Texas serves dinner and shows 
movies and in the MHI model, a mental health provider, a PCP, and care manager all 
reside in one office to provide integrated and coordinate care). 
As defined earlier, a complex patient is one who has multiple needs and thus 
demands service from multiple service processes, and it is the management of disparate 
interfaces between service modules that causes the majority of service issues for complex 
customers. Additionally, the hypothesis that complex customers will have more difficulty 
managing traditional modularized healthcare compared to managing integrated healthcare 
organizations has support in the traditional product literature as well. The product 
literature speaks about "virtual products," which can be likened to a modular healthcare 
system, which must be pieced together to form a "virtual service product." 
In some markets, such as home entertainment, users create virtual products 
by assembling collections of products provided by diverse manufacturers. 
Modularity at the level of the entire system, when combined with standard 
interfaces, allows for the virtual artifact to evolve and change through 
independent actions by individual manufacturers. (Ulrich, 2007, p. 14) 
Customers faced with virtual service processes must be adept at mixing and matching 
products to arrive at an optimal outcome. To extend Ulrich's home entertainment system 
analogy, if I am an audiophile or "techy" I would most likely enjoy putting together 
disparate parts to build an optimal system; on the other hand, if I am not confident in my 
abilities, I will probably buy the stereo as a complete set from a single manufacturer. The 
complex customer on the low end of the ability spectrum can be likened to the 
nonaudiophile customer. The medical literature strongly supports the idea that most 
depressed patients and their primary care physicians will find the mixing and matching of 
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service processes difficult at best (Ford, 2006). In the product architecture literature, the 
difficulty of mixing and matching product parts puts pressure on a system to integrate 
(Schilling, 2000); thus, the product design literature theoretically supports the idea that 
customers who find it difficult to combine component service process may significantly 
benefit from receiving integrated care. 
In support of this concept, Dr. Provonost (Gawande, 2007) studied hospitals 
staffed with internists and found these hospitals produced better outcomes in safety and 
efficiency for patients because in effect the internist acted in a similar manner to MHI's 
care managers by coordinating care for patients in the modular environment of the 
hospital. Integration need not require extra staff: It can also be facilitated by technology; 
the digital integration of medical and information systems in a hospital in Hackensack, 
NJ, led to a drop in mortality of 16%, a shortening of the average length of stay by 24% 
(evidence of decreased medical asset usage), and an increase in the hospital's operating 
margins from 1.2% to 3.1% (Mullaney & Weintraub, 2005). In line with these results, 
Schmenner (2004) theorized that the best performing services increased the swift and 
even flow of customers through a process; it may be that integration increases the swift 
and even flow of complex patients through the healthcare system, giving an advantage to 
patients in an integrated system (Schmenner, 2004). 
When the concept of the complex customer is combined with the concepts of 
integrated and modular services, it becomes clearer that customers are selecting multiple 
service processes to complete their service needs, and that these service processes can 
either be delivered in an integrated fashion by the supplier or they can be pieced together 
in a more modular fashion by the customer. In effect, customers play the role of co-
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designers of the service supply chain in addition to their role of customers in the service 
supply chain. For example, the customer might choose to eat at the Olive Garden and 
travel to AMC theaters, or she might choose to have all the processes delivered in one 
setting; either way, she can be considered co-designer in the look and delivery of the 
bundle of service processes she needs as a complex customer. This role of co-designer is 
in addition to other roles the service management literature has identified for customers 
such as supplier (i.e., bringing her car to Jiffy Lube (Sampson, 2000)) and co-producer 
(i.e., participating in physical therapy (Mills & Morris, 1986)). (The topic of the complex 
customer being a co-designer in the supply chain is more deeply covered in Chapter 4.) 
2.3 Hypotheses 
2.3.1 Overview 
When compared to traditional care, mental healthcare at IH is integrated into 
primary care clinics, bringing disparate specialists together in a co-located setting, hiring 
care managers to facilitate the coordinating of care processes for IH's most complex 
patients, and providing tools to assist in diagnosis. Through integration, IH makes 
navigating the healthcare system easier for complex patients because it assists these 
patients in their role as co-designer and supplier to the care process. IH contrasts with 
traditional/modular care where the patient as co-designer is fully in charge of seeking out 
disparate care providers and as supplier is in charge of facilitating the coordination of 
care between the processes. 
2.3.2 Filling in the Gaps in the Literature 
Some theories suggest the activities involved in integrating services might not 
always produce optimal outcomes for all parties involved. Detractors claim integration 
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disaggregates centralized mental health services, decreasing the value of economies of 
scale and pooling (Netessine & Rudi, 2006). Integration also combines a value-adding 
process with a solution shop, which Christensen et al. (2009) claim is an expensive and 
not particularly effective strategy. Additionally, critics claim, integration unfocuses 
primary care clinics (Herzlinger, 2007; Skinner, 1974), creates additional variation 
(Cayirli & Veral, 2003), and produces additional bottlenecks in the service process 
(Manager, 2004). These disagreements come because the boundaries of beneficial and 
detrimental integration have not been clearly defined. In the following paragraphs I 
demonstrate how the theory of integration's benefit to complex customers fills in an 
important gap in existing service management literature. 
The gap in service literature can be traced to the extensive literature in services on 
the customer as a co-producer (Sampson, 2001; Tsai et al., 2007). The service 
management literature has recognized the important role customers play in the production 
of services (Mills & Morris, 1986), and it has even been recognized that the customer is a 
supplier in the service supply chain (Sampson, 2000). I extended this idea by 
demonstrating that the customer is also a co-designer of the service supply chain (see 
Chapter 4 for greater detail). The gap in the literature is not in the customer's key role, 
but in research surrounding the customer's likelihood to fail at the co-designer and 
supplier tasks. 
Because customers are an essential part of the service process (Sampson & 
Froehle, 2006), it is obvious that their role would contribute to the quality of the service 
process. Frei (2006) acknowledges the variation customers introduce into service 
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processes and points out that service businesses have the responsibility to control 
customer-induced variation. She tells the following story about Starbucks's efforts: 
Starbucks provides an excellent example of the deft handling of capability 
variability. The coffee shop chain allows customers to choose among 
many permutations of sizes, flavors, and preparation techniques in its 
beverages. In the interests of filling orders accurately and efficiently, 
Starbucks trains its counter clerks to call out orders to beverage makers in 
a particular sequence. It is all the better when the customers themselves 
can do so. Therefore, Starbucks attempts to teach customers its ordering 
protocol in at least two ways. It produces a "guide to ordering" pamphlet 
for customers to peruse, and it instructs clerks to repeat the order to the 
customer not in the way it was presented but in the correct way. The tone 
is not one of rebuke, but nevertheless most customers learn to avoid the 
implied correction by stating their order in the way that helps Starbucks's 
operations—with no hit to the service experience. Indeed, for some 
customers, getting the order right is an aspiration, a small victory on the 
way to the office. It's a clever solution, achieving an uncompromised 
reduction of variability, (p. 97) 
As Frei points out, controlling customer-induced variation is vital, but what is missing in 
the literature is the role of customer-made mistakes while coordinating broader networks 
of service and care. Mistakes made by the customer in her role as a co-designer of the 
service supply chain have not been addressed and are a missing key to increasing service 
quality and decreasing service process rework. Recent studies of hospital readmissions 
have shown many patients make mistakes in self-care after being released from the 
hospital for surgery (Bisognano & Boutwell, 2009): up to 70% have problems with 
medication (Naylor, Foust, Boling, & Cappuzzo, 2005) and half of the patients being 
readmitted never saw a physician (Bisognano & Boutwell, 2009), causing 12 billion 
dollars in unnecessary readmissions in the United States. A chief medical officer at a 
large health system in the United States described his after-surgery experience in this 
manner: 
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He was mostly delighted with the care he received, but, when asked if he 
had experienced any surprises, he responded this way: "The pain was a 
surprise—mostly because each nurse seemed to have his or her own 
theory of pain management. Some predicted and managed pain 
aggressively, and others 'followed the orders' to the letter, even when I 
was in severe pain, without consulting the surgeon. The biggest surprise 
was at home. I was alone, fearful, uninformed, and disconnected. I had no 
real education on how to care for myself and no way to reach out for 
information, guidance, consolation, and care. I thought maybe it was 
because I am a physician, but now that I am sensitive to this, I see this 
failure happening everywhere." (Bisognano & Boutwell, 2009, p. 4) 
If a highly trained doctor and administrator at a well respected hospital has misgivings 
about his own care, it is clear that self-managed care is a part of the process that may be 
prone to mistakes, especially for complex patients. These mistakes are not costless to the 
care system (Hackbarth, Reischauer, & Miller, 2007). I propose service integration is a 
tool for mitigating and decreasing mistakes made by customers in their role as designer 
and supplier of the service process. 
For those interested in the literature on human mistakes I refer them to Reason's 
(1990) book entitled "Human Error," which summarizes the literature in psychology on 
the theory behind human mistakes. He provides the following definitions: 
Slips and lapses are errors which result from some failure in the execution 
and/or storage stage of an action sequence, regardless of whether or not 
the plan which guided them was adequate to achieve its objective. 
Mistakes may be defined as deficiencies or failures in the 
judgmental and/or inferential processes involved in the selection of an 
objective or in the specification of the means to achieve it, irrespective of 
whether or not the actions directed by this decision-scheme run according 
to plan. (p. 57) 
In other words, complex customers are more likely to make slips, lapses, and mistakes 
because they are required to access more service modules, and in unfamiliar modules like 
medicine, judgment failures are more likely as witnessed by the high rate of hospital 
readmissions (Bisognano & Boutwell, 2009). Service integration acts like a service Poko 
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yoke to mitigate and eliminate lapses and mistakes customers make in their role as co-
designer of the service process (Stewart & Grout, 2001). 
In most service processes this is not a concern because it is unimportant if a 
customer has a nonoptimal family vacation or night out. Usually, customers do not even 
realize their own failures because they rarely have multiple trips to Hawaii to compare 
experiences. In healthcare and education our views are quite different, especially when 
we begin to see service failure in terms of rework. As previously cited, we have rework in 
terms of failed mental health patients ending up in the ER (Russo et al., 2005) and rework 
in the terms of high rates of readmission (Bisognano & Boutwell, 2009). Just imagine 
what university ratings would look like if they were judged by the number of students 
who dropped out or failed to find employment after graduation; it might make the 
educational community more finely examine their level of rework. 
This premise is also supported by the medical literature: Brief physician visits 
with co-morbid patients are not conducive to consistent care and treatment, even when 
evidence-based medicine is available (Bodenheimer, 2007), because patients not only 
need education about the disease, they also require self-management training, which is 
impossible for doctors to provide in short timed visits (Bodenheimer, Lorig, Holman, & 
Grumbach, 2002). Understanding these shortcomings to primary care leads to the 
expectation that for chronically ill and co-morbid patients, an integrated team approach to 
care may be more effective (Bodenheimer, Wagner, & Grumbach, 2002). Research 
indicates that dedicated integrated teams can make a difference in mental healthcare 
(Grumbach & Bodenheimer, 2004; Reiss-Brennan, Briot, Cannon, & James, 2006). Thus, 
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the more complex a patient is, the more that patient will benefit from receiving integrated 
care. Ford commented about how inefficient nonintegrated care is: 
Moreover, patients with depression frequently overuse medical services 
and markedly drive up primary health care costs...This combined 
overutilization of medical services and nonadherence to prescribed care 
leads to an inefficient process in which both patients and providers suffer. 
(2006, p. SI0) 
In integrated care, we should be able to observe more efficient care defined as using 
fewer resources to receive treatment because as customers make fewer mistakes in their 
role as co-designers and suppliers, they will need less rework. If patients do not get 
better, they overuse resources at the primary care clinic and in more expensive hospital 
settings. 
/ posit customer/patient complexity increases the likelihood of the customers 
making lapses and mistakes in their role as designer of service processes, which leads to 
service rework and the overuse of resources. Service integration mitigates this effect. As 
the complexity increases, the mitigating influence of service integration increases. 
2.3.3 Testable Hypotheses 
2.3.3.1 General Hypothesis 1 
MHI (integrated care) is more efficient and effective than standard (modular) care for 
complex patients. As the complexity of a patient increases (as measured by the number of co-
morbidities), MHI increases the efficiency of care for the patient. Efficiency and 
effectiveness are measured by fewer ER visits, fewer primary care visits, fewer central Psych 
visits, and more compliance with medication during 3 years of continuous care (see the next 
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Figure 5: General hypothesis 
The general hypothesis breaks down into five working hypotheses: 
Proper treatment and care for depression should lead to fewer depressed patients 
having escalated symptoms or fewer breakdowns and thus fewer ER visits. Fewer ER 
visits would lead to greater capacity in the ER room and less service rework. 
Hypothesis 1. MHI patients will use the ER less often than non-MHI patients. 
Additionally, these results will be accentuated by an interaction effect between patient 
complexity and the potency of the MHI process. 
Y variable = Number of visits to the ER. Main X variable = MHI versus non-MHI 
treatment group, and the interaction effect between MHI and the number of co-morbidities a 
customer has. (Control variables will include sex, age, visits to instacare, number of co-
morbidities, psych services, and care manager intervention. The controls will all be 
addressed in greater detail in the next section.) 
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2.3.3.2 General Hypothesis 2 
Ford (2006) pointed out that depressed patients who receive inadequate care 
eventually return to their primary care doctors and over use resources; thus, integrated 
care should possibly lead to fewer visits to the primary care doctor. This is congruent 
with an interview I had with an IH primary care doctor: He told me he sees his patients 
less often under the program. MHI may increase the capacity of primary care doctors and 
allow them to see more patients. 
Hypothesis 2. MHI patients will visit their primary care physician less often than 
non-MHI patients. Additionally, these results will be accentuated by an interaction effect 
between patient complexity and the potency of the MHI process. 
Y variable = Number of visits to the primary care doctor. The main X variable = 
MHI versus non-MHI treatment group, and the interaction effect between MHI and the 
number of co-morbidities a customer has. (Control variables will include sex, age, visits 
to instacare, number of co-morbidities, psych services, and care manager intervention.) 
2.3.3.3 General Hypothesis 3 
The current centralized mental health system (a modular service, where IH 
aggregates its mental health providers) is overburdened and could be considered a scarce 
resource (as manifested by long wait times). Therefore if the MHI system can keep 
patients from needing treatment or can decrease their need for services from the 
centralized mental health specialists, then capacity will have been increased in mental 
health care. 
Hypothesis 3. MHI patients will use centralized mental health specialists (in the 
behavioral health network) less often than non-MHI patients. Additionally, these results will 
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be accentuated by an interaction effect between patient complexity and the potency of the 
MHI process. 
Y variable = Number of visits to behavior health, main X variable = MHI versus 
non-MHI treatment group, and the interaction effect between MHI and the number of co-
morbidities a customer has. (Control variables will include sex, age, visits to instacare, 
number of co-morbidities, psych services, and care manager intervention.) 
23.3 A General Hypothesis 4 
Integrated care leads to consistent treatment. I hypothesize that integrated care 
will lead to more consistent use of pharmacy prescriptions, and thus MHI patients will 
have more prescriptions filled because they are receiving consistent and even care. 
Hypothesis 4: MHI patients will fill more prescriptions during the 3-year period 
than non-MHI patients. Additionally, these results will be accentuated by an interaction 
effect between patient complexity and the potency of the MHI process. 
Y variable = Scripts filled during the 3-year period, main X variable = MHI 
versus non-MHI treatment group, and the interaction effect between MHI and the number 
of co-morbidities a customer has. (Control variables will include sex, age, visits to 
instacare, number of co-morbidities, psych services, and care manager intervention.) 
2.3.3.5 General Hypothesis 5 
It follows the line of reasoning that if patients use fewer total healthcare services 
they should also have lower overall patient healthcare costs. Costs are difficult to 
measure and even more difficult to be accurate with. Co-pays, different insurance plans, 
deductibles, etc., all make measuring cost difficult because being sure that apples are 
being measured to apples is a difficult chore with costs and imprecision. Despite not 
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being able to accurately measure all costs, the measurement will still be used, based on 
the insurance plan's allowable cost to offer the most accurate test possible. Though not 
precise, this measurement is necessary as a check to the previous tests. Additionally, 
previous medical literature predicts that it will be difficult to discover a cost offset 
through providing additional care (Sturm, 2001) because medical managers lack the skills 
to narrowly offer additional services only to the niche patient groups, which would most 
likely benefit from them. 
Hypothesis 5. MHI patients will have less total medical utilization as measured by 
allowable charges than non-MHI patients. Additionally, these results will be accentuated 
by an interaction effect between patient complexity and the potency of the MHI process. 
Y variable = allowable costs from the insurance agency, main X variable = MHI 
versus non-MHI treatment group, and the interaction effect between MHI and the number 
of co-morbidities a customer has. (Control variables will include sex, age, and number of 
co-morbidities.) 
2.4 Description of Data Set, Testing Procedures, 
and Results 
2.4.1 Data Set 
The patient populations used to construct the test population consisted entirely of 
patients newly diagnosed with depression in 2006. (Patients are identified in the IH 
depression registry by insurance claims with either of two billed diagnoses of depression 
(ICD-9 296.2X, 296.3X, 298.OX, 296.82, 296.90, 300.4, 309.0, 309.1, 309.28, 311, and 
646.4); or a billed diagnosis of depression and a filled antidepressant prescription within 
the same 365-day window). By designing the study population in this manner, I was able 
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to control for two potential confounding factors. First, other studies have shown industry-
wide trends in the way doctors prescribe medication and recommend other therapies to 
treat depression (Armstrong, 2009). For example, comparing patients diagnosed in 2003 
to patients diagnosed in 2006 would be difficult because of changes in industry-wide uses 
in medication for treating the disease. Second, by only examining patients who were 
newly diagnosed with depression in 2006, I control for the length of treatment patients 
receive for their depression. For example, a patient who has been diagnosed with 
depression and been receiving treatment for more than 10 years is likely different from a 
patient who has been receiving treatment for depression for only the last 6 months. 
The data sets retrieved from Intermountain Healthcare contained 3 continuous 
years of the patients' data, beginning in 2006 and extending to the end of 2008, using two 
distinct data capturing methods. The longer the treatment time periods, the greater 
amount of power the integrated treatment would have on potential patients, so the longer 
periods of time were preferable to shorter periods. Data experts at IH concluded 2006 
would be the earliest and cleanest year for capturing patients classified with a diagnosis 
of depression. For all patients diagnosed with depression in 2006,1 obtained all their data 
of medical usage through 2006, 2007, and 2008 using IH's two methods for collecting 
data. 
The first method consisted of gathering all the data from IH's insurance arm 
called SelectHealth, and then from this selecting patients who were patients at IH PCP 
offices. This first method was the most preferred because it gathered all claims to the 
insurance from patients' use of medical services both inside and outside IH medical 
facilities. For example, patients insured by SelectHealth could visit IH's LDS hospital ER 
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or the University of Utah hospital's ER and Select Health would have a record of each 
visit. The records from SelectHealth patients provided the most complete picture of 
medical service usage possible. All the patients in this data set were continuously 
enrolled in SelectHealth for the entire 3-year period to ensure completeness. The 
downside to using this method of extraction is that it constricts the sample to only 
SelectHealth/IH patients: a very homogeneous and smaller sample size. 
The second method for gathering patient information consisted of tracking facility 
and doctor usage within IH facilities, regardless of where insured (or if insured). The 
advantage of this extraction method comes from its ability to track the usage from Blue 
Cross, Medicare, United Health, SelectHealth, and even uninsured patients. The 
disadvantage of using this extraction method comes from the possible gaping holes it 
leaves in the patient's record because patients who visit the LDS hospital ER will have a 
record while patients who visit the University hospital ER will not have a record of 
usage. Because of the deficiencies in this second method of extracting the data, the 
second data set is an exploratory and confirmatory data set; only the first data set is 
relatively complete enough to be relied upon to accurately reflect results. 
IH determined approximately 28,000 patients were newly diagnosed with 
depression in 2006, but not all of these patients were usable for testing purposes 
because we required 3 years of data and they had to visit a primary care clinic enough 
to be mapped to its use. Using the first extraction method we found 5,011 patients who 
were diagnosed with depression in 2006 and were continuously enrolled in 
SelectHealth insurance from 2006 to 2008. Of those patients, only 2,991 could be 
mapped to an IH clinic, which means the remaining SelectHealth patients chose to have 
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their primary care needs met by non-IH providers or were diagnosed in a hospital and 
did not attend a clinic regularly enough to be mapped to it. Because I have 
documentation on the clinic integration progress for each clinic in IH and not on those 
clinics not owned by IH, I cannot group patients according to their sharing of a 
common clinic resource. I kept only patients who could be mapped to an IH clinic in 
the sample because it allowed control for variation in the ownership of the clinic and in 
the amount of service integration at the clinic. The final sample (SelectHealth group) of 
continuously enrolled SelectHealth patients consisted of 2,991 patients (to see more 
detailed statistics on this group see Table 1). Using the second extraction method, I 
found (treatment facility group) 11,091 patients with 3 years worth of data who could 
be mapped to an IH clinic (to see more detailed statistics on this group see Table 2). It 
is worth noting the 2,991 in the first group are also included in this group, but their data 
are less complete because they are extracted using the second method; thus, it misses 
visits to non-IH facilities. Because the first group has the most complete data, we use it 
as the primary test group and the second set, using a wider population, is used to 
confirm the results found using the smaller group, which consists of only Select Health 
patients. The primary difference between the original 28,000 diagnosed with depression 
and the smaller test populations is caused by patients' failing to have 3 years' worth of 
complete data or failing to map to a IH primary care clinic. Tests of those who dropped 
from the sample because of a lack of complete data reveal that dropped patients were 
not statistically different in age, sex, or complexity from the sets used in the statistical 
tests. 
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46 Non-Integrated clinks 
Mean UpperCI LowerCI 
2001 
40.3 40.9 39.8 
66.4% 68.4% 64.3% 
Non-Integrated 
Mean UpperCI LowerCI 
1.70% 2.3% 1.2% 
1.50% 2.1% 1.0% 
9.80% 11.2% 8.5% 
100.00% 100.0% 100.0% 
8.00% 9.2% 6.9% 
4.00% 4.9% 3.2% 
79.30% 81.1% 77.5% 
16.80% 19.5% 14.2% 
3.90% 4.7% 3.0% 















10 Integrated dinks 


























46 Non-Integrated dinks 
IVfean UpperCI LowerCI 
7462 
46.3 46.7 45.9 
69.7% 70.7% 68.6% 
Non-Integrated 
Mean UpperCI LowerCI 
4.1% 4.6% 3.7% 
4.0% 3.6% 4.5% 
13.8% 14.6%) 13.0% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
3.1% 3.5% 2.7% 
5.3% 5.8% 4.8% 
76.4% 77.4% 75.5% 
18.1% 19.5% 16.7% 
5.5% 5.9% 5.0% 
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All the patients in both cohorts have a diagnosis of depression (a chronic disease) 
and thus they all fit the definition of being complex patients/customers because at a 
minimum they need to return to their PCP for continued care. There are two factors that 
differentiate patients beyond their depression as determined by the literature. These two 
factors are severity of the disease and the level of complexity defined by the number of 
co-morbidities patients have. Because the data were inadequate to control for the severity 
of the depression, the level of patient complexity as measured by the number of co-
morbidities a patient has is the only measure used. 
The patients patronized doctors at 56 IH clinics with varying degrees of 
integration. All the clinics were ranked on a scale from 0 to 5 by the specialists at IH 
according to preset guidelines as to the clinic's adoption of mental health integration. 
Clinics rated as 0 had never been briefed on the program. Those rated as Is and 2s had 
been briefed on the program to some extent and were included in future plans to have the 
MHI implemented at the clinics. Clinics rated as 3 had started the implementation process 
in a very limited fashion. The clinics had started passing out PHQ9s to their patients, but 
none of the additional support or team members required for integration were operating 
with the clinic. Level 5 clinics had fully implemented and sustained MHI key elements— 
leadership, team-based care, information technology, partnering with community 
resources, and financing. Level 5 clinics demonstrated budget neutral impact on net 
operating income 3 to 4 years after implementing MHI. Level 4 clinics were similar to 
level 5 clinics but were not as mature and may not have had all team members in place. 
Because the 0 to 5 grades are subjective as to their cut off and definition, it was 
determined that all 4- and 5-ranked clinics would be considered integrated and all the 
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others would be considered nonintegrated, creating a dichotomous variable. Level 4 and 5 
clinics are integrated (MHI clinics) and 0 to 3 clinics are considered modular (non-MHI). 
In this study the 10 level 4 and level 5 clinics were considered integrated, while the 
remaining 46 clinics with ratings from 0 to 3 were considered nonintegrated. 
2.4.2 Matching Clinic Demographics to Ensure Accuracy 
In one of my discussions with researchers at IH, the concern was brought up that 
the demographics of the clinics might be a deciding factor in the results. To be 
conservative, an additional cut of the data was made to control for demographics by 
matching clinics. In an earlier study with a separate group of data, IH researchers had 
matched four non-MHI clinics to four MHI clinics by size, insurance mix of patients, 
rural versus urban, and size of doctor staff. The SelectHealth data set was used. These 
tests singled out the four non-MHI clinics and the four MHI clinics singled out by IH in 
their previous study. The sample size dropped from 2,991 to 589. While 589 is a 
statistically strong sample size, the number of patients with multiple co-morbidities in 
this matching data set drops significantly from the full data set, thus decreasing the power 
of the tests for the interaction effect. I used the same process to test all three data sets and 
present all the results in unison. 
2.4.3 Testing Procedures for All Hypotheses 
If linear regressions are used to predict count outcomes, they may result in 
inefficient, inconsistent and biased outcomes; it is safer to use models specifically 
designed for count outcomes (Long & Freese, 2006). 
Count outcomes are unique because the outcomes are not continuous, but divided 
into specific response outcomes. For example, visits to the ER for each patient can be 
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counted exactly; a patient either has 2 or 3 visits to the ER: not 2.5. Because outcomes 
are not continuous, count regressions are required. To understand count regressions, it is 
important to first understand the Poisson regression in its basic format as displayed in 
Equation 1 (Long & Freese, 2006). 
(1) Pr(y | ii) = e-^f for y = 0,1,2, 
where fi is the number of expected times an event will occur in a fixed period of time; 
thus, in my study fi is the expected number of times a patient will go to the ER between 
2006 and 2008, y is a random variable indicating the number of times an event did occur, 
or the number of times a patient did go to the ER. Some patients, of course, will go to the 
ER more times than the average and sometimes less than average. The expected count, fi, 
is related to the probability of the observed count y as specified by the Poisson 
distribution where fi is > 0 (Long & Freese, 2006). 
According to Long (1997) there are four characteristics of the Poisson regression, 
which are important to remember when considering count regressions. 
1. JU is the mean of the distribution. As ft increases, the mass distribution 
shifts to the right. 
2. ft is also the variance. Thus Var (y) = fi, which is known as 
equidispersion. In real data, many count variables have a variance greater 
than the mean, which is called overdispersion. (This is an important 
consideration in light of my eventual use of the Negative Binomial 
regression.) 
3. As fi increases, the probability of a 0 count decreases. For many count 
variables, there are more observed zeros than predicted by the Poisson 
distribution. In reality many count data sets do not follow the Poisson 
distribution. 
4. As fi increases, the Poisson distribution approximates a normal 
distribution, (p. 350) 
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These restrictions often make the Poisson a poor fit, especially in the face of 
heterogeneity of action, because the Poisson distribution considers all counts as 
independent. For example, if a Poisson regression predicted the number of articles a PhD 
could be expected to publish during his/her career, it most likely would perform very 
poorly; there would be a large 0 count for the number of PhDs who enter industry, and 
there would also be an additive effect from PhDs who do publish becoming more likely 
to publish again. Large 0 counts and the additive effect from the propensity of actors to 
perpetuate activities at which they gain competence causes overdispersion in the 
regression model; thus a model less constricted than the Poisson model is required (Long 
& Freese, 2006). 
The negative binomial model accounts for over dispersion in the following 
manner. If the Poisson regression could be supposed to have the following generic 
formula with three independent variables (Long & Freese, 2006): 
\i = exp (ft + ft xtl + ft xi2 + ft xi3) 
The negative binomial regression could be considered to add an error term to the 
equation, which is uncorrelated to the x's. 
H = exp (ft + ft xtl + ft xi2 + ft xi3 + £i) 
H = exp(/?0 + ft xn + ft xi2 + ft *ia) expfo) 
li = exp(ft + ft xix + ft xi2 + ft xi3)Si 
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We assume S is drawn from the gamma distribution (Long, 1997). The real telling effect 
is the effect on the variance or dispersion function according to Long and Frees (2006). 
The Poisson variance equation is as follows: 
Var ( y, \ xt) = E ( y, | xi) = //,. 
As the equation demonstrates, this defines equidispersion because the conditional mean 
equals the conditional variance. But in the real world counts are usually overdispersed, or 
in other words the variance exceeds the means conditional variance. The negative 
binomial regression accounts for this variance in the following equation with a. 
Var (yi\xl) = pfr a fxf 
Thus as a approaches 0 the negative binomial regression reduces to the Poisson 
regression. 
In addition to the data being count data, it also has a two-level hierarchal data 
structure, which must also be accounted for. This is exemplified in Figure 6, which 
depicts a traditional hierarchical linear model that I have modified to display a simplified 
MHI environment. 
Normal OLS regression or ANOVAs are insufficient because of the multilevels of 
the data. Each patient is nested in a clinic. By using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
we can separate the variation in the models between the levels of the model, and thus we 























































































































































In the end we want to discover the variation in the treatment type, but we also 
have to take into account that not all the variation is independent since patients treated at 
one clinic should have correlated errors when compared to other patients at the same 
clinic. HLM allows us to isolate the variation at each level and helps us to overcome the 
problem of correlated errors caused by patients using the same clinics. 
Hierarchical models have been popular in educational research for some time but 
are now finally gaining traction in operations research as well, DeHoratius and Raman 
(2008) studied a cross HLM model where the individual products were nested in both the 
store and their product categories to study inventory record inaccuracy. Hierarchical 
models have also been applied to healthcare empirical research in operations. To study 
the effects of operations in nonprofit versus profit nursing homes, Chesteen, Heigheim, 
Randall, and Wardell (2005) grouped patients in nursing homes into a hierarchical model. 
2.4.4 Tests 
Taking all these previous concerns into account I tested and applied the models 
for the first hypothesis in the following manner: 
Y = Total ER encounters over 3 years, X = sex, age, number of co-morbidities, 
care manager interaction, visits to mental health specialists for depression, instacare, 
integrated clinic effect, the interaction effect. 
2.4.4.1 Explanation for the Use of X Variables in Equation 
1. Sex - important control variable 
2. Age - important control variable 
3. Number of co-morbidities - the measure I use to differentiate between the 
complexity of patients. As the patient's number of co-morbidities increases so does 
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his/her complexity. All the patients have depression, and there is the possibility of up to 
five other medical co-morbidities that are closely measured by IH, so a patient's score on 
this variable can range from 1 to 5. The five possible co-morbidities are coronary artery 
disease (CAD), congestive heart failure (CHF), diabetes, asthma, and cancer. One might 
ask, "Are there more medical co-morbidities?" The answer is yes, but these are five well-
defined and well-tracked base co-morbidities, and IH classified these five as the five most 
common medical co-morbidities occurring with depression. Another question is, "What 
about mental co-morbidities?" (such as schizophrenia). Again the answer is yes, they are 
important, but they currently are not as well-defined and traceable in the medical records. 
A third question is, "Is it viable to treat ordinal data (the co-morbidities) as continuous in 
this circumstance because some might think having cancer is a little worse than having 
asthma, for example?" Again, this is a legitimate concern, but as I presented my tests to 
multiple healthcare researchers, they felt it was a legitimate use of the data because 
literature has supported the high correlation between the number of illnesses a patient has 
and the severity of the patient's condition. A final question is, "What happens when the 
diseases are all treated separately as independent dichotomous variables?" All the 
following results were run with the co-morbidities treated continuously and separated 
dichotomous variables, and the answers were consistent. 
4. Care manager interaction - this variable is a count for the number of times a 
care manager accessed and made a notation to a patient's medical record. While an 
imperfect measure, it was the best proxy available for gauging the amount of interaction 
the care manager had with a patient. This measure was used in the equation to assure that 
drops in the use of the ER, PCP, etc. were not simply replaced by greater use of another 
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resource (the care manager). The results were robust to the care manager's presence 
being dropped from the model. 
5. Visits to a mental healthcare specialist for depression - this variable counts 
the number of office visits a patient has with a mental health care specialist for her 
depression. These visits were used as a control in the equation to assure that drops in the 
use of the ER, PCP, etc., were not simply replaced by greater use of another resource 
(visits to the mental health specialists). The results are robust to the medical specialist's 
presence being dropped from the model. 
6. Instacare visits - medicine is making a change and many patients have started 
to use instacare or urgent care more often than they use their PCP or ER. These visits 
were used as a control in the equation to assure that drops in the use of the ER, PCP, etc., 
were not simply replaced by greater use of another resource (instacare visits). The results 
are robust to the instacare variable's presence being dropped from the model. 
7. Clinic effect - The main effect tests integrated clinics (rated by IH's MHI 
group as either 4 or 5) against nonintegrated clinics (all other IH clinics classified as 
either a 3 or lower). It is a dichotomous variable. 
8. Interaction effect - created by multiplying the clinic effect times the number 
of co-morbidities variable. The interaction effect tests the hypothesis that as a patient 
increases in complexity she benefits more from treatment in an integrated clinic. 
This yields the following model: (Total ER Visits) = Constant + Bi*(sex) + 
B2*(age) + B3*(Number of co-morbidities) + B4*(Care Manager Interaction) + Bs*(Visits 
to Mental Health Specialists for Depression) + B6 *(Instacare visits) + B7*(MHI Effect) + 
B8*((MHI Effect) * (Number of co-morbidities)) + e 
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Using the above variables, I tested the data (the testing process is documented and 
described in more detail in Appendix C) using the negative binomial regression model 
(NBRM) with a hierarchal data structure. Long and Feese (2006) recommend the 
following postestimation analysis for count regressions: the Wald test, likelihood ratio, 
measure of fit, and collinearity. The postestimation analysis supported the regression 
results as being consistent and stable. As can be witnessed in Figure 7, the NBRM has a 
superior fit when compared to the Poisson regression, which in early tests also trumped 
OLS regression results. 
Test of Hypothesis 1. MHI patients will use the ER less often than non-MHI 
patients. Additionally, these results will be accentuated by an interaction effect between 
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Figure 7: Model fit 
51 
As shown in Table 3, the highlighted portions are results significant at the .05 
level. Hypothesis 1 is supported with both the main effect and interaction effect. The 
main effect is supported in all three data sets. As displayed in the odds ratio, patients in 
an integrated clinic will have 24% fewer visits to the ER when compared to those in 
modular clinics, and as the number of co-morbidities increases there is an extra additive 
effect of decreasing ER visits by 23.5% as number of co-morbidities increases. The 
interaction effect is supported visually as well as numerically as the data is graphed in 
Figures 8, 9, and 10. 
Test of Hypothesis 2. MHI patients will visit their primary care physician less 
often than non-MHI patients. Additionally, these results will be accentuated by an 
interaction effect between patient complexity and the potency of the MHI process (see 
results in Table 4). 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































mean_er predicted mean_er 
mean_er predicted mean_er 
Figure 9: Fractional polynomial fit mean ER values 
Figure 10: Quadratic fit to mean ER scores 
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Hypothesis 2 is not supported for either the main effect or the interaction effect, 
except in the matched data set; the matched data set does provide support for the notion 
that integrated clinics decrease the amount of PCP visits as witnessed by the P value. In 
the smallest but most controlled data set, the main effect is supported. This is potentially 
a promising result, but would need further study with a larger patient population to 
confirm the results. 
Test of Hypothesis 3. MHI patients will use centralized mental health specialists 
(in the behavioral health network) less often than non-MHI patients. Additionally, these 
results will be accentuated by an interaction effect between patient complexity and the 
potency of the MHI process (results shown in Table 5). 
As shown in Table 5, Hypothesis 3 is not supported for the main effect as 
evidenced by the insignificant P values. When the interaction effect is clearly not 
significant, it is dropped from the regression to provide a more accurate view of the main 
effect. The number of visits to psychiatrists at IH's central mental health clinic does not 
seem to be affected by the integrality or modularity of the service provided. 
Test of Hypothesis 4. MHI patients will fill more prescriptions during the 3-year 
period than non-MHI patients. Additionally, these results will be accentuated by an 
interaction effect between patient complexity and the potency of the MHI process (results 
shown in Table 6). 
As shown in Table 6, Hypothesis 4 is not supported for either the main effect or 
the interaction effect as evidenced from the insignificant P values. The number of co-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































research would suggest, but currently there are no indicators that the integrality and 
modularity of a service affect rate of prescription usage. 
Test of Hypothesis 5: MHI patients will have less total medical utilization as 
measure by allowable charges than non-MHI patients. Additionally, these results 
will be accentuated by an interaction effect between patient complexity and the 
potency of the MHI process. 
Again as Table 7 displays, the hypothesis was not supported by the data in any of 
the data sets. The total cost measure is messy at best, and impossible at worst because it 
is based on SelectHealth's allowable insurance costs, which may or may not actually 
reflect reality. 
2.4.4.2 Summary of All the Results 
Table 8 summarizes the results for each test, displaying first the effect of patients 
having a co-morbidity, then the main effect of visiting an integrated clinic, and finally an 
interaction effect for the cross between complexity and the use of integrated clinics. 
(Note: see Appendix C for greater detail on the tests performed to validate the tests.) 
2.5 Discussion of Results and Managerial Implications 
2.5.1 Discussion of Results 
2.5.1.1 Limitations of the Study 
While the results of this study are promising, the study is limited by a number of 
factors. First, all the clinics were managed by the same firm. Partnering with only IH 
created a number of advantages such as the use of detailed information systems, the use 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































which provided a deeper understanding of the study context. Moreover, in testing 
hypotheses, the study controlled for factors dealing with firm-specific factors such as 
firm ownership, information systems, insurance plans, coverage options, and incentive 
designs for clinics. However, statistically the study cannot claim that the results 
generalize beyond IH. The decision to use a random effects model in the hierarchical 
design will allow the study to be generalized to cover the entire population of 
Intermountain Healthcare, but it would require data from multiple firms before any 
claims could be made beyond IH. That said, other studies that were not specifically 
looking at integrated services but included positive results from healthcare organizations 
that improved handoffs or cooperation (Gawande, 2007; Shah, Goldstein, Unger, & 
Henry, 2008; Tucker, Nembhard, & Edmondson, 2007) give supporting evidence that 
show the hypothesized relationships will hold beyond IH. 
In addition to issues with external validity, there are also issues with internal 
validity. Because the study dealt with archival data, not all variability possibly affecting 
the system could be controlled for in the data set. It is plausible that other unmeasured 
factors such as doctor experience, nurse training, proximity to competition, and facility 
design all influence patient outcome. Variation across patients could be driven by 
numerous other factors such as prior experience with Intermountain Healthcare doctors, 
distance to facilities, employee health promotion, family size, where the patient ranks on 
the "ability" continuum, and other unmeasured factors. 
2.5.1.2 Important Insights 
Through healthcare integration, complex patients receive assistance in navigating 
the healthcare system. There is strong evidence that MHI clinics decrease the amount of 
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rework depressed patients need (i.e., visits to the ER). Additionally, as the patient's 
complexity increases (i.e., more medical co-morbidities) there is an interaction effect, 
which means that the need of depressed patients to use the ER is decreased by a greater 
amount than it is for less complex patients. There is also weaker evidence that it also 
decreases the use of the PCP. 
These results are consistent with a recent article by the award-winning medical 
author and surgeon Atul Gawande entitled The Cost Conundrum (Gawande, 2009). 
Gawande praised health systems like Mayo, Intermountain Health Care, and Grand 
Junction Colorado and highlighted their ability to integrate care between providers in 
behalf of patients. Gawande tells the following story: 
I talked to Denis Cortese, the C.E.O. of the Mayo Clinic, which is among 
the highest-quality, lowest-cost health-care systems in the country. A 
couple of years ago, I spent several days there as a visiting surgeon. 
Among the things that stand out from that visit was how much time the 
doctors spent with patients. There was no churn—no shuttling patients in 
and out of rooms while the doctor bounces from one to the other. I 
accompanied a colleague while he saw patients. Most of the patients, like 
those in my clinic, required about twenty minutes. But one patient had 
colon cancer and a number of other complex issues, including heart 
disease. The physician spent an hour with her, sorting things out. He 
phoned a cardiologist with a question. 
"I'll be there," the cardiologist said. 
Fifteen minutes later, he was. They mulled over everything 
together. The cardiologist adjusted a medication, and said that no further 
testing was needed. He cleared the patient for surgery, and the operating 
room gave her a slot the next day. (p. 6) 
The interaction in this story works much like the "rubbing of shoulders" in the 
MHI model at IH. The consultation by multiple specialists in this story expedited the care 
for this complex patient, which increased her swift and even flow through the system. 
Likewise, MHI increases the swift and even flow for complex patients through the health 
system and decreases their need for expensive ER visits. 
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Service integration increases the swift and even flow of customers/patients by 
decreasing the burden of customers' role as designer and supplier in the service supply 
chain. Integration can do this by co-locating services, coordinating services, or both. 
2.5.2 Managerial Implications 
2.5.2.1 Service Design 
The theory presented in my dissertation challenges service providers to think 
beyond the simple tasks that they are providing to their customers. Service providers 
considering the advantages of integration must ask: "What other tasks might my 
customers be attempting to accomplish when they visit my service (How are they 
complex)?" "How can I provide these additional services, or how can I assist my 
customers in obtaining these services?" For example, Best Buy locations that include 
stereo installation service sell far more car stereos than Best Buy locations without them. 
Additionally, the more likely a service is to provide service to complex customers, 
the greater the benefit customers will receive from its integration. Integrated Healthcare 
systems have been singled out as a vehicle for cost containment by our President and 
others (Gawande, 2009). Recent articles have also promoted educational advantages of 
using technology to engage parents and students more completely, which increases 
educational outcomes. Technology has the ability to facilitate service integration in a way 
unthinkable even 10 years ago (Butler et al., 1996); thus, there is a window of 
opportunity for service providers to better serve their most complex customers at lower 
costs. One need go no further than the mailbox to see offers of integrated billing from 
phone and cable companies. 
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2.5.2.2 Possible Pitfalls From Blindly Integrating 
While integration does have benefits especially for the complex customer, there 
are dangers in following this strategy blindly. 
1. Integration is difficult to orchestrate and to sustain. The Mayo Clinic has 
introduced two new operating sites outside of its original Minnesota location. Each site 
took at least a decade to develop and mature (Gawande, 2009). Likewise, IH started MHI 
10 years ago, and needed a grant to fund its instigation. Other fully integrated facilities 
like Shouldice have yet to be successfully replicated. 
2. Integration increases complexity in the service environment for the service 
provider (see Appendix B for detail). 
3. Those who get the benefit may not pay the price. IH's primary care clinics 
support and pay for the training of MHI staff, and yet one of the primary beneficiaries are 
the local hospitals and insurance plans. Without integrated pay systems, the costs and the 
benefits are unequally distributed. 
4. Service integration requires a long-term outlook because many benefits will 
only be reaped in the long-run. For example, integrating curriculum at a high school or 
university in the long-run may increase the learning of students (especially for the more 
complex students) and eventually increase the university's or high schools stature and 
reputation, but in the short-term, there will be large up-front costs to facilitate integration 
and create buy-in by disparate departments or decrease incentive complexity (see 
Appendix B). 
5. Integration on any level increases fixed costs and demands larger flows of 
customers to produce profits. For example, as universities add degrees they increase 
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integration by co-locating services, but this also requires an increase in overhead and a 
larger student base to cover those costs. Additionally, patients have to stay in the 
integrated system long enough to experience long term reduced utilization. If the patient 
moves in and out of MHI and non-MHI you would likely not see the reduce utilization. 
This is one of the reasons the patients were mapped to clinics and why the patients in the 
samples were required to be continuously mapped to either MHI or non-MHI clinics. 
2.5.2.3 How to Handle the Complex Customer 
There are three ways to handle complex customers entering your service 
environment: specialize, facilitate, or integrate. 
2.5.2.3.1 Specialize and treat them simply. Many service providers will 
succeed by ignoring their complex customers' needs and treating them like a simple 
customer who visits the service provider with one single need, returning home 
afterwards. This may be the best strategy for many providers because it allows them to 
specialize and become deeply knowledgeable and efficient at one task. So although the 
provider's scope is limited, the quality and price differential offered by the modular 
service provider encourages both simple and complex customers to enter the service 
queue. For example, there is a low priced gas station near my home, which I have visited 
at least 10 times, but I have never been inside the station because I have always used the 
pay-at-the-pump service. Complex customers entering this environment know all the 
design and supplier functions rest on their shoulders; in most instances, this is how the 
customer prefers it. 
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2.5.2.3.2 Facilitate. To facilitate a complex customer, a service provider can 
design their service to help customers integrate their needs without going all the way. In a 
sense the provider attempts to increase the customer's ability to design their own service 
process without providing the service for them. For example, a physician wanting to 
implement MHI, but not having the advantage of the IH's structure, could develop 
relationships with local psychologists to whom he could refer patients and have back and 
forth conversations between visits. Facilitation could also occur through location. A 
restaurant positioned near a movie theater increases integration for customers looking for 
a night out. McDonald's invested in Red Box and started its growth by providing spots 
for the machines outside their restaurants. In this way, McDonald's facilitated integration 
for its customers. 
2.5.2.3.3 Integration. Service integration for the complex customer will always 
have its limits because of the heterogeneous nature of customer demand and the extra 
expense integration often incurs to implement, but carefully detailed integration concepts 
can increase service and can increase profits. The Disneyworld resort hotels and cruise 
lines have increased revenues and profits for Disney, but neither chain can compete with 
more modular and lower cost service options. There is a certain subset of complex 
customers for whom these chains provide the greatest benefit; if these complex customers 
are sorted and marketed to efficiently, Disneyworld can be profitably service both the 
complex and simple customers. The process is not for the faint of heart and must be 
managed carefully, but the thoughtful service provider will find profit in serving the 
complex customer from retail to healthcare and from recreation to education. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SERVICE INTEGRATION AND MODULARITY 
3.1 Integrated Versus Modular Service Design 
3.1.1 Chapter Preview 
While discussion of product modularity is a well-documented stream of literature 
(Fixson, 2007; Salvador, 2007), service modularity and integration have received scant 
attention. 
This chapter builds a theoretical base as well as a definition of modularity and 
integration in the service environment. This chapter's theoretical base draws heavily upon 
the literature of product modularity and other service management literature to create 
testable research propositions. The propositions can be applied to specific service 
environments and can inform decisions in practice and research. 
This section purposefully strays away from discussions about IH's MHI model, in 
order to broaden the theoretical base of service integration to all service processes. Its 
purpose is to become a standalone theoretical paper. 
The 2 x 2 model, the definitions, and the propositions are all significant 
contributions. I will end the chapter with future research questions for validating and 
extending the theoretical propositions. 
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3.1.2 Service Design 
The service design literature says very little about modularity versus integration in 
contrast to the product design literature in which the scholarship is deep and well defined 
(Fixson, 2007; Salvador, 2007). Its absence is neither because the topic has been ignored 
nor because it is unimportant. Quite to the contrary, the service design literature, which is 
deep and growing (Tsai et al., 2007), covers many of the facets of service integration but 
describes the process in a drastically different manner than product design literature, thus 
obscuring the topic. For example, Shah et al. (2008) describes the process of multiple 
health organizations banding together to synchronize care and reduce heart attack 
fatalities, but the authors never mention the process of integrating modular service 
process, which facilitates the success of the enterprise. Likewise, Froehle and Roth 
(2007) recommend the building of complementary resources and capabilities to increase 
capability and the speed of service design, which could also be amended to declare the 
need for integrating current process or creating complementary modular processes. 
One of the reasons for this lack of clarity in the service design literature derives 
from its focus on service providers. The literature, while highlighting the importance of 
customer satisfaction, correctly addresses management (because managers are their 
audience) by testing firm-level data and encouraging changes in the way management 
perceives or approaches service design. The literature does describe the way customers 
view the service process or interact with the process (i.e., Alam & Perry, 2002). It can be 
likened to a response one might receive from an Intel executive if the executive were 
asked, "Are you a modular corporation?" The executive would most likely tell the tale of 
how chip design, sales, marketing, and manufacturing all work seamlessly in an 
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integrated fashion to create the most powerful chip producing company in the world. And 
from the executive's perspective, she would be right; on the other hand, if the same 
question were asked of Intel's customers, they would most likely comment on the 
modular nature of Intel's product and how it can be plugged into a multitude of diverse 
computer products. Thus the idea of modularity versus integration is obscured by the 
management literature's focus on its customers: management. 
This study contributes to the literature in three primary ways. First, it defines 
modularity and integration in terms of service management and differentiates them from 
definitions used in product design. Second, it highlights how the amount of service 
integration increases along the vectors of location and coordination (i.e., as services 
physically co-locate and as they coordinate more they become more integrated). Finally, 
it translates accepted research propositions proposed by Schilling (2000) in AMR, which 
focus on when systems move toward and away from integration into service management 
propositions. 
3.1.2.1 Product Design Literature 
Because the product design literature richly describes modularity and integration, 
this paper will draw heavily upon product design literature to build the definition of 
service integration and modularity. Schilling (2000) begins her paper on the theory of 
modularity in the following way: 
Modularity is a general systems concept: it is a continuum describing the 
degree to which a system's components can be separated and recombined, 
and it refers both to the tightness of coupling between components and the 
degree to which the 'rules' of system architecture enable (or prohibit) the 
mixing and matching of components. Since all systems are characterized 
by some degree of coupling (whether loose or tight) between components, 
and very few systems have components that are completely inseparable 
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and cannot be recombined, almost all systems, to some degree, modular, 
(p. 312) 
The product design literature stresses that modularity and integration are not meant to be 
black and white concepts but rather two ends of a continuum that can only be measured 
by contrasting products or systems. Likewise, service processes should also be viewed as 
a continuum of service products, varying between levels of modularity and integration 
contained in the service process. 
Because modularity and integration are continuums, the concept of a module or a 
component must be defined to assist our ability to contrast service processes on a 
continuum. The product design literature has treated modules and components 
inconsistently (Salvador, 2007); for example, some suggest modules are like chemical 
compounds and physically nonseparable parts of larger products (Pine, 1993); others 
allow simple component parts to be considered potential modules (Kusiak & Huang, 
1997); while others suggest modules must have some complexity (Baldwin & Clark, 
2000). Finally, some suggest only discrete components and subassemblies, which are 
separable parts of larger products, should be considered as modules (Lele & Karmarkar, 
1983). Out of the many definitions, I prefer Ulrich's definition of a component because it 
could easily describe service process and is synonymous with module. 
I define a component as a separable part or subassembly.... a component 
can be thought of as any distinct region of the product, allowing the 
inclusion of, for example, a software subroutine in the definition of a 
component. (2007, p. 2) 
McClelland and Rumelhart's definition is also similar: 
A module is a unit whose structural elements are powerfully connected 
among themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements in other 
units. Clearly there are degrees of connection, thus there are gradations of 
modularity, (as cited in Baldwin & Clark, 2000, p. 61) 
72 
For the remainder of the dissertation I will borrow Ulrich's definition of a 
component/module and liken it to an independent service routine, which can be separated 
from a larger service routine and be performed by the customer or an additional service 
provider. 
As it applies to physical products, modularity is viewed as follows (e.g., Baldwin 
& Clark 2000): A modular product architecture is one where there is a well-defined 
interface connecting modules (or components). Within any given module, a change in the 
design of one part can have a big impact on the performance of each other part (there is a 
high degree of interaction between the parts inside that module). For example, if you 
change the diameter of the pistons in the engine of a car you may also have to change the 
design of the piston rings, connecting rods, crankshaft, and a host of other parts. But 
across modules, a change in the design of a part in one module has little impact on the 
performance of a part in a different module (there is little interaction between parts across 
modules). Again using the car example, changing piston diameter may not significantly 
impact transmission design. The modular design requires that tight specifications be 
developed to define the interface between modules—these specifications define exactly 
what each module is supposed to "deliver" in terms of output and performance. At the 
interface between the engine and the transmission there is a standard flywheel interface. 
In contrast, an integral product architecture is one where the components have a 
high degree of interaction. Ulrich defines it this way: "An integral architecture includes a 
complex mapping from functional elements to components and/or coupled interfaces 
between components" (Ulrich, 2007, p.3). 
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It is generally accepted that an integral architecture offers the highest possible 
level of performance, as every component in this design can be tailored to deliver the 
very best performance for the product as a whole. Some research suggests that innovation 
breakthroughs happen most often in integrated products (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001) 
because in a modular design, it may be necessary to compromise on any one part in order 
to make that part independent from parts in some other module. But an integral design 
has disadvantages, in that it may not be flexible enough to handle different customer 
preferences and needs. If you had a fully integral car and wanted to offer both 4-cylinder 
and 6-cylinder engines, each version of the car would be its own entirely unique design, 
whereas a modular design would allow you to simply swap one engine for the other. 
The product design literature accepts the design structure matrix as an instrument 
to measure the continuum of product integration and modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 
2000). Smith and Eppinger (1997) present the basic model of a design structure matrix 
(see Figure 11). The design structure matrix maps the components affected by the change 
in a singular component; thus the most integrated component in the system is component 
two, which if changed would require the change of the other three components. The 
stronger the connections and the more complex the interface between components, the 
greater the measurement of the product's integration. 
In products, multiple modules or components must be involved in the construction 
and use of the product for the discussion of modularity and integration to even apply. For 
example, having a conversation about a crowbar made of single bar of steel as being 
either modular or integrative in design is nonsensical. It only has one module; thus it can 
be neither modular nor integrated in design. The product must have multiple components 
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Figure 11: Basic design structure matrix 
before modular and integrated designs can even be compared. Services also require this 
same constraint. 
Customers must have a need for multiple services before we can compare the 
modular versus integrated responses to their needs. A customer who only needs gasoline 
will not interact with either a modular or integrated service process because a single 
service process like a crowbar cannot be defined on the modular to integrated service 
process continuum. 
To summarize and simplify the conclusions in the literature, integral products 
have components bound together with complex interactions and multiple interfaces that 
are not easily separable and increase the value of the product by their interaction; in 
contrast, modular product designs have well-defined interfaces but their interactions are 
more loosely connected and easily separable. 
3.1.3 Integration and Modularity in Services 
The basic differentiating factors in product modularity, interaction management 
and interface management also apply to service design, but there are some subtle 
differences in service design, which creates problems when a direct transfer of 
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terminology is attempted. For example, Baldwin and Clark (2000) claim modular 
products have well-defined interfaces between modules. In modular services, what is the 
well-defined interface between services? I propose the interface is the customer 
(Sampson & Froehle, 2006), which is hardly a well-defined or reliable interface! For 
example, Biognano and Boutwell (2009) document an epidemic of hospital readmission 
creating 12 billion dollars in extra costs in the country. Surprisingly, most readmitted 
patients never connect with primary care physicians to receive needed and extended care. 
It was the patient/customer's job to be the interface between these processes, but they 
failed to perform their task in an adequate manner, causing unnecessary hospital 
readmissions. 
Frei (2006) defines the five types of variation customers introduced into service 
production processes, demonstrating their inability to be a well-defined interface. They 
are generally a very heterogeneous interface, causing significant differences in defining 
integration and modularity in services. In addition to customers not being well-defined 
interfaces, they also are quite variable in their ability to manage interactions between 
service modules. 
To continue the analogy of the automobile, to create an end-use vehicle, both the 
modular vehicles and the integrated vehicles must do three things: first bring together 
disparate modules, second define their interface, and third facilitate and manage the 
modules' interactions. The difference between modular and integrated vehicles lies in the 
way the modules' interfaces are designed and interactions managed. Because customers 
are an integral part of the service supply chain, two scenarios are possible in services that 
are unthinkable in vehicle product design. 
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First, in services some disparate modules are never brought physically close 
together, because the customer (co-designer: see the next chapter) is in charge of 
selecting from all the available service processes, and the customer can if needed traverse 
long distances to link the service supply chain together. Imagine a car sold to a customer 
where all the parts were connected by long wires, but the parts were scattered across 
suppliers' sites in multiple states. Second, imagine a vehicle in which the modules are 
brought together, but no plans are made for how each module will communicate with the 
other modules because the customer ("designer") will be in charge of communication and 
coordination. Imagine a vehicle where none of the internal parts are connected but they 
are all in one place. 
While both of these scenarios are unthinkable in car production and design, they 
happen daily in services as customers experience modular services, co-designing the 
mixture and order of service process, supplying themselves and their possessions to 
distant and disparate processes (Sampson & Froehle, 2006). In most cases (such as a 
night out), the customer is capable of performing the coordination, bringing together of 
disparate services processes, and acting as a common interface, which is required in a 
modular service environment. Indeed, in many instances the customer demands to have 
the autonomy to configure service processes in the order and manner she pleases; the 
heterogeneity of customers' wants and needs create a fertile environment for modular 
services. On the other hand, modular product companies, like car companies, would not 
dream of giving customers the power of deciding how modules interfaced and in deciding 
how modules communicated. Likewise, iPhone customers have been begging for years 
for the ability to swap batteries out, but Steve Jobs has not yet felt the need to comply. 
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Thus the customer's role as both supplier (Sampson, 2000) and co-designer (see Chapter 
4 for more details) of the service process illuminates two characteristics that both refine 
the customer interface and facilitate the management service interaction: co-location and 
coordination. 
The definition of modular versus integrated services hinges on the role of the 
customer as co-designer and supplier of the service components. I define modular and 
integrated services as follows: 
In a modular service process the customer shoulders most of the burden of 
coordinating and combining services and serves as the primary interface and manager 
between service processes (components). 
In an integrated service offering, disparate service providers communicate, 
manage, and coordinate service in behalf of the customer and (possibly) share location 
(customer takes on a lesser burden of coordination and service management between 
components). 
3.2 Illustrating Integration and Defining Its 
Characteristics 
Consider a customer who wants to buy a night out on the town with his 
companion. This night out includes two simple components: dinner and a movie. He 
could choose Olive Garden for dinner and a visit to the local AMC Theaters 12 for the 
movie. This would be a very modular service offering. He would be required to provide 
transportation and coordination between events. The Olive Garden, which is a totally 
separate service module, may take too long preparing dinner and cause him to miss his 
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show. In this environment the customer is in total control, for better or for worse, in 
coordinating and designing the components in his total service offering of a night out. 
Now consider two other options the customer might have. In contrast to the earlier 
selection, the customer might visit the Megaplex at the Jordan Commons in Draper Utah. 
At the Jordan Commons over five restaurants, an Imax theater, and 16 stadium-seating 
screens are housed in the same complex. The customer choosing to visit Jordan 
Commons now has his options co-located for him and to a certain degree coordinated for 
him by large electronic boards that announce movie start times. The restaurant and movie 
choices are still his to make, but the complex has in some respects simplified his burden 
of service coordination. 
His second option is to take integration even one step further by visiting the 
Alamo Drafthouse in Austin, Texas. The Drafthouse not only co-locates services but 
also coordinates the dinner and the entertainment. The Alamo Drafthouse allows 
patrons to buy drinks, eat dinner, and watch a movie or live entertainment option all in 
one location. By examining online comments from some customers, the Alamo 
Drafthouse finds a loyal following from those who value being served beer while 
watching a movie! 
As the aforementioned example demonstrates, integration has two characteristics: 
location and coordination (see Figure 12). Thus a truly modular service occurs when the 
customer collects and communicates between service processes (see Figure 12, Quadrant 
1: The customer coordinates her entertainment on a Friday night or coordinates her care 
between multiple doctors' offices). These types of services are modular in design (single 
service process in location) and modular in use (meant to be coordinated by the 
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A partially integrated service can communicate between disparate modules for the 
customer but not physically combine the services (Quadrant 2: at Travelocity.com, 
flights, hotel rooms, and rental cars can be purchased and in medical services I could 
have a medical home or care manager who assists me in making appointments and 
follows up with my care); these services are integrated in use by the way they coordinate 
services in the customer's behalf, but they are modular in design because of disparate 
ownership and operation of providers. 
On the other hand, some service providers physically bring the services processes 
together, but do not coordinate the service (Quadrant 3: Disneyland brings together 
disparate rides, shops, and restaurants and allows the customer to choose in what order 
and how many to use, or a hospital with multiple departments requires that the patient or 
her representative decide which departments to activate to create a care plan); these 
processes are integrated in design because of the physical proximity of providers, but 
they are modular in use because the customer acts as the coordinator of the service 
process. 
Finally, the process might become fully integrated by physically bringing 
processes together and performing part or all the communication and coordination on 
behalf of the customer (Quadrant 4: A cruise ship that provides restaurants, sleeping 
accommodations, entertainment and concierge service to link the customer to places 
outside the resort if needed and MHI, which combines the services of the mental health 
provider, PCP, and care manager in one office to provide integrated and coordinate care); 
these services coordinate and co-locate, making them integrated in use and in design. 
81 
3.2.1 Quadrants Detailed 
Quadrant 1, modular in design and modular in use: Services in this quadrant do 
not physically bring modules together or coordinate communication between modules. 
All organizing and structuring of service process is left in the hands of the customer. 
Service processes, which can be defined as modular in design and modular in use, 
usually focus on a single service provision, offered quickly and efficiently. If the service 
provides any ancillary offerings at all, the offerings usually complement the main service 
process by adding additional revenue opportunities without requiring excessive costs or 
additional staff. For example, a service station might sell convenience goods in addition 
to gasoline because it requires little extra labor for the attendant to collect revenues from 
gas and convenience items at the same time. Likewise, Jiffy Lube technicians examine 
lights and air filters while changing a car's oil, and if either needs to be replaced, Jiffy 
Lube offers the service at an enhanced price. 
Quadrant 1 service processes treat every transaction as a separate and distinct 
transaction and give the customer the greatest latitude in service process design. A visit to 
a particular gas station last week has no bearing on transactions this week at the same 
station or any other station. If a customer needs multiple service processes such as gas 
and a car wash, the responsibility to coordinate services between disparate service 
processes relies fully on the design skills of the customer. 
Quadrant 2, modular in design and integrated in use: Services in this quadrant do 
not bring the service modules physically together, but they coordinate communicates 
between service modules on behalf of the customer. 
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Many times the choices facing customers with multiple needs are overwhelming 
in their scope and options; services modular in design and use do nothing to streamline a 
customer's overwhelming and difficult choice options, much less assist in finding the 
optimal or even a palatable outcome. Modular in design and integrated in use services fill 
in the gaps for the more complex needs of these customers. Service providers in this 
quadrant literally provide the integration process in behalf of the customers, thus they 
have titles like real estate agent, insurance agent, travel agent and marketplace. These 
service providers do not offer true integration because the heterogeneous nature of 
demand in their market place would make integration exceptionally expensive. For 
example, an airline that purchased hotel chains and rental car agencies in an attempt to 
integrate services in behalf of customers would become an expensive alternative for 
customers not needing all of those assets. Recognizing the high cost of integration 
through ownership, service processes in this quadrant act as bundlers of services ("virtual 
service providers") for customers who are overwhelmed by the difficulty of bundling all 
their service needs. For example, a customer may feel comfortable independently 
contracting with all the service providers she needs (flights, hotels, rental cars, and dining 
options) when returning to visit her parents in Illinois, but when traveling to Indonesia or 
experiencing her first cruise, she might feel overwhelmed at her options and prefer to 
meet with a travel agent. Likewise, marketplaces like eBay offer meeting places for 
disparate buyers and sellers, thus facilitating and streamlining the transaction process that 
would be cost prohibitive otherwise. 
Gummesson (1996) discusses these types of services in the marketing literature in 
terms of imaginary organizations and relationship marketing. Organizations build 
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relationships with customers and bind services together when needed, thus leveraging 
relationships and only tying services together when needed. 
Quadrant 3, integrated in design and modular in use: Services in this quadrant 
physically bring service modules together, but because of heterogeneity of demand, they 
do not coordinate the communication between the service modules. The customer as co-
designer or the customer's advocate is in charge of designing which processes and in 
what order these processes are to be consumed. 
Unlike Quadrant 2 services, the integrated in design and modular in use services 
actually support multiple service providers in a single location, but these providers leave 
the designing and coordinating of the service offering in the hands of the customer. This 
organizational type is an attempt to fully accommodate the customer while still allowing 
for heterogeneity of demand. Disneyland typifies services in this category: It brings 
together a multitude of rides, eating establishments, entertainers, and retail shops under 
one umbrella, thus congregating all the attractions under one management group. Once 
the customer enters the park, she can mix and match the attractions as she chooses, and 
how she designs or coordinates the service is entirely up to her; thus once inside 
Disneyland, the customer experiences a very modular service offering. Many hospitals 
organize in a similar manner to Disneyland by bringing together disparate service process 
into a single location but allowing the service to be provided in a very modular fashion 
(but unlike Disneyland where customers excitedly enter anticipating the experience, 
hospital customers experience most of their joy when leaving the institutions). Helgheim, 
Randall and Bo's (2006) research supports this concept by demonstrating how patients 
with exactly the same diagnosis were treated with such a high degree of variability (as 
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measured by the service processes they received) that it would be very difficult for 
hospitals to achieve economies of scale even for patients with matching diseases. 
A personal experience I had with Primary Children's Hospital in Salt Lake City 
Utah exemplifies how modular general hospital care can be. A couple of months ago I 
accompanied my daughter to the hospital to receive outpatient-style tests. We waited for 
20 minutes in the lobby before being able to check in with the clerk at the hospital's 
outpatient desk. Despite my daughter and my other children having been patients at the 
hospital on previous occasions, the check-in process still required 20 minutes while our 
personal information was taken and linked to past care. After finishing the check-in 
process, the clerk handed us our paperwork and gave us verbal directions for navigating 
the hospital on our own. Since we had never been to that wing of the hospital before, a 
map much like the one distributed at Disneyland would have been more helpful. We 
found the x-ray department first, having obliviously passed the blood-drawing 
department in our search for the nearest service provider. When we arrived at the x-ray 
department, we handed the staff our paperwork. They asked us who we were and why we 
were there: basically the same questions reception had asked us 10 minutes earlier. 
Despite our paperwork from reception, it still required 7 minutes and two employees to 
find us in their system. We waited an additional 20 minutes for care. After the x-ray 
exam, we walked to the blood drawing department. Again they did not know who we 
were, and it took another 5 minutes to find us in the computer system. They again asked 
us to wait, which we did for another 15 minutes. I want to stress that everyone we met 
was kind and competent. We received quality care, but I shouldered the responsibility for 
coordinating my daughter's care. Because of the modular nature of the care, we left the 
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hospital after our second test without anyone taking notice or wondering if we needed 
more assistance; in this way, the hospital experience mirrored Disneyland, except there 
was no smiling-faced hand stamper on the way out. 
It is important to note that integrating services in design is expensive. It requires 
massive overhead that is usually not associated with a single service process. Hospitals, 
theme parks, and universities are top-heavy in overhead and fixed expenses. This is part 
of the reason why some authors are calling for focused hospitals to correct the runaway 
costs in healthcare (Herzlinger, 2007), and why Christensen has pointed to healthcare and 
university education as two industries that are ripe for disruptive business models 
(Christensen et al., 2009; Christensen, Johnson, & Horn, 2008). 
Quadrant 4, integrated in design and integrated in use: Services in this quadrant 
physically locate service modules together and coordinate communication between 
needed service modules in behalf of or in participation with the customer. In this 
quadrant the customer has the least design control over the service process. 
Services integrated in use and in design coordinate service between multiple 
service providers and/or between multiple visits in conjunction with the customer. In an 
integrated environment, the service providers assist the customer in coordinating and 
communicating service between processes and build complex communication networks 
that facilitate multiple communication points between disparate service providers and the 
customer. Additionally, they also co-locate services in one location as much as possible. 
Service design in this quadrant requires committed planning and organizational 
goals aligned with customer needs; thus it is difficult to find service processes that truly 
match the designation of integrated in design and in use. As a service organization 
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expands and adds additional service processes, it becomes more difficult to synchronize 
the goals and objectives of all service providers. Tucker, Nembhard, and Edmondson 
(2007) describe hospitals as complex organizations because hospitals have 
"interdependent work units whose work must be coordinated to provide customer service, 
but whose units often have conflicting priorities" (p. 151). Despite the difficulty of 
integrating services, both Tucker et al. (2007) in neonatal intensive care and Shah, 
Goldstein, Unger and Henry (2008) in rural cardiac care revealed significant 
improvement in patient outcomes when service processes were integrated to achieve a 
particular goal. 
To understand the quadrant design, one has to be aware of the level of focus: 
The description of a service process as either modular or integrated often depends 
on the level at which one examines the process. For example, if a friend were looking for 
an integrated treatment option for her hernia, I would recommend Shouldice without 
reservation as a highly integrated care option. Shouldice hospital seamlessly integrates 
the three service processes: preoperation, operation, and postoperative recovery. 
Shouldice plans meals, therapy, patient meetings, surgery, recovery, and support groups 
all in the same location with massive amounts of coordination (Heskett, 2003). 
Shouldice's care for hernias fits the definition of integrated care because it integrates care 
from the moment a patient arrives at the hospital to the point she returns for her 10th 
reunion. Shouldice physically co-locates these processes and coordinates the 
communication between them in behalf of the patient. On the other hand, if my friend 
had multiple co-morbidities, one of which was a hernia, I am confident Shouldice would 
most likely reject her application on the basis that her case was too complex for their 
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facility. While Shouldice integrates the three parts of hernia care, it purposefully does not 
expand the facility to include more disparate service offerings. In light of this, most 
practitioners would define Shouldice as a modular care system when seen in the totality 
of all healthcare providers. Shouldice, as an integrated facility, offers the "hernia 
module," but relies on other modules (i.e., other facilities) to offer complementary 
treatments to service additional patient needs (i.e., "cancer treatment" module, etc.). This 
leads to the obvious observation that because customers are co-designers to the service 
process, their needs are a factor in determining whether a facility is an integral or a 
modular service provider and in determining which process can best serve their needs. 
Schmenner (2004) theorizes that a service process with a swift and even flow 
produces the more effective outcome than those service processes with choppier and 
slower delivery. I concur with this theory and hypothesize that integrated service design 
delivers to complex customers the best possible service because as it coordinates 
disparate service processes, the customer in need of those processes will have the swiftest 
and most even flow through the service process. If this hypothesis is true, why don't all 
services race to be organized as a Quadrant 4 process, and why are many service 
businesses in other quadrants successful, profitable, and of high quality? To answer this 
question I will return to the product modularity literature. 
3.3 Propositions on the Systems' Modularity and 
How They Relate to Service Management 
In AMR, Schilling (2000) extensively examines the modularity, integration, and 
systems literature to create 11 propositions, describing the forces that drive systems to 
and away from increased modularity. In general, her research propositions are intuitive 
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and precisely written. In an effort to further translate discussion of product modularity 
and integration into a service environment, I will examine each of her propositions 
independently and how they relate to service process. 
"Proposition 1: The degree to which functionality is achieved through component 
specificity will be negatively related to increasing interfirm product modularity" 
(Schilling, 2000, p. 322). 
The proposition reverses itself in service processes: The more a specific service is 
needed or desired than other services in the service supply chain, the more likely the 
service is to be modularized. Highly desired service specialists will be able to financially 
leverage their position in the service supply chain because the customer is most likely to 
favor their access to specialty service provider over their convenience of flow through the 
service system; as the customer, who designs the service supply chain, we yield to the 
module with the greatest veracity in the chain. 
"Proposition 2: The degree of difficulty customers face in assessing the quality 
and interactions of components will be negatively related to increasing interfirm product 
modularity" (Schilling, 2000, p. 322). 
This proposition accurately describes service systems in addition to product 
systems. The more difficult it is for customers to ascertain the quality of one service 
process over another, the more likely the customers are to choose the convenience of 
flow over the variety offered by service modularization. For example, if food and 
convenience items are seen as having little differentiation in their quality, a customer is 
more likely to choose a supermarket, which integrates the sale of all products, over more 
modular specialty shops. 
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"Proposition 3: The degree of difficulty customers face in assembling components 
will be negatively related to increasing interfirm product modularity " (Schilling, 2000, p. 
323). 
Again, Schilling's third proposition also applies directly to service integration. 
The more difficulty a customer has piecing together her service supply chain, the more 
likely she is to value service integration or to rely completely on it. Travel agencies, 
guided tours, and other integrated packages are used more often for international travel 
than for domestic travel. 
"Proposition 4: Greater diversity in technological options available in the market 
will be positively related to increasing interfirm product modularity " (Schilling, 2000, p. 
323). 
This proposition could be restated as, the greater the diversity of service options 
from diverse firms the more likely the customer is to prefer interfirm service modularity. 
Customers do enjoy diversity options, but diversity and choices can also cause customers 
to be overwhelmed. Because the choice of service integration versus modularization 
comes from the customer, this proposition would need to be reworded for services. For 
example, the more heterogeneous the customer base, the more likely the customer is to 
demand increasing interfirm service modularity. 
"Proposition 5: The degree to which firms in the market have different 
capabilities will be positively related to increasing interfirm product modularity" 
(Schilling, 2000, p. 324). 
Again this proposition needs to be restated in terms of the service market. In 
retail, for example, the growth of large grocery stores and super centers have caused 
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small independent (i.e., more modular) service offerings to close. We could restate this 
option a different way for service modularity. The more diverse the offerings in the 
service marketplace, the more likely customers will be to seek out a service provider who 
can integrate the offerings and provide location and organization to service offers to 
facilitate flow for the customer through the services in the supply chain. 
"Proposition 6: The degree to which firms in the market have differentiated 
capabilities and the availability of diverse technological options will reinforce each 
other" (Schilling, 2000, p. 324). 
Restated for service management, the more heterogeneous the customer 
population the more modular the service offerings that will be demanded, but this will be 
counteracted because as service offerings become more heterogeneous the number of 
choices will cause customers to demand the integration and organization of service 
offerings in their behalf to increase their speed and flow through the service supply chain. 
"Proposition 7: The adoption of increasingly inter firm modular product designs 
may result in both the further differentiation of firm capabilities and the development of 
diverse technological options " (Schilling, 2000, p. 324). 
This is basically true as well in services. Restated, as customers become more 
comfortable with navigating modular service operations, they are more likely to demand 
and to be able to facilitate movement through greater modular service process design. 
"Proposition 8: Customer heterogeneity in desired function or scale of product 
will be positively related to increasing interfirm product modularity" (Schilling, 2000, p. 
325). 
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Customer heterogeneity will produce demand for greater heterogeneity in service 
options, which will produce service supply chain options from all four quadrants in the 
service supply chain. It is unclear whether heterogeneity will always push towards greater 
modularization in services because of structural costs. For example, take a city of 35,000 
residents. It may have one central hospital (integrated for healthcare) and multiple stand 
alone restaurants with one or two stand alone theaters (modular for entertainment). As the 
city grows and becomes a town of 100,000 it starts to sprout specialty hospitals 
(increasing modularity in healthcare); it also starts to sprout large joint movie and eating 
options, creating megaplexes for the masses (increasing integration options in 
entertainment). In summary, greater heterogeneity in demand can cause growth in 
multiple service quadrants not necessarily leading to either greater modularity or greater 
integration. 
"Proposition 9: Heterogeneous inputs (diversity in technological options and 
differentiation infirm capabilities) and heterogeneous demands (customer heterogeneity) 
will each reinforce the effect of the other " (Schilling, 2000, p. 326). 
This proposition, which restates and combines propositions 7 and 8, differs 
slightly for service operations. In services, as capabilities become more diverse and 
customers become more heterogeneous, the demand for increased diversity not only 
increases the number of modular offerings, it also increases the amount and the deepness 
of the integrated service options. 
"Proposition 10: If there are pressures to increase or decrease the inter firm 
modularity of a product system, the speed of technological change will increase the 
likelihood of such a change " (Schilling, 2000, p. 328). 
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Technology is an enabler of service supply chain change and does not necessarily 
increase or decrease pressure to move towards increasing modularity or increasing 
integration. On one hand, technology gives customers the power to choose supply chain 
design with greater control and confidence. For example, in the past a customer traveling 
to a distant location employed a travel agent to integrate the needed modular services. 
The internet now gives customers the confidence and ability to snap together their own 
modular offerings. Thus from the customer perspective, technology allows greater 
modularity. On the other hand, technology also allows modular service firms greater 
ability to offer a more integrated experience to customers. For example, Southwest 
Airline now offers car rental and hotels to its flying customers through its web site, and 
the Hackensack NJ medical center uses technology to more tightly integrate its services, 
leading to higher profits and better patient outcomes (Mullaney & Weintraub, 2005). 
"Proposition 11: If there are pressures to increase or decrease the interfirm 
modularity of a product system, competitive intensity will increase the likelihood of such 
a migration" (Schilling, 2000, p. 328). 
The service literature is extensive about the copycatting that happens in services 
because they are so difficult to patent (Tsai et al., 2007). For example, when IH, the 
leading healthcare provider in Salt Lake City, announced a specialty orthopedic hospital, 
the University of Utah medical system quickly followed with a facility of their own. But 
because service supply chains are so easy to manipulate, competitive intensity in service 
supply chains also spawns competing systems. One system will often be more modular, 
while the other system will offer greater integration in the presence of customer 
heterogeneity. A third hospital system in the Salt Lake Area, St. Mark's, separated their 
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orthopedic unit, but kept it as part of the main hospital campus and not as a fully separate 
facility. 
In services, customers are the designers of the service supply chain, and their 
heterogeneity often ends up allowing firms on both ends of the integration spectrum to be 
successful. This is often the case because modular and integrated service firms attract 
different customer segments and often have radically different cost structures and 
opposing effects of the complexity of process management. Because costs and 
complexity play a large role in the balance between service modularization and 
integration, it is now time to address both topics and how they pressure service supply 
chains to offer either integration or modularization. 
3.3.1 Cost 
Service processes that accommodate complex customers through integration face 
increases from two basic categories of costs within a service supply chain: server costs 
and relationship costs. Adding servers and service processes to the basic service process 
increases server costs, which includes direct labor for additional specialists, overhead 
from additional building design and space requirements, additional equipment purchases, 
and additional billing and HR costs. Integrating relationship aspects into a process 
increases relationship costs, which arise as patient needs are tracked and responded to in 
an individualized manner. Customized care across service visits requires either a smaller 
staff-to-customer ratio, which gives the provider the ability to intimately know its 
customer base, or it requires investments in database processes to more efficiently track, 
contact, and provide services to customers over time. This is one of the reasons why 
service typologies single out service customization as a defining service factor (Baumol 
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& Bowen, 1996; Lovelock, 1983; Schmenner, 1986): because to truly customize a service 
usually requires a substantial investment in relationship costs. 
In the presence of demand uncertainty, precisely matching the level of the 
patient's complexity with the level of integration in the supply chain is difficult. Market 
costs of not correctly matching service supply chain design to customer needs includes 
customer waiting costs (patients wait months to receive care and may become worse or 
customers spend long periods of time waiting for dinner or attractions), wasted capacity 
when supply exceeds demands (missed appointments, waiting for a psychologist, empty 
tables in a restaurant), and the cost of lost sales when demand exceeds supply (a patient 
not served ends up in the ER or at another clinic or customers who wait too long in line 
go elsewhere for dinner). 
In manufacturing, all three market costs caused by mismatching supply and 
demand directly affect the profits of the producer. But in services when a mismatch 
occurs, only the cost of too much capacity falls directly on the primary provider (thus 
producers are particularly sensitive to wasted capacity). The market costs of waiting lines 
or of patients who are left to piece together services by themselves only indirectly affect 
the provider. In some cases where the provider is the customer's only option, the market 
costs of waiting lines do not affect the provider at all. Ryan and Wittkins (1977) entitle 
this situation "trapped commitment." The waiting costs and the burden costs of a self-
integrating modular service process usually fall directly on the customer (a vital supplier 
to the service production process). For some customers these costs are more burdensome 
than for others, and for the complex customer these costs can be almost overwhelming to 
shoulder. 
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While integrating services to respond to customer complexity in the service 
process increases server costs, relationship costs, or both, different types of complexity 
have different relative influences on server costs and relationship costs, depending on the 
level and severity of needs underling the complexity. Hence, the association between 
customer complexity and service supply chain structure depends on the relative impact of 
service demand on server costs and relationship costs. For conceptual clarity, one can 
distinguish between two types of customer complexity: server-dominated complexity and 
relationship-dominant complexity. Complexity is server-dominant if the increases in 
server costs associated with increased customer complexity outweigh the increase in 
relationship costs. For example, customer/patient complexity that requires multiple expert 
servers to work in close proximity to fully serve a co-morbid patient requires large 
investments in overhead, hiring costs, billing, equipment, and planning. The University of 
Utah Orthopaedic Hospital has lower overhead and a faster average turnaround time than 
the University of Utah's general hospital for orthopedic surgeries, yet at-risk patients or 
patients with multiple co-morbidities often find their surgeries are scheduled at the 
general hospital instead of the orthopedic center because the orthopedic center is not 
staffed with the necessary specialists and equipment to serve patients with potentially 
adverse surgical outcomes. The orthopaedic center would exponentially increase its 
server cost if it staffed servers to care for all the potential negative outcomes severely co-
morbid patients could experience because these severely co-morbid patients represent a 
small portion of their patient population. Conversely, customer/patient complexity is 
relationship-dominant if the increase in relationship costs associated with increased 
customer/patient complexity outweighs the increase in server costs. For example, 
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customer/patient complexity that requires repeat visits to the same provider for a chronic 
illness has minimal impact on overhead but a significant impact on the relational and 
organizational impact of the service provider. Server-dominant customer complexity 
typically requires substantial investments in fixed costs for each variant, and relationship-
dominant customer complexity is often associated with a high degree of effort to build 
and support relationships. While separating these costs, it should be noted that the vast 
majority of complex customers/patients need both server and relationship support. Very 
few complex customers/patients need only one or the other, and empirically the costs are 
very difficult to isolate. 
Integrating services always increases costs for the server, but the integration may 
result in lower costs for the consumer, which will increase service value and increase 
revenue purchases above the increased costs to the server. For example, if a patient were 
admitted to an ICU it would be dangerous and expensive for her care to be spread across 
multiple locations even if each silo offered the lowest possible cost, and so while full 
level-3 trauma hospitals are expensive to run and operate, they drastically reduce costs 
for customers who need their services. 
Community and research hospitals are often attractive because of the range of 
services and diagnostic procedures they co-locate, but by offering a multitude of 
heterogeneous services, hospitals increase their server costs because of the additional 
expenses (equipment, overhead, hiring costs, etc.), which are required to support such a 
disparate group of service offerings. In grouping all of these specialists together, hospitals 
often assume that they can achieve economy of scale, but as costs continue to escalate, 
the assumption is proving less and less viable. Helgheim, Randall, and Bo (2006) found 
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no pattern of consistent care among patients with the same diagnosis at the same hospital. 
Patients' wide variation in treatment caused them to conclude it would be difficult for the 
hospital to gain economies of scale by including more services. 
Schmenner's (2004) theory of swift and even flow claims that more is needed 
than co-location to increase productivity: For a hospital to achieve faster flow, the 
process would have to be arranged to integrate service processes according to the 
complex service needs of the patient. In support of this concept, Dr. Provonost 
(Gawande, 2007) studied hospitals staffed with internists and found these hospitals 
produced better outcomes in safety and efficiency for patients because, in effect, the 
internist coordinated care for patients in the modular environment of the hospital. The 
relational care can also be facilitated by technology; the digital integration of medical and 
information systems in a hospital in Hackensack, NJ, led to a drop in mortality of 16%, a 
shortening of the average length of stay by 24% (increased the swift and even flow), and 
an increase in the hospital's operating margins from 1.2% to 3.1% (Mullaney & 
Weintraub, 2005). 
3.3.2 Increasing Complexity in the Service Process 
Because integration increases either the number of servers or the number of and 
quality of interactions with the customer or both, it increases the complexity of the 
service processes, and unless this added complexity is managed, it will increase costs and 
slow down the flow of customers through the service process. Through observation of the 
service integration process and through an examination of service typology research, I 
have delineated seven types of endogenous service complexities that need to be 
considered and managed when services are integrated (step complexity, path complexity, 
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definitional complexity, skill complexity, relearning complexity, handoff complexity, and 
incentive complexity). I entitle these complexities as endogenous because unlike Frei's 
(2006) five types of variability, which come from including exogenous customers in the 
service process, these endogenous complexities are the result of choices service providers 
make in designing and positioning their service processes. (Note: to see a detailed 
discussion on the seven types of complexity and how mental health integration at IH 
attempts to manage these complexities, see Appendix B.) 
3.4 Chapter Summary and Discussion 
Modular services require customers to locate and organize service offerings 
whereas integrated service offerings lift some or all if the burden of service process 
organization from the customer. Integration can come for co-location, service 
organization, or both. Integrated services require greater overhead and greater complexity 
management from the service provider, which often makes them expensive unless they 
can increase scale; on the other hand, integrated services increase the flow of customers 
through the service process and often decrease complexity management for the customer. 
In this chapter, the choice between a modular versus an integrated service system 
has been treated as a customer preference or a decision about convenience, thus the 
choice becomes nothing more than a marketing tool for service providers to differentiate 
themselves from other providers. On the other hand, if the choice between modular and 
integrated design affects the quality of the service offering for certain customer groups, 
the choice becomes a vital design issue for those service providers who must or chose to 
serve these niche customer groups. For example, recent studies (Bisognano & Boutwell, 
2009) on hospital readmissions uncovered 12 billion dollars in unneeded readmission 
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expense because customers were unable to manage the home care portion of their service 
process. Unlike Shouldice, which integrates the after-surgery care process with their 
surgical procedure, most hospitals modularize and leave the integration of postoperative 
care in the hands of patients. Studies seem to indicate that a large portion of patients find 
their supplier role in this process is overwhelming (Bisognano & Boutwell, 2009). While 
this chapter has attempted to broaden the discussion of service integration beyond 
healthcare, it is important to remember that integration is more than a simple convenience 
choice: It is also a quality choice. Because the study of modularization and integration in 
services requires customers to have multiple needs (this is further developed in the next 
section), it also foretells high amounts of customer heterogeneity and variation (Frei, 
2006). This variation allows service operations in every corner of the quadrant to be 
successful in the market place when correctly positioned with customers. Customers' 
heterogeneity in demand and heterogeneity in ability to piece together service supply 
chains will always demand from the market an ebb and flow between service modularity 
and integration. 
3.4.1 Future Research 
Future research in this area includes the examination of the benefits of service 
coordination in comparison to service performance. For example, many privately 
practicing doctors perform surgeries on hernias using the Shouldice methods. An 
experiment could be performed, holding constant patients' acuity, comparing surgery 
outcomes between the modular and integrated service designs. 
Research could also answer questions about the advantages gained from co-
location compared to the advantages of coordination, to see which is more important or 
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cost effective. For example, if we simply locate specialists in the same office complex 
will we have the same resulting care as coordinating care? And would care coordination 
without co-location provide an equivalent level of care without the added costs? 
Additionally, questionnaires about a customer's perceived burden in care 
coordination might also be revealing to understand the burden customers feel they are 
under in modular care. Similar questionnaires could be distributed to college freshman to 
understand the burden they feel in their coordination responsibilities. 
CHAPTER 4 
COMPLEX CUSTOMERS AND THEIR EFFECT ON 
THE SERVICE SUPPLY CHAIN 
4.1 The Complex Customer and How This Customer 
Shapes Our Understanding of the 
Service Supply Chain 
4.1.1 Chapter Preview 
This chapter will define the complex customer and describe how this customer 
redefines how the service management literature understands the service supply chain. The 
complex customer opens the door to the customer as co-designer of the service supply chain, 
and as co-designers, these customers receive benefits from service integration because it 
assists them in their role as designer. This chapter builds specifically on Sampson (2000), and 
it adds dimension to customer/supplier duality. This chapter, like Chapter 3, is an attempt to 
broaden the concepts in the main study to the entire service operations field; thus MHI will 
not be explicitly used. There will be medical examples into which MHI could be inserted 
because these ideas were generated from the process of going through the main study. This 
paper is meant to eventually become a stand-alone theoretical article. It details the managerial 
implications of serving complex customers and possible future research. 
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4.1.2 Introduction 
Sampson and Foehle (2006) in the their unified services theory define a service 
process as a process "where the customer provides significant inputs into the production 
process" (p. 331). In other words, a service is a service because of direct customer inputs, 
and these inputs are a necessary and sufficient part of the process for it to be labeled as a 
service. 
The theme of how customer inputs define and affect the service process 
experience permeates the literature. Frei (2006) describes five distinct types of variability 
that customers introduce into service processes (arrival, request, capability, effort, 
subjective preference), and multiple authors (Chase, 1978; Kellogg & Chase, 1995; 
Mersha, 1990; Schmenner, 1986; Verma & Young, 2000) demonstrate how the amount 
of customer contact (or intensity of inputs) affects the efficiency and management of a 
service process. Additionally, the literature has also focused heavily on the level of 
customer involvement and the level of customer discretion within the service process, 
and how these levels affect service process efficiency (Lovelock, 1983; Mills & Morris, 
1986; Schmenner, 1986; Wemmerlov, 1990). In summary, it is clear that having a service 
means dealing with customer inputs. 
Most services consist of a single transaction, such as eating out at the Olive 
Garden or having one's oil changed at Jiffy Lube. In these simple transactions, what one 
orders or does not order during a previous visit has little to no influence on the process or 
experience of the following visit to the Olive Garden; thus for the Olive Garden to 
provide a customer with a quality service, there is no need to transfer customer 
information between visits or between other service providers. 
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Jiffy Lube, the Olive Garden, and a million other service settings act as the 
genesis for the majority of our service supply chain research questions. The research, 
generated from the view of the firm, examines the process the firm goes through to 
deliver a service to its customer. While this examination has produced excellent research, 
it misses the unseen portion of the service supply chain, discounting and dismissing the 
full role customers play in the supply chain when they bring multiple inputs into the 
service process. To capture the intricate role the customer plays requires moving past the 
role of the firm to examine fully the role of the "complex customer." 
This chapter contributes three main items to the literature of service management 
and service supply chains. First, it provides a clear definition of the complex customer. In 
addition, it examines the role of the complex customer in the service supply chain, and 
how an understanding of this role changes the dynamics of the role of services. Finally, 
this chapter will address the management implications of servicing the complex 
customer. 
4.1.3 Defining the Complex Customer 
"A service is a process where the customer provides significant inputs into the 
production process" (Sampson & Froehle, 2006, p. 331). The basic customer is one who 
has a simple need, and this customer provides a single input into a process. A customer 
arrives at Jiffy Lube and simply needs her oil changed. This simple customer provides a 
single input—her car—to the system, and she receives a quick and efficient oil change. 
Similarly at the Olive Garden, the customer gives her single input, her dinner order, and 
she is served an authentic Italian meal. On the other hand, the dynamics change and the 
customer moves from being simple to being complex if the customer needs a car wash in 
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addition to her oil change or is looking for a night out on the town and not only authentic 
Italian pasta. 
A complex customer is defined to be one who: 1) demands multiple 
processes, 2) experiences interactions between these processes, and 3) 
could benefit from assistance in managing the interactions and interfaces 
between these processes. Customer complexity increases with the number 
of processes, the extent of interactions, and the degree of customer 
ineptness in managing service interactions and interfaces. 
Why is this definition important? 
Recent studies have shown that 88% of Americans over 65 have more than one 
chronic disease and 25% have more than four (Wagner, 2001), demonstrating the extent 
to which service providers deal with complex customers. Customers with chronic and 
multiple diseases need their care coordinated between multiple service providers and 
across time, defining them as complex customers. By their very nature, they demand a 
new paradigm in the way we view the creation of service supply chains. It is actually 
through this new lens of seeing the obviously complex medical patients/customers, that 
we can also view less obviously complex customers (the Jiffy Lube customer who needs 
an oil change and a car wash and the Olive Garden customer who really wants a complete 
night out) as complex customers. 
4.2 The Complex Customer in the Service 
Management Literature 
Despite the role of the customer permeating the service management literature, 
the bulk of the literature focuses on the customer interaction in a single transaction and 
not across multiple visits; the one exception is what Cook, Goh, and Chung (1999) call 
the commitment literature (Goodwin, 1986; Lovelock, 1983; Ryans & Wittink, 1977; 
Wilson, 1972). Yet even the commitment literature is unsatisfactory in this area. For 
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example, Lovelock (1983) delineates services by those whose service processes require 
memberships versus those whose service processes do not (attending Gold's Gym versus 
listing to the radio). This delineation lumps the service I received as a college freshman in 
with the service I receive from my car insurance company. Both services require a 
membership, yet as a freshman, I committed myself as an input into the service process 
on a daily basis. In contrast, as a customer of State Farm, I provided significant inputs at 
the inception of my policy, but since inception, the extent of my input has been to write 
checks every 6 months. The nature of these constant inputs into the service process of 
education makes it an inherently more difficult process to manage and to scale than an 
insurance process. The other writers in this area focus more on the level of commitment 
or relative power inherent in customer relationships as a defining factor (Goodwin, 1986; 
Ryans & Wittink, 1977; Wilson, 1972), and again they are unsatisfactory in their ability 
to address the customer who supplies information at multiple points in the service 
process. 
4.2.1 Three Streams of Service Management Literature 
To approach the issue of the complex customer, this study will relate to three 
streams of research in the service management. The customer as co-producer, the service 
supply chain literature, and the customer/supplier duality. 
4.2.1.1 Customer as Co-Producer 
The customer as co-producer literature engages the customer as a "partial" 
employee because of the customer's role in performing the service (Mills & Morris, 
1986). Customers often gather information for lawyers to assist in the service provided by 
the law firm or engage in activities suggested by their doctors; thus Mills and Morris 
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(1986) suggest that service providers need to provide a level of training to customers. The 
role customers play is so important it was developed into a typology by Mills and 
Newton (1980) to rank customers according to personal interactiveness in the process. 
Indeed, the literature has gone so far as to recommend ways to satisfy and motivate these 
personal employees (Kellogg, Youngdahl, & Bowen, 1997; Mills, Chase, & Margulies, 
1983). More recently, Frei (2006) warned service providers to be aware of variation these 
employees cause to the system. 
The fault of this literature is that it does not expand outside the current service 
process. The customers are simply seen as an employee of the current process. The 
literature pays scant attention to customers' multiple needs that may take them outside 
the service area except for their role in forming and sustaining relationships (Mills & 
Morris, 1986; Ryans & Wittink, 1977). 
4.2.1.2 Service Supply Chains 
Despite the important role the customer plays in a service process, the service 
process supply chain literature has failed to go into great depth about how the customer's 
needs affect the design of the service supply chain. The frameworks and the descriptions 
of service supply chains seem to start from the current manufacturing perspective and 
then gravitate towards services while pointing out the difference in service supply chains. 
The differences are built off of the traditional differentiating factors in services, and 
researchers use those contrasts to differentiate service supply chains from traditional 
supply chains (Baltacioglu, Ada, Kaplan, Yurt, & Kaplan, 2007; Ellram, Tate, & 
Billington, 2004; Sengupta, Heiser, & Cook, 2006). This approach extends 
manufacturing concepts into the service realm; for example, Akkermans and Vos (2003) 
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demonstrated amplification in the telecom service environment, and Ellram, Tate, and 
Billington (2004) extended the ideas of executive purchasing into the procurement of 
professional services. But when it leaves the traditional supply chain design and 
incorporates "pure services" like education and healthcare, most of the literature and 
attempts to use the term "supply chain" seem forced at best. The service supply chain 
literature tries so hard to model itself after product supply chains that it likewise gives 
scant attention to the customer, who mainly becomes the final link in the chain, excepting 
feedback loops. 
4.2.1.3 The Customer Supplier Duality 
Sampson and Froehle (Sampson & Froehle, 2006) make a notable addition to both 
the customer as co-producer and the service supply chain literature by combining their 
elements. Sampson creates a term he calls the customer supply chain duality (Sampson, 
2000). Sampson quotes Lovelock to set the stage for his argument (Lovelock, 1983, 
1996). Sampson (2000) describes how all services can fit into one or more of four 
categories: 
(1) services that act on people's minds (e.g., education, 
entertainment, psychology); 
(2) services that act on people's bodies (e.g., transportation, 
lodging, funeral services); 
(3) services that act on people's belongings (e.g., landscaping, dry 
cleaning, repair); 
(4) services that act on people's information (e.g., insurance, 
investments, legal services). 
To summarize, all services act on something which is provided by the 
customer. This is true. The implication is that all services have customers 
as primary suppliers of inputs. In other words, customers are suppliers in 
all service businesses, which is the customer-supplier duality, (p. 351) 
Or in other words, the service supply chain differs from manufacturing supply chains 
because the customer is both the customer and a supplier of inputs. Because the 
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customers supply their inputs to the service supply chain, they are suppliers (i.e., a Jiffy 
Lube customer supplies her car), but they are also recipients of the service so they are 
customers as well. 
Sampson (2000) continues on to explain that in services there are two basic types 
of service supply chains: 
The simplest form of a bidirectional supply chain is for the customers to 
provide their inputs to the service provider, who converts the input into an 
output which is delivered back to the customer. [This single-level 
bidirectional supply chain is depicted in Figure 13.] 
Things get more complicated when the service provider employs another 
service provider to assist with the processing of customer inputs. For 
example, some electronics retailers offer television repair but outsource 
the actual repair process. The result is a two-level bidirectional supply 
chain: customers supply broken televisions to the retailer who then 
supplies them to the repair contractor. [Such a two-level bidirectional 
supply chain is depicted in Figure 14.] 
Finally, the service firm needs to select the supplier based on relevant 
criteria. The consideration of service suppliers in two-level bidirectional 
supply chains is not markedly different from the decision processes for 
manufacturers. Finally, supplier selection is usually not an issue under 
customer-supplier duality, since it is the customers who choose to be input 
suppliers to the service provider, not the service provider who chooses the 
customers, (p. 354) 
Sampson closes his discussion on the customer-supplier duality by arguing that 
service supply chains rarely become more complicated than the two basic structures 
































Figure 14: Sampson supply chain design 2 
4.3 The Complex Customer as Co-Designer 
While Sampson's theory well describes typical customers, it is inadequate to 
explain the role of the complex customer, which also includes the customer-designer 
duality. For example, visiting Jiffy Lube is a typical example of the first most basic 
service supply chain (see Figure 13). The total service process is finished in a single 
location, by a single provider, at one point in time, and the customer provides one input 
into the process. It would seem that the service supply chain ends after the customer 
leaves the Jiffy Lube garage. But what if the customer also needed her car washed: is the 
service supply chain finished? In this example the customer has two options: She can go 
to two separate service providers—one that provides an oil change (Jiffy Lube) and one 
that provides a car wash (Spray and Wash)—or she can go to her local Lube and Wash, 
which provides both services at the same location. In this instance, the customer needs 
two disparate service offerings and in her customer-designer role she chooses how to 
configure her service supply chain; thus customers not only play the additional role of 
supplier to the service chain, they also play the role of co-designer. 
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The previous example of a customer needing an oil change and car wash is 
relatively trivial when compared to how customers with chronic diseases and co-
morbidities need to see multiple specialists or repeatedly enter the service system. 
Patients diagnosed with diabetes, a chronic disease, will require multiple specialists and a 
life-time of vigilance and doctor visits to keep the disease under control (Herzlinger, 
2007). Consequently, the service they need for their diabetes cannot simply be obtained 
in a single visit or with a single given input. Additionally, many of these patients have co-
morbidities such as heart disease, depression, or asthma. To effectively treat these co-
morbidities, a number of different specialists are required, and only treating one of the 
co-morbidities leaves the entire care incomplete. For example, if co-morbid depressed 
patients are treated for their depression and not for their diabetes, their depression will 
rarely improve. On the other hand, if their diabetes is treated and their depression is 
ignored, it is unlikely that the patient will effectively regulate her diet, causing her 
diabetes to worsen. Additionally, unlike a visit to a car wash where the amount or timing 
of the last service has no bearing on the service received at the current visit, in the case of 
both the co-morbid and chronically ill patients, what transpired during their last visit to 
the doctor relates directly to the care they need to receive during the current visit. So 
unlike the Jiffy Lube example, the customer designs major and sometimes life-altering 
supply chain designs depending on how she exercises her role as co-designer of the 
supply chain. 
Healthcare may be a fertile area to find complex customers, but other service 
industries, such as education, also house complex customers as a rule. Most educational 
services, because of their repetitive nature and multiple disciplines, by definition deliver 
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goods to complex customers. Take for example a college freshman attending her first 
semester far from home. To receive the services of a 100-level English class, she will 
attend the class more than 20 times during the semester (much like a chronically diseased 
patient), and during the same semester she will also require services from multiple 
specialists such as those in chemistry, math, and arts (much like the co-morbid patient). 
Because of the complex customer's role as customer and designer, I propose two 
additional service supply chain designs (Figures 15 and 16), which are derivations of the 
two previous basic service supply chain designs suggested by Sampson (Figures 13 and 
14). These two new supply chains can have two alternate shapes (see Figures 17 and 18). 
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Figure 16: Modular service supply chain for the complex customer - 2 
In the first set (Figures 15 and 16), the customer takes full control of the design of 
the supply and configures disparate visits and service providers to create a complete 
service chain (a modular design). In the second set of supply chains (Figures 17 and 18), 
the service provider takes on the role of service coordinator in behalf of the customer (an 
integrated design). 
Note that Figure 14 and Figure 15 are variants of the two original service supply 
chains proposed by Sampson (2000) in Figures 12 and 13. The main differences in these 
supply chains are the continual inputs received from the customer over the extended 
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Integrated Service System, where the service provider controls and 
communicates service needs between the different specialties. 
Figure 18: Integrated service supply chain for the complex customer - 2 
specialists before she is completely served; thus she must give inputs herself for every 
step in the process. This differs from customers dropping their cars off at a dealerships. 
Even though the car needs to be seen by multiple specialists within the dealership 
to be completely repaired, the customer is not complex because the customer only 
provides one input to the process upfront. After the initial inputs the dealership can work 
much like a manufacturer completing the remainder of the service on the car without 
input. In fact, recent literature suggests that services in dealerships and insurance 
agencies (Brunt & Kiff, 2007; Swank, 2003) benefit greatly by using lean management 
principles to organize, increase quality, and drive out waste in these noncustomer input 
areas. These improvements most notably affect service processes that occur after the 
customer input has been received, such as the processing of insurance policies or the 
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actual repair of the automobile. The service management literature trumps the separation 
of back office (parts where the customer does not supply inputs) and front offices (areas 
where customers do supply inputs) services as an area where efficiencies in services can 
be gained (Chase, 1996; Metters & Vargas, 2000). To summarize, it is important to note 
the complexity caused by the customer either giving multiple inputs into the same 
process (Figure 14) or across multiple processes (Figure 15). 
The service supply chains represented in Figures 14 and 15 are designed to be 
experienced by the customer in a modular fashion. The customer takes all the 
responsibility for the information shared across visits and between providers. Under these 
conditions, while the customer requires multiple visits to be fully served, the design of 
the service essentially requires the designer/customer to carry all the burdens of the 
needed relational interaction and needed coordination activities in the service process. 
Essentially, this means the customer in Figure 14 is complex, but she appears or is treated 
by the service provider as a Figure-12 customer or noncomplex customer. The same can 
be said about the Figure-15 customer; although she has complex needs, she is essentially 
treated by every server as a Figure-13 customer. It is the modular nature of most services 
that requires customers to carry most of the burden of information transfer between 
providers and relationship support across visits. Customers as co-designers of the service 
process often choose to design their supply chain of services in this manner. 
On the other hand, the customer as co-designer could enter a service process 
similar to the two service supply chains in Figures 14 and 15 but differing in that the 
service provider coordinates the disparate service offerings and the relationship support, 
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thus constituting an integrated design as opposed to the modular ones presented earlier 
(see Figures 17 and 18). 
The integrated approach almost always allows the customer to move through the 
service supply chain faster because it contains a seamless service package that resolves 
all of their purchase needs and decreases "designer" related costs to the customer. 
On the other hand, the integrated approach significantly increases costs for the 
service provider. If the service provider is unable to pass the costs on, they might 
abandon the integrated approach and return to the modular approach. If the service 
provider can pass the costs along to the customer, most likely a certain set of complex 
customers will be better off under modularity because managing of their own "designer" 
costs is less expensive than the increased price passed on to them by the service provider, 
despite the benefits of integration. A recent article (Shah et al., 2008), studying cardiac 
service supply chain issues in rural Minnesota, documented all these issues, 
demonstrating increased speed as services were integrated, resulting in higher costs to 
providers, which found it difficult to pass costs along. 
The idea of integrating service supply chains to increase service for the most 
complex customers has a corollary in the physical supply chain domain as manifested in 
the migration of major manufacturers and companies to 3PL and 4PL logistic companies. 
A survey of Fortune 500 manufactures has found they are outsourcing a greater 
percentage of their supply chain and budgets to 3PL and 4PL providers (Lieb & Miller, 
2002). Another study details how the attractiveness of these providers stems from their 
ability to integrate (or in the case with 4PL providers by owning sections of supply chain) 
numerous aspects of the supply chain process, syncing warehousing to transportation, 
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combing trucking with rail, facilitating imports and exports (Tyan, Wang, & Du, 2003). 
As global supply chains become more complex, the value of integrating processes in the 
supply chain as offered by 3 PL and 4PL providers increases as witnessed by purchasing 
behaviors of large manufactures. Likewise, as service supply chains become more 
complex for customers to navigate, the value of service supply chain integration will also 
create greater value to customers seeking to purchase a wide range of services. 
In summary, the customer is not only a supplier to the process, but the customer is 
also a co-designer in the service supply chain. In manufacturing products, the entity that 
holds the most sway in the supply chain is often its chief architect and can coordinate 
portions of the supply chain to achieve better outcomes; the customer as co-designer and 
supplier in the service supply chain shares this responsibility, but often complex 
customers are overwhelmed or unsure of how to optimally perform their duty as designer 
of the supply chain. Service providers will increase customer service as they recognize 
customers' shortcomings as designers, provide support to the designer, and relieve the 
integration costs exacted from the customer. 
4.3.1 Management Implications and Future Research 
Complex customers offer new challenges and new opportunities for service 
providers; providers who recognize the needs of these customers and offer ways to 
facilitate their way through the total service supply chain can increase customer service. 
Educators and parents who act as service integrators for students can generate better 
results (Lewis, 2006). Healthcare providers who integrate care for complex patients have 
demonstrated dramatic improvement of care (Gawande, 2007; Shah et al., 2008; Tucker 
et al., 2007). 
118 
Managers also need to be aware that they do not need to fully integrate to assist 
complex customers. Location can assist. For example, a Jiffy Lube set up next to a car 
wash assists customers with the design of that particular chain, or the Olive Garden in 
Times Square that assists customers look for the totality of a night out are assisted by its 
location. Additionally, service providers can virtually integrate to assist the complex 
customers. Southwest Airlines sells car rental and hotel rooms on its web site to assist 
travelers with complex travel needs. As service managers take the time to understand the 
service design burdens of their customers, they can better assist them by easing their 
burdens and in so doing increase service and customer satisfaction. 
Questions to be probed by future additional research include tests to find out how 
customers who have service supply chain design competence differ from those who need 
extra assistance. What role does price pay in the design role customers choose and the 
supply chain structures they select? Can co-location or virtual integration provide 
customers with a similar service quality level and a decreased price when compared to 
fully integrated alternatives? By how much and in what ways do customers benefit from 
service supply chain integration? Under what conditions do complex customers benefit 
more from integrated supply chains and under what conditions do they benefit more from 
modular service supply chains? Are there ways to diagnose the supply chains customers 
are trying to build quickly? 
As service supply chain providers acknowledge they are often a small part of the 
customer's service supply chain, they can better fulfill their role and can better assist 
customers. 
APPENDIX A 
HOW THE IDEAS OF THE COMPLEX CUSTOMER 
AND SERVICE INTEGRATION INTEGRATE 
WITH THE IDEAS OF SERVICE DESIGN 
A.1 Abstract 
The New Service Design literature does not discuss integration or the needs of the 
complex customer. It does focus on the role of the customer, and in this section I 
demonstrate how the role of the customer could be better understood by examining the 
service process through the eyes of the complex customer, which would make a case for 
integration or for modularity depending on the strategic position of the service provider. 
The key to being able to see opportunities for integration depends on seeing services 
through the eyes of the job the customer wants to accomplish and examining thoroughly 
all the service processes required to complete that job. 
A.2 Introduction 
To give this section form, I will draw from Tsai, Verma, and Schmidt's 
(2007) chapter on service design. 
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(I encourage the reader to study this chapter on service development: its treatment 
of the topic is the most comprehensive I have seen; its summary instructs and teaches as 
it narrows the wide literature into singular points.) The outline they use and the major 
points they derive are all relevant to the discussion of how understanding the complex 
customer and integration will enhance service design. I will begin with a discussion of 
new service development (NSD) typologies because it is important to recognize the 
beginnings of the literature. Next, I will highlight how the four differences between NSD 
and new product development (NPD) relate to serving the complex customer. Finally, I 
will use the concepts of the complex customer and integration to build upon Tsai, Verma, 
and Schmidt's (2007) five Ds: discover, define, design, deliver, and debug. 
A.3 New Service Development Typologies 
Typologies in NSD are often developed empirically or as contrasting elements of 
NPD, and they tend to consist of steps or lists. Following are five examples listed 
chronologically. 
Bowers (1987) used a survey of hospital administrators and an NPD model 
(Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1982) to develop a suggested eight-step process: 1. Business 
Strategy (consider the producer's mission) 2. New Service Strategy (only accept those 
services that support the mission) 3. Idea Generation (providers should have a task force 
to develop and consider new ideas) 4. Concept Development and Evaluation (surveys 
sent out to test positives and negatives) 5. Business Analysis (concerns about profitability 
and capacity addressed) 6. Service Development and Evaluation (detail the service 
blueprint and develop supporting tools) 7. Market Test (pilot test the new service) 8. 
Commercialization (introduction to the public on a wider scale). 
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Scheuing and Johnson (1989), like Bowers, studied the financial industry and its 
new service development processes. Scheuing and Johnson (1989) have the largest 
number of steps of any researchers: new service objectives and strategy formulation, idea 
generation, idea screening, concept development, concept testing, business analysis, 
project authorization, service design and testing, process and systems design testing, 
marketing programming design testing, personnel training, service testing and pilot run, 
test marketing, full-scale launch, postlaunch review. The financial industry's population 
of larger, more stable firms makes its development process more structured and easier to 
study, and possibly the detail and number of steps would decrease drastically with 
smaller and newer firms. Alam and Perry (2002) show significant evidence that the 
process decreases with size. 
Ramaswamy's (1996) eight stages are more parsimonious than Scheuing and 
Johnson's 15 stages, but despite cutting down on the number of steps, their steps remain 
descriptive and do not yet get into more prescriptive, operations, or time saving 
strategies. Ramaswamy's steps are defining service design attributes, specifying 
performance standards, generating and evaluating design concepts, developing design 
details, implementing the design, measuring performance, assessing customer 
satisfaction, and improving performance. 
Alam and Perry (2002) studied the financial service process for developing new 
service process at multiple companies in Australia, approaching the process with an 
empirical bent. They developed 10 stages: strategic planning, idea generation, idea 
screening, business analysis, formation of cross-functional team, service design and 
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process/system design, personnel training, service testing and pilot run, test marketing, 
and commercialization. 
Interestingly, companies considered test marketing as the least important stage, 
while idea generation and idea screening were two of the most important stages. This 
coincides with what Scott Sampson once said to me in a personal conversation: 
"Everyone has experienced a service, so it is intuitively understood and usually 
uninteresting to observe." It could be that service providers are so confident in their 
ability to project the value proposition of a service because they all intuitively understand 
the process; they feel they can confidently do away with test marketing the service as 
long as they properly screen the idea first. 
Additionally, Alam and Perry (2002) found differences between small and large 
organizations in the process development process, but all companies valued customer 
input, particularly in the beginning stages. Large organizations tended to follow the steps 
in order, while smaller organizations tended to do steps concurrently, and uniformally 
across organizations, input in the idea stage was valued as helping the development 
processes proceed at a faster pace. 
Froehle and Roth (2007) reveal the need for resource-oriented practices to be 
included in the service design process, which in the previous literature was wholly 
devoted to process practices. Froehle and Roth argue that service providers need to seek 
out new competencies and tools to develop service practices and not simply examine 
service offerings and ideas they could provide with their knowledge base. They segment 
practices into four main process-oriented NSD practices (design stage, analysis stage, 
development stage, launch stage) and into three main resource-oriented NSD practices 
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(intellectual resources, organizational resources, physical resources). They strengthen 
their theoretical argument by combining it with an empirical survey to demonstrate NSD 
is incompletely understood without the inclusion of resource development practices. 
A.3.1 Summary of Typologies 
The current typologies, while differing on the finer points of the process, almost 
universally cover the same ground in NSD, and their differences seem only minor when 
compared side by side. Thus I have chosen for the remainder of the paper to examine the 
summary points brought out by Tsai, Verma, and Schmidt (2007); for example, while all 
the typologies make homage to the role of the customer in the process, they lack a 
process for developing and understanding the tasks customers are trying to accomplish by 
hiring them. Johnson, Menor, Roth, and Chase (2000) claim the typologies presented to 
date are mainly descriptive; thus they lack a prescriptive process that examines customer 
purposes, making businesses who follow the existing descriptive processes blind to 
customers who are currently struggling within their system and blind to ways they can 
integrate to improve service processes for complex customers. For example, if Froehle 
and Roth had added the idea of service integration to their typology they might have been 
able to focus service providers on what new resources should be developed to increase 
customer flow and not just the need for the concurrent development of resources. 
The creation of the mental health integration process at IH has been very iterative, 
and truthfully at times it has been loosely organized, giving clinics wide latitude on how 
they will implement the integration processes, but the one constant has been a passionate 
desire to assist the most complex customers in their quest to receive total care. The entire 
MHI process organizes resources to increase patients' accessibility to receive total care of 
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both body and mind by bringing mental healthcare specialists into the clinic, tying them 
to the PCP through communication processes and institution support. This vision to 
integrate patient care to include both body and mind has energized outside organizations 
like NAMI and created efforts to bring the patients' families into the center of the care 
process. While the role of supporting individuals and groups had previously been 
considered important in primary care, it was never explicitly made part of the care 
process until the family's role in integrating the service process was considered. IH could 
learn from the service management literature how to formalize the service development 
process, but through the process of integration, it has demonstrated a way to build upon 
these typologies by adding the vision of the patient/customer to service design process. 
Services could include this vision by asking questions such as, "What previous steps 
before my service and future steps after my service will my customer take, and how can I 
relieve their supplier/designer burden through the design of their service process?" The 
real key for this type of design is the ability of the care provider to step out of their 
primary service process and concentrate on previous and future customer steps, a role not 
currently found in service development typologies. 
A.3.2 The Four Contrasting Differences of NSD Versus NPD 
Because Operations and Service Management sprouted out of manufacturing and 
product development, literature searches in services are incomplete without making 
contrasting arguments against product development and manufacturing. The contrast is 
important because surveys done by Griffin (1997) demonstrate NSD is statistically 
significantly shorter than NPD but also much less formal, with 60% of respondents 
saying they have no NSD processes at all. To give the contrasting points structure, I will 
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use Tsai et al. (2007), who make four basic claims of differentiation between NSD and 
NPD. I will cover those four points and further demonstrate how thoughts about 
integration and modularity further differentiate the new service development process. 
A.3.2.1 The Customer Remains at "Center Stage" 
Chase and Dasu (2001) highlight how behavioral characteristics matter in 
services because customers are part of the process, unlike in production where they only 
receive the final product. For example, when a customer purchases an automobile, details 
about the production process such as the car's doors being painted before assembly to the 
car body versus afterwards are unimportant, but in a service, the order of service 
processes can significantly change the outcome of the service process. Chase and Dasu 
(2001) point out how providing bad experience up front and good experiences at the end 
of a process changes perceptions of the process. For example, in a routine checkup with a 
pediatrician, placing difficult experiences, such as a shot to a toddler, at the beginning of 
the process and positive experiences, such as choosing a toy from a gift box, at the end of 
the process leads to an increased positive perception of the doctor's visit in the mind of 
the toddler. 
Because customers are part of service processes, the service process will be 
iterative and nonlinear. Pointing out the nonlinear and iterative nature of NSD processes, 
Menor, Tatikonda, and Sampson (2002) labeled them as process cycles. The description 
of the NSD process as a cycle matches the formation of MHI exactly. In meetings I 
attended where the discussion described the formation of MHI, I was struck by how clear 
the vision of mental health integration was, and how starkly that clarity contrasted with 
the lack of clarity on the other operational details. The process cycled for nearly a year in 
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the original clinic until it became part of the fabric of the clinic. The lead doctor in the 
clinic said, "My clinic would fall apart" when he was asked, "What would happen if MHI 
were removed from your clinic?" 
The service process integration paradigm adds to this first contrast by 
demonstrating that clarity of patient/customer needs must move beyond the primary 
service process to processes not always considered in the purview of the primary service 
provider. For example, while working on my MBA, I took a night class in economics at 
the University of New Mexico. The professor began the first lecture with a calculus math 
review because he realized that the majority of the students needed assistance in bridging 
their previous service from the math department to his economics course. His effort in the 
first lecture paid dividends for the remainder of the semester because it increased student 
understanding and allowed the lectures to flow smoothly. This particular professor has 
received the gratitude of multiple students as shown by the numerous teaching awards he 
has received. 
A.3.2.2 Greater Heterogeneity in the Way the Product 
Is Produced and Viewed 
The customer-centric focus of services and the heterogeneity in customer 
inputs and demands suggest a market environment that is less predictable, 
and one that can change over time as customer perceptions change and as 
new customers are acquired. Iansiti and McCormack (1997) suggest such 
an environment calls for a flexible product development process. They too 
stress the necessity of overlapped activities, continual feedback and early 
launch; offering the examples of how Netscape and Yahoo! Handled beta 
testing. (Tsai et al., 2007, p. 435) 
Integration decreases the amount of heterogeneity in demand that is allowed into a 
service process as assets become more specified and more difficult to coordinate. Thus 
for integration to work properly there must be tools to focus the service on the correct 
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demand streams and to place the service in an environment where homogenous demand 
is high enough to cover the exceptional overhead. MHI has taken this to heart and 
developed the cascade model to separate demand streams into treatment pathways so as 
to not over serve those patients who do not need the extra care and coordination. 
A.3.2.3 Innovative Services Are not Patentable Due to Their Intangibility 
Services are often pushed to the market. Researchers have commented on this 
phenomenon, saying services' intangibility and inability to be patented may be the cause 
of this behavior. Tufano (1989) suggests the first mover advantage comes not from patent 
protection but also from larger market share and early entry. Integrated processes are 
difficult to copy because they are expensive to set up, and so while they may not be 
patentable, their design and set up can be sold. Intermountain Healthcare has shown this 
ability by selling the MHI format to other healthcare organizations. Intermountain assists 
them in setting up model clinics and invites them to visit and interview mature 
Intermountain clinics. In a way, well-performed and orchestrated integration can lead to 
possible consulting or franchising type activities. While firms may not be able to patent 
the process, they can sell their ability to orchestrate and synchronize services. 
A.3.2.4 The Activities of Service Design Are Used to Account for 
Service Perishability Because Service Capacity Is Time-Sensitive 
Given that customer demand patterns affect the allocation of resources in services 
(Verma, Thompson, Moore, & Louviere, 2001), one would expect that integrated service 
processes, which increase cost and complexity, would guard the perishability of resources 
with greater tenacity. MHI exemplifies the issues dealt with in service perishability 
because the margins on providing mental healthcare are so thin that to break even on 
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salaries, mental health professionals must be constantly busy. The more integrated a 
service offering, the less it can afford to have its capacity empty. Certain researchers have 
suggested that creating extra capacity is the key to reining in costs and improving quality 
in production, but in integrated services it may well be the undoing of the service to have 
unused capacity; this may be another reason why copying an integrated service design is 
so difficult. 
A.4 The Five Ds of New Service Design 
Tsai et al. (2007) has boiled the numerous points in the previous typologies into 
five main points, clarifying the important steps in NSD, and paring away the parts that 
muddy understanding and clarification. Again I will follow their outline, and I will 
address each one of the five Ds in NSD and show how a view of service integration for 
the complex customer can build upon and clarify our understanding of the principle. 
A.4.1 Discover 
The literature has been all over the map on classifications of new services. 
Johnson et al. (2000) segment services from a customer perspective, distinguishing 
services as either incremental innovations or radical innovations, a segmentation often 
used in NPD (Chandy, Prabhu, & Antia, 2003). In contrast, Menor et al. (2002) use a 
company perspective to distinguish services on the basis of external versus internal 
newness. Again, I prefer the new typology of Tsai et al. (2007), which distinguishes 
service by company capability versus customer perception. Company capabilities are 
considered the supply side of the equation or similar to Froehle and Roth's (2007) 
perspective on developing resources in order to offer new services, asking which 
resources may be needed to deliver this service, and being cognizant of resource 
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constraints and capacities in the firm. Customer perceptions of the innovativeness of the 
new service are the demand side of the equation, understanding the level of novelty that 
will bring in new customers or drive old customers away. 
My contribution to discovery will not be to add a new typology but to add a tool 
for finding new services. This project is similar to that of Sawhney, Balasubramanian, 
and Krishnan (2004), who recommend looking at the edge of service delivery to discover 
additional services that could be offered in natural succession. In the HBR article they 
tout Kodak's online printing and GM's OnStar service as processes that successfully 
grew by leveraging products to induce services in related arenas. Better examples may be 
the current wind-generated power stations in Iowa and southern Minnesota, where John 
Deere realized farmers, to whom they already offered financing through farm equipment, 
had an abundant natural resource in their wide-open land. John Deere stepped in and 
offered these same farmers financing and a business model that would allow them to take 
advantage of tax subsidies and incentives to build profitable wind farms (Hargreaves, 
2007). In part because of John Deere's efforts, Iowa is now one of the country's top 
producers of electricity produced from wind. 
Likewise, service integration is a task that concentrates on integrating nearby 
services, but it stems more from a customer perspective than a company perspective. The 
question that needs to be asked is: What in the total service process does the customer 
find difficult? IH answered this question by concluding that customers find it difficult to 
receive total care for both mind and body; thus by integrating they hoped to make the 
process easier for the customer. It is similar to Christensen, Anthony, Berstell and 
Nitterhouse (2007) who asked the question, "What job is a customer trying to accomplish 
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with this product?" They give the example of the McDonald's milkshake, which many 
people were consuming as an extended breakfast during a long, boring commute. By 
understanding how and why people were ordering the milkshake, McDonald's was better 
able to market the product. While Christensen et al. (2007) asks a similar question, it is 
not exactly the same. The integration for the complex customer asks, Which process 
might customers find difficult performing on their own, and how can I help them 
accomplish the task? This question takes a process view of services from the customer's 
perspective. Recent research has shown that hospitals have high and needless readmission 
rates (Bisognano & Boutwell, 2009). The readmissions are a symptom of customers 
finding delegated to them a process step which is difficult to manage and in need of 
greater integration. Car dealerships long ago found many customers had difficulty 
navigating the financing side of purchasing, and financing has become an integral part of 
automobile sales to the point that Ford and GM have often made more money off 
financing cars than producing them. In a similar fashion, retail, education, healthcare and 
multiple other industries can find growth through integration by asking themselves, 
Where are my customers having difficulty in the process? 
A.4.2 Define 
Goldstein, Johnston, Duffy, and Rao (2002) alerted the NSD community to the 
fact that NSD service design was missing the idea of the service concept. What outcomes 
and benefits are offered to the customer, what service is delivered by employees, and how 
do the services strategically align to the service concept? New services are often 
contemplated without considering the service concept, and I agree with Goldstein et al. 
(2002) but widen their concern to current service offerings. 
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An excellent educator may have the service concept to be a superior math teacher 
to high school students, but despite the educator's skills in teaching math there will be a 
number of students the teacher will find it difficult to reach because these students need 
assistance bridging their educational gaps between modularized subjects. One such 
example was "Big" Mike: He was essentially abandoned by his parents and living in 
poverty with multiple friends who would temporarily shelter him. He was failing in 
school not because he was not bright enough to understand, but because of his 
deficiencies in reading. The New York Times writes a moving story about a family who 
took Mike under their wing. The mother essentially became the integrator of Mike's 
educational services. As she took control of Mike's education, his grades improved, he 
joined the football team and excelled, he enrolled in college, and was chosen as a first-
round pick in the NFL (Lewis, 2006). Multitudes of well-meaning teachers at Mike's 
school who narrowly defined their service concept led to this complex student failing in 
the system. Likewise, service integration requires providers to often think beyond their 
core business to difficulties customers may be having in completing all their objectives in 
hiring a service. 
A.4.3 Design 
Tsai et al. (2007) emphasize six specific types of service design that need to be 
addressed, which includes both virtual and real facility and information system design: 
Service features design refers to the design and prioritization of service 
attributes to fulfill the service concepts. Service operations design refers to 
the conversion of the new service concept into an operational entity, i.e., 
the development of the operational details of the service itself. Service 
facility design refers to the design of the physical layout of the facility 
(including virtual facility) where the service is delivered. Service 
marketing design involves formulating and testing the introductory 
marketing program with prospective users. Service encounter design 
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pertains to the interactions process between the service provider and the 
customer. Service recovery is designed to help do it right the second time 
since it is impossible to prevent every possible service failure in all service 
encounters due to the heterogeneity and simultaneity nature of services. 
(Tsai et al., 2007, p. 440) 
Service integration adds to this research by asking the question, what services 
should be co-located and what communication pathways need to be developed to 
integrate the relationship between co-located and other sparsely offered services? These 
concerns cross the boundaries between features, operations, facility, and marketing 
design, and it is one of the reasons why integration is such a difficult and expensive task 
to achieve. During the design phase it may be determined it is most palatable to ignore 
the complex customer and not offer integrated service because doing so will raise costs 
significantly for more able customers. 
A.4.4 Deliver 
The delivery of new services covers ideas mentioned by all the typology providers 
such as field and marketing testing, two areas vital to service integration. Alam and Perry 
(2002) found that testing was one of the least important stages for many service 
providers. On the other hand, because integration increases costs and complexity, the 
testing phase will most likely be intertwined with the service development phase. MHI 
required a number of iterations to develop into a truly integrated service offering, 
learning and designing processes in tandem with complex customers and new service 
providers, unable to distinguish between testing and implementation. Integration is more 
inherently a trial and error process in delivery than other NSD projects because of the 




Stewart and Chase (1999) found human error caused a high percentage of the 
service failure in the delivery of services; thus even integrated services need a way to 
track service failures and to compensate for these failures. The area where integrated 
service design can build upon this area is to help managers see service failure as an 
opportunity to possibly integrate services and improve their quality. Last year the United 
States spent 15 billion dollars in hospital readmissions (rework), of which 12 billion 
dollars was preventable (Hackbarth et al., 2007). This service failure is a cue that 
hospitals need to better integrate postsurgical care into the flow of care. 
A.5 Summary of How My Work Builds on the 
Service Design Literature 
Alam and Perry (2002) stressed the following about NSD: 
Managers should pay most attention to the idea generation stage in the 
development process, and should strive to develop services that match 
customers' needs. Managers should look beyond simple market research 
and develop a planned and formal process of obtaining customer input for 
their new service development projects. Managers should treat customers 
as partners in their quest for successful new services, (p. 520) 
When managers realize complex customers enter their service processes, they will 
recognize these customers have additional needs that must be served before they can be 
fully satisfied. For managers to capture this vision, they will need to look beyond the 
services they currently offer and to examine the costs of co-location and coordinating 
different services in behalf of customers. Opportunities for increased integration will 
often be found by examining customers who fail in the service process. Operationally, the 
aspects of the service must be seen from the customer's point of view, and only by 
envisioning all the steps the customer needs to take can integration by fully envisioned. 
134 
Integration is an extra opportunity to increase customer service and service offerings, but 
it is also expensive and the decision can be made to treat all customers as simple 
customers for cost and management reasons. The concept of the complex customer and 
service integration add to the already rich literature on NSD by demonstrating areas 
where managers can take more caution and use extra steps to increase the service quality 
for their customers. As managers consider all customer types entering their service 
processes, they will increase service quality by acknowledging different levels of needs 
and planning processes to accommodate those needs. 
APPENDIX B 
THE SEVEN SOURCES OF ENDOGENOUS 
COMPLEXITY 
B.l Introduction 
We base our analysis of the MHI system at IHC on the "process view" that is 
prevalent in operations management. This view suggests that any product or service can be 
thought of as a series of process steps that collectively transform raw materials into finished 
goods. For example, the production of a Toyota car involves a host of process steps that 
transform iron ore (and other raw materials) into a drivable vehicle. In healthcare, a series 
of process steps transforms a sick patient into a (hopefully) cured patient. Each process step 
is performed by some resource (in some cases the customer herself may be this resource), 
taking some amount of time. (Of course, a process step may involve multiple resources and 
be performed concurrently with some other process step.) 
In order for Toyota to improve the process of creating a car (i.e., in order to 
improve its quality and/or reduce its cost), it must develop a better transformation process. 
That is, it must come up with a better set of process steps, and/or follow its predefined set 
of process steps more precisely to improve quality, and/or better manage resources to 
perform the process steps more cost-effectively/efficiently. This is the crux of the Toyota 
Production System. The same holds for healthcare. Thus our analysis is aimed at 
examining the MHI system from the "process view." 
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The well-established field of queuing theory can model the performance of a 
system of processes, given the system and its parameters. For example, it can describe the 
distribution of throughput times and the level of inventory in the system given the 
distribution of process times and arrival times. These output measures (throughput times 
and inventory levels) can then be compared against targets that must be achieved for the 
firm to be competitive in its market environment. 
But before one can run a performance (queuing) analysis, one has to know what 
the process steps are, what the resources are that are performing those process steps, what 
the demand stream is for the jobs arriving for processing, and so forth. In this research we 
will focus not on the queuing theory analysis itself, but rather on the aforementioned 
inputs that would go into a queuing system analysis. That is, we explore the extent to 
which the benefits of MHI (if any) might accrue from the way MHI 1) prescribes the 
process steps, 2) directs and monitors the flow of a job (i.e., a patient) through the 
system, and 3) assigns/manages the resources performing each process step. 
In particular, we hypothesize that mental health integration increases process 
"complexity" in that as the number of service process increases it becomes more difficult 
to manage the three aforementioned elements, i.e., it is difficult to prescribe the process 
steps, direct and monitor product (patient) flow, and assign/manage the resources 
performing each process step. We identify seven different factors that might contribute to 
complexity of any service transformation process. 
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B.2 The Seven Sources of Service Complexity 
Summarized 
1) Step Complexity (The number of steps in a process. A four-stitch wound is slightly 
more complex than a three-stitch wound.) 
2) Path Complexity (The number of paths or branches a service can follow. All 
withdrawals from an ATM must be in denominations of $20, thus there is only one 
very well defined path the service can take to disseminate $100. But when using a 
teller, there are an almost unlimited amount of paths or monetary combinations that 
can be requested to disseminate $100.) 
3) Definitional Complexity (How definable a service's steps and paths are before the 
service process begins. Project management for building prefabricated homes in a 
suburb has a greater percentage of definable steps than project management of a one-
time construction project such as the "Big Dig.") 
4) Skill Complexity (The skill required to perform a task. It is more difficult to take a 
last-second 15-foot shot under defensive pressure than it is to hit a 15-foot free throw 
shot.) 
5) Relearning Complexity (This is the complexity caused by time between service 
events in a continual service process. Treating a chronic disease is made more 
difficult because the service by its nature must be given over time and not at a single 
event. When teaching, the longer the time-periods between each class the greater the 
relearning curves experienced by the students and teachers each time they meet.) 
6) Handoff Complexity (Each time a customer is handed off from one server to another, 
service complexity increases. The transfer process between service providers causes a 
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loss of information. A nurse from the afternoon shift turns a patient over to a nurse on 
the evening shift, which can lead to a loss of vital information.) 
7) Incentive Complexity (Whenever there are multiple servers in a service environment 
it is possible for each server to have their own incentives and agendas. Individuals 
and departments within a firm often seek to maximize their own efficiency because of 
their incentives, but optimality for an individual often causes suboptimality within the 
entire system. The goal of the ER department is to cut wait times for patients, but the 
goal of the janitorial staff is to cut costs by having fewer employees. The ER 
department becomes frustrated in its attempts partially because a shortage of janitorial 
staff causes long changeovers, which cuts the capacity of available rooms.) 
B.3 Step Complexity 
Sampson (2001) draws from Shostack (1987) to define complexity as "the 
number and intricacy of the steps in a process. Complex procedures have many steps, and 
may include a number of process branches. A process branch is a rule that changes the 
procedure based on a condition" (p. 85). 
Step Complexity is measured by the number of steps in a process. The more steps 
a process has the more step complexity it has. Applying stitches to a 3-inch wound is less 
complex than applying stitches to a 6-inch wound, simply because it requires fewer 
stitches or steps in the process. 
Step Complexity has been intuitively understood for quite some time. The roots of 
scientific management are deeply imbedded in the attempt to decrease step complexity. 
Taylorism taught that the responsibility of the "Scientific Manager" was to study the 
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routines of her employees and find the fastest and simplest ways to accomplish their tasks 
(Taylor, 1911). 
Not controlling for or understanding step complexity can be a source of defects in 
process and product quality. Boeing built the first B-17 bomber in 1935 at the request of 
the military for a new long-range bomber. During its initial test-flight the B-17 (later 
called the flying fortress) left the ground briefly only to crash seconds later, killing its 
experienced test pilot (the pilot failed to disengage the control locks on the plane). The 
military considered the aircraft too complex to fly for ordinary pilots and gave the 
contract for production to Boeing's smaller competitor. Despite the military's decision, 
some engineers and pilots saw the potential of the B-17 bomber and would not abandon 
the project. They developed a checklist of liftoff protocols for flying the B-17. Pilots with 
the checklist in hand flew 1.8 million miles in World War II without a similar accident 
and gave the U.S. air force a superior position in flight range and bombing power in its 
fight against the Axis (Gawande, 2007). 
By integrating mental health services into the primary care clinic, IH has actually 
increased the number of steps a patient can take in its clinics, thus intuitively increasing 
process complexity for the clinic. On the other hand, patients needing mental health 
services experience a decrease in the number steps they must take to receive total care, 
and thus with mental health integration the complexity of care actually decreases from 
the patient perspective. These patients no longer have to manage care and coordinate care 
between two separate care systems and are thus better off. 
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B.4 Path Complexity 
Service management increases in difficulty when the possible service options or 
pathways that service steps can take multiply. Sampson (2001) adds to (Shostack, 1987) 
labels the potential for numerous service pathways as divergence. "Divergence is seen in 
the nature of the steps: divergent procedures have steps that can be handled any number 
of ways depending on the circumstances of production" (p. 85). The multiplication of 
service pathways can quickly become overwhelming even for the best checklist. Expert 
systems in retail that support decision making can have over 100,000 possible pathways 
(Sampson, 2001). 
Path Complexity is measured by the number of possible process branches 
(possible paths) in a process. The more paths a process has the more path complexity it 
has. An ATM that offers a $100 withdrawal only in increments of $20 has less path 
complexity than a teller who offers an unlimited number of denominational choices to a 
customer seeking a $100 withdraw. 
IH intuitively realized the possibilities of treatment plans could be exponentially 
multiplied by integrating mental healthcare into the clinic, and the MHI team created a 
cascade treatment model. The cascade model created three basic pathways of treatment, 
which pathways were triggered by the severity and complexity of the patient. By creating 
medical pathways, IH controlled path complexity within the MHI service process. 
B.5 Definitional Complexity 
Unfortunately, not all step or path complexity can be realistically controlled and 
dealt with because there are often unknown and indefinable steps and paths. By 
definition, customers are part of the service process and having customers in the process 
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means there will be as much variation in process as there is variation in the customers in 
the process. In an example shared below about central line infections, each customer's 
anatomy is similar enough that each step could be defined and executed in exactly the 
same manner for every patient, and what the patients defined as an appropriate outcome 
of central line insertion was always the same; in other service processes customer-
induced variation increases definitional complexity. The customers may have a wide 
variety of demands on the same service system (request variability (Frei, 2006)), or a 
wide variety of skills they can bring to the service production process (capability 
variability (Frei, 2006)), or even varying degrees of what they define excellent service to 
be (subjective preference variability (Frei, 2006)). 
In addition to ambiguity that is customer induced, task ambiguity is also common 
in project-based service management. Companies that bid on large construction projects, 
software firms developing new programs, and mental health professionals counseling 
patients operate in environments with healthy doses of ambiguity at the beginning of the 
task. It is only once the task is in process that all the necessary process paths and steps are 
even definable. 
Definitional complexity is measured by amount of ambiguity inherent in the 
service process pertaining to understanding the proper paths and steps that should be 
considered before the service process begins. A psychiatrist treating a patient with 
depression will have more definitional complexity (caused by the ambiguity of the 
depression's source) than a cardiologist will have performing a coronary angioplasty. 
This definition is consistent with that devised by Goldratt, who defined 
complexity as ambiguity, or in other words, not knowing how certain factors will affect a 
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system. "The more degrees of freedom the system has the more complex the system is" 
(Goldratt, 2008, p. 41). For example, heart bypass surgery has many steps and thus is 
high in step complexity, but the steps are definable and can be consistently executed by a 
well-trained staff. On the other hand, treating depression can be a much more 
complicated task because of the compounding factor of ambiguity that causes a lack of 
definition for the steps of care. Patients' backgrounds and chemistry are highly variable, 
which causes their responses to different therapies to be highly variable. It is interesting 
to note that treating both the heart bypass patient and the depressed patient requires 
customization, yet their complexity differs significantly because of known and unknown 
processes steps. 
In the service management literature, high-contact services and the level of 
customization have been used to segment services (Chase, 1978; Lovelock, 1983; 
Schmenner, 1986). Chase (1978) said the following: "it follows that service systems with 
high customer contact are more difficult to control and more difficult to rationalize than 
those with low customer contact" (p. 138). Thus it would seem that the more time spent 
with a customer in a service process and the level of customization provided would 
simply determine the management complexity process and its ability to be improved and 
streamlined. These typologies, though, have insufficient granularity. 
For example, central line insertion is a very customized and high contact service 
by any measurement, but through the use of a simple checklist, infections received from 
the procedure have been eliminated (Pronovost et al., 2006). The customization and high 
contact services typologies examine groups of services at the 10,000 foot level. They 
make it impossible to differentiate between service providers within an industry (Verma 
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& Young, 2000) and group the management of disparate industries that have little in 
common into the same management groupings (Mersha, 1990). Understanding step, path, 
and definition complexity gives managers a more granular thought tool for making 
decisions about how to structure services and what steps can be taken to improve them. 
Managers who understand these three general forms of service complexity (step, 
path, and definitional) can take steps to control it and significantly affect quality 
outcomes: 
In 2001 . . . a critical-care specialist at Johns Hopkins Hospital named 
Peter Pronovost decided to give checklists a try. He didn't attempt to make 
the checklist cover everything; he designed it to tackle just one problem: 
line infections. On a sheet of plain paper, he plotted out the steps to take in 
order to avoid infections when putting a line in. Doctors are supposed to 
(1) wash their hands with soap, (2) clean the patient's skin with 
chlorhexidine antiseptic, (3) put sterile drapes over the entire patient, (4) 
wear a sterile mask, hat, gown, and gloves, and (5) put a sterile dressing 
over the catheter site once the line is in. Check, check, check, check, 
check. These steps are no-brainers; they have been known and taught for 
years. So it seemed silly to make a checklist just for them. Still, Pronovost 
asked the nurses in his I.C.U. to observe the doctors for a month as they 
put lines into patients, and record how often they completed each step. In 
more than a third of patients, they skipped at least one. 
The next month, he and his team persuaded the hospital 
administration to authorize nurses to stop doctors if they saw them 
skipping a step on the checklist; nurses were also to ask them each day 
whether any lines ought to be removed, so as not to leave them in longer 
than necessary. This was revolutionary. Nurses have always had their 
ways of nudging a doctor into doing the right thing, ranging from the 
gentle reminder ("Um, did you forget to put on your mask, doctor?") to 
more forceful methods (I've had a nurse body check me when she thought 
I hadn't put enough drapes on a patient). But many nurses aren't sure 
whether this is their place, or whether a given step is worth a 
confrontation. (Does it really matter whether a patient's legs are draped for 
a line going into the chest?) The new rule made it clear: if doctors didn't 
follow every step on the checklist, the nurses would have backup from the 
administration to intervene. 
Pronovost and his colleagues monitored what happened for a year 
afterward. The results were so dramatic that they weren't sure whether to 
believe them: the ten-day line-infection rate went from eleven per cent to 
zero. So they followed patients for fifteen more months. Only two line 
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infections occurred during the entire period. They calculated that, in this 
one hospital, the checklist had prevented forty-three infections and eight 
deaths, and saved two million dollars in costs. 
Pronovost recruited some more colleagues, and they made some 
more checklists. One aimed to insure that nurses observe patients for pain 
at least once every four hours and provide timely pain medication. This 
reduced the likelihood of a patient's experiencing untreated pain from 
forty-one per cent to three per cent. They tested a checklist for patients on 
mechanical ventilation, making sure that, for instance, the head of each 
patient's bed was propped up at least thirty degrees so that oral secretions 
couldn't go into the windpipe, and antacid medication was given to 
prevent stomach ulcers. The proportion of patients who didn't receive the 
recommended care dropped from seventy per cent to four per cent; the 
occurrence of pneumonias fell by a quarter; and twenty-one fewer patients 
died than in the previous year. The researchers found that simply having 
the doctors and nurses in the I.C.U. make their own checklists for what 
they thought should be done each day improved the consistency of care to 
the point that, within a few weeks, the average length of patient stay in 
intensive care dropped by half. 
The checklists provided two main benefits, Pronovost observed. 
First, they helped with memory recall, especially with mundane matters 
that are easily overlooked in patients undergoing more drastic events. 
(When you're worrying about what treatment to give a woman who won't 
stop seizing, it's hard to remember to make sure that the head of her bed is 
in the right position.) A second effect was to make explicit the minimum, 
expected steps in complex processes. Pronovost was surprised to discover 
how often even experienced personnel failed to grasp the importance of 
certain precautions. In a survey of I.C.U. staff taken before introducing the 
ventilator checklists, he found that half hadn't realized that there was 
evidence strongly supporting giving ventilated patients antacid 
medication. Checklists established a higher standard of baseline 
performance. (Gawande, 2007, pp. 90-91) 
Pronovost replicated his success using checklists on a larger scale in the state of 
Michigan when the program rolled out in a statewide program (Pronovost et al., 2006). 
Using checklists in hospitals is similar to the science behind standard work at 
Toyota (Liker, 2004). At Toyota, standard work procedures for each process are so 
detailed they even describe the order for which bolts are to be put into seats (S. Spear & 
Bowen, 1999). Standard work like checklists have the ability to control step and path 
complexity, but they also have the side benefit of increasing memory, which decreases 
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and controls indefinable steps or processes added by or forgotten by employees. 
Gawande (2007) quotes Levitt as advocating that "discretion is the enemy of order, 
standardization, and quality" (p. 92). 
The MHI team designed a mental healthcare packet to assist primary care doctors 
in diagnosing the type and severity of mental illness a patient possessed. A physician in 
Maine, which is partnering with IH, described the mental healthcare packet as the best 
part of the MHI system. The packet effectively decreases definitional, path, and step 
complexity for the primary care doctors in the diagnosis of the mental health diseases and 
in the measurement of its severity. 
B.6 Skill Complexity 
Skill Complexity is measured by the amount of training it takes to perform a 
service process. The more training a step takes, the greater the skill complexity. Surgeons 
usually require 8 years of training beyond medical school before they are approved to 
operate independently, whereas a "sandwich artist" at Subway can usually be considered 
fully trained after his first shift. Skill complexity not only addresses the inherent 
difficulty in a step, but it also encompasses the variation between similarly trained 
employees performing the same tasks because of natural talent. 
Skill complexity is best understood in the terms of a sport such as baseball. 
Regardless of how good a major league batter is, the skill necessary to hit 
a ball pitched at up to 150 kilometers per hour is phenomenal. A ball 
pitched at major league speeds takes just half a second to reach the batter. 
Allowing about a quarter of a second for the swing, the batter may only 
have a tenth of a second to decide where to swing, and the ball will be 
over the plate for as little as 0.01 seconds. Given these figures, it's easy to 
see why most major league batters only manage to hit successfully about 
one time in four! (Willis, 2000, n.p.) 
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Is there any doubt as to why Manny Ramirez, a player often vilified for dogging it but a 
very prolific hitter, is still worth between 20 and 35 million dollars per year (Crasnick, 
2008)? The skill of hitting a major league baseball is rare indeed. 
Sports offer a unique view of the process problems caused by skill complexity not 
only because they require immense skill to perform but also because skills vary so widely 
between players on each team, and managing the variability in skills between players by 
providing a network in which they can complement each other and thrive as a team is a 
talent unto itself. The best sports managers, such as the Laker's Phil Jackson, are paid 
millions to integrate talent. Despite the immense skill of both Michael Jordan and Kobe 
Bryant, neither won a championship without Phil Jackson. If CEOs can be considered to 
be managers of skill complexity, then their talent is even more valued in the business 
world than it is in sports, as witnessed by the precipitous drop in Apple's stock when 
Steve Jobs was rumored to be extremely ill. Research verifies that skill does not reside 
fully in independent actors, but also within the system in which the actors work. 
Huckman and Pisano (2006) found evidence of highly skilled physicians being unable to 
reproduce the quality of their work at all disparate hospitals with which they contracted. 
Despite their skill, the hospital processes also weighed heavily upon their outcomes. 
The way MHI has managed complexity is though their training processes, 
automation, and job segmentation. After attending brown bags and experiencing a high 
level of system support, PCPs at MHI clinics have displayed an increased confidence in 
dealing with mental health issues. One doctor said that when they first implemented MHI 
at their clinic they felt they had to have a psychiatrist on the staff, but now that they are 
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more familiar with mental health medications, they are comfortable working with a 
psychologist to perform the needed counseling while they handle the medication. 
B.7 Relearning Complexity 
Relearning Complexity is caused by elapsed time between steps in a continuous 
service process. It is measured by the required amount of relearning for both the server 
and the customer in the next step of the service process. Often the greater the time 
elapsed between steps, the more relearning is required by the servers and customers in 
the service process. Year-round school for grammar school students reduces relearning 
complexity when compared to traditional school years by reducing the relearning needed 
for both students and teachers. 
Most service delivery happens in a single visit, thus eliminating relearning 
complexity completely. Often customers will return to a service provider if they are 
satisfied with its service offering, but customers consider the second visit to be an 
entirely separate service offering. On the other hand, education and care for chronic 
diseases exemplify services that require the customer to visit multiple times to complete a 
single service offering. Because customers are an intimate part of the production process 
(Sampson & Froehle, 2006), the quality of their inputs will vary over time and separation 
from the service provider. One colleague mentioned it was easier to teach summer 
semester classes because the students came to class every day and the semester was 
compressed. It was easier for students to recall the previous day's discussion than to try 
and recall items that had occurred a week earlier. 
Even in the simulation of service delivery, complexity caused by the elapse of 
time increases management difficulty. Sterman (1989) used the beer game to challenge 
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students thinking about inventory. He found it was very difficult for the students to gauge 
the value of choices when time lags were present. The time lags instigated larger orders 
of inventory than necessary because students were incapable of judging the results of 
their inventory orders over time. 
While relearning complexity in service processes centers on customers who need 
multiple visits to receive complete care, such as chronically ill patients, the concepts also 
apply to the actors in the service process. Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondson (2001) found 
medical teams that stayed together longer decreased their surgical times drastically when 
compared to those teams with multiple server configurations. As team cohesion 
increased, learning and service quality also increased. 
MHI at IH uses the position of care manager to bind its relationship with the 
patients. The care manager provides education, schedules appointments, and tracks the 
customer in an effort to provide continuous integrated care. By so doing, they control 
relearning complexity and increase compliance amongst their patients. 
B.8 Handoff Complexity 
Tucker et al. (2007) said, "we define a complex service organization as one with 
interdependent work units whose work must be coordinated to provide customer service, 
but whose units often have conflicting priorities" (p. 894). 
Handoff complexity is measured by the number of servers involved in delivering 
the service product and by the amount of information that needs to be handed off between 
servers. The more servers there are involved in a process, the higher the cost of 
orchestrating their movements to supply a service product. The more information that 
must be exchanged in the handoff, the costlier the handoff will become. 
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Every time a customer is passed off to an additional server the complexity in the 
system increases. Tucker's (2004) in-depth study of nursing found that most operational 
failures stem from breakdowns in the supply of materials and information across 
organizational boundaries. Her results concur with a 2005 study and other studies that 
revealed nearly 70% of preventable hospital mishaps occurred because of communication 
problems, and at least half of such breakdowns occur during handoffs (Naik, 2006). 
Woodside, Frey and Daly (1989) documented that for service encounters with 
multiple acts, quality is judged at each act. Thus a service provision with multiple stops 
and providers would make quality more difficult to manage. 
Although handoff complexity is a service management concept, its roots are 
found in the production management literature. Bohn (1995) studied the variableness 
inherent in each of the numerous steps in semiconductor manufacturing. He concluded 
that it was nearly impossible for all but the best plants to detect small improvements in a 
single step in the process because of the combined process noise of the entire process. 
And it may have been an inherent understanding of handoff complexity caused by 
multiple handoffs that led Japanese manufacturers towards the strategy of fewer 
suppliers. Chrysler followed this strategy in the mid-1990s by cutting the number of 
suppliers it worked with and integrating these suppliers into the design and production 
process. Through this strategy, Chrysler experienced significant increases in quality and 
efficiency (Dyer, 1996). Unfortunately, a change in leadership at Chrysler caused a move 
away from these quality initiatives. 
Once service providers understand the added complexity that comes with 
handoffs, they can actively act to manage and decrease errors while increasing 
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throughput. The Great Ormond Street Hospital in London retains a reputation of pediatric 
cardiac operational excellence. In 1994 one of its brightest surgeons published an 
unusually forthright paper about quality defects in the surgery process, which he 
attributed to "suboptimal performance" by himself and his team. Many small mistakes 
made by his team caused death and hardship for his patients. "At Great Ormond Street 
Hospital, it prompted doctors to take a harder look at how their teams were working 
together and transferring patients. 'Our handovers were haphazard,' says Dr. Goldman, 
the pediatric ICU chief (Naik, 2006, p. A.l). Blood pressure monitors would go missing 
and when patients would arrive in the ICU after surgery the ventilator would not be set up 
properly. On a Sunday afternoon in 2003 the doctors were relaxing by watching a 
Formula One race after a particularly stressful surgery. As they watched, they were 
fascinated by how a 20-man pit crew could completely service a car in less than 7 
seconds. 
In early 2005, Dr. Elliot, Dr. Goldman and Mr. Catchpole traveled to 
Ferrari's headquarters in Maranello, Italy, and sat down with Nigel 
Stepney, the racing team's technical director. As a test car roared around a 
nearby track, the visitors played a video of a hospital handover and 
described the process in pictures. 
The Ferrari man wasn't impressed. "In fact, he was amazed" at how 
clumsy and informal the hospital handover process appeared to be, recalls 
Mr. Catchpole, now a researcher at Oxford University. 
In that meeting, Mr. Stepney described how each member of the 
Ferrari crew is required to do a specific job, in a specific sequence, and 
usually in silence. By contrast, he noted, the hospital handover was often 
chaotic. Several conversations between nurses and doctors went on at 
once. Meanwhile, different members of the team disconnected or 
reconnected equipment to a patient, but in no particular order. 
In a Formula One race, the "lollipop man" with a paddle ushers the 
car in and signals the driver when it's safe to go. But in the hospital 
setting, it wasn't always clear who was in charge. Though the 
anesthesiologist had nominal responsibility to take the lead during a 
handover, sometimes the surgeon assumed that role-or no one at all. 
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The crew at Ferrari trained for the worst contingencies. "If Michael 
Schumacher comes in five laps early because it's raining and he wants 
wet-weather tires, they're prepared," says Mr. Catchpole, referring to the 
Ferrari driver and seven-time world champion, who recently retired. The 
hospital team dealt with problems as they came up. (Naik, 2006, p. A.l) 
After the visit to Ferrari, Dr. Goldman and his associates began to implement the pit 
crew's suggestions into their process. They submitted a paper to a journal after studying 
23 handovers before and 27 handovers after the changes. Their results revealed technical 
errors per handover fell 42%, information omissions fell 49%, and the handover process 
was significantly shortened even though that was not the intent of the changes (Naik, 
2006). 
IH uses their electronic medical record system and co-location of services to 
combat the problem of handoff complexity. As one doctor described the system, "We rub 
shoulders in the hallway." This rubbing of shoulders and a commitment to the medical 
record provides for a seamless handoff between the primary care doctor, the care 
manager, and the mental health specialist. These communication patterns create a 
complex web of communication interaction, which increases integration (Ulrich, 2007). 
B.9 Incentive Complexity 
Incentive complexity is closely related to handoff complexity because it only 
surfaces when a service requires multiple handoffs. It usually surfaces when a service 
operation is large enough that it requires supervision from multiple managers. As quoted 
earlier, Tucker et al. (2007) said, "we define a complex service organization as one with 
interdependent work units whose work must be coordinated to provide customer service, 
but whose units often have conflicting priorities" (p. 894). 
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Incentive complexity is measured by the number of incentives separate servers are 
subject to in the delivery of the service product. The more disparate the incentives exerted 
upon service providers, the higher the cost of orchestrating their movements to supply a 
service product. Competing incentives produce sub optimality caused by servers acting 
independently to maximize the "profitability" of their particular process while causing 
the process as a whole to suffer. 
At Mercy hospital in Missouri, the staff set a goal to lower wait times in the ER to 
15 minutes or less. In their attempt to decrease process times they found that the entire 
hospital community needed to be orchestrated to achieve these process results. Cleaning 
crews, nursing staffs, and bed openings on all floors had to be orchestrated to achieve the 
stated goals (PBS documentary on healthcare). It is clear that a cleaning crew attempting 
to maximize its individual efficiency could seriously affect the efficiency of the entire 
hospital. Unfortunately, the individual silos approach to healthcare is the norm rather than 
the exception in the US healthcare system. 
Herzlinger's (1997) case study on Humana describes the classic example of 
incentive complexity. Humana began as an insurance organization. Its profits and size 
ballooned dramatically, and to extend its growth, Humana began to purchase hospital 
systems. Although Humana had sizeable managerial skill, it did not plan on the incentive 
complexity that would accompany this purchase. For example, it was in the insurance 
arm's best interest to have patients use the hospitals as little as possible, but it was in the 
hospitals' interest to have the patients use the facilities as much as possible. The strain of 
these competing priorities led to losses and the eventual spin off of Humana's hospital 
units. 
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MHI cuts down on incentive complexity by hiring its mental health workers 
directly and paying them by the hour. Because the mental health specialists are paid 
directly from the clinic and are paid whether or not they see patients, their incentives to 
cooperate and to assist with the patient flow in the clinic are maximized. 
APPENDIX C 
STATISTICAL TESTS AND 
PROGRAMMING OUTPUT 
In this section I explicitly write out all the steps I took in my statistical testing 
procedures. I include the programming language used in Stata, and I include the Stata 
output. This level of detail was necessary to explicitly demonstrate how I came to my 
conclusions and to demonstrate the tests and checks I performed. The programming 
and the output are raw (thus not appropriate for the general dissertation), but in the 
appendix, it is appropriate to provide full and complete detail of the tests and the 
order in which they were preformed. 
C.l Testing Steps 
C.l.l OLS Regression 
I tested the regression model using OLS regression. I used Stata's statistical 
package for all the data work (see Table 9). 
reg total_all_er sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total 
clinic_mhi interaction_mhi, cluster (clinic) 
Linear regression Number of obs = 2 991 
F( 8, 55) = 8.57 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.0472 
Root MSE = 3.3023 




































































































































































































































































































































































Note: both the clinic and interaction effect are significant, but we expect the OLS 
to be a poor estimator for the count data. Note also that to increase accuracy, I cluster the 
data on the clinic number and use robust errors. While clustering does not have the same 
effect as a hierarchal model, it is a conservative regression technique. I must often refrain 
from using the hierarchal model because postestimation does not work on the hierarchal 
models. 
C.1.2 Poisson Regression 
I tested the data using the Poisson regression. 
poisson total_all_er sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total ph2 
interaction_five_num_co, cluster (clinic) 
Poisson regression Number of obs = 2991 
Wald chi2(8) = 488.68 
Log pseudolikelihood = -6489.3662 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 56 clusters in locationnumber) 
Robust 



















































































Note: the interaction effect holds but the clinic effect becomes insignificant. At 
this point I am not using a hierarchal model because those models do not allow for post 
estimation effects. I will first test for the goodness of fit and then I will apply the 
hierarchal model once I am sure of fit to increase the accuracy of the model. 
C.1.3 Goodness of Fit 
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I compare the two models for goodness of fit. 
Measures of Fit for regress of total all_er 
Model: 
N: 











BIC used by 















































Note: Clearly, as we would expect, the Poisson regression has a better fit to the 
data than the OLS regression. The count nature of the data makes it nonlinear and thus 
OLS is a bad fit. The two main tests to examine are the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) (Raftery, 1996) and Akaike's information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973); both 
tests show the Poisson has a lower score and thus is a better fit (Long & Freese, 2006). 
C.1.4 Hierarchical Model 
Now I take the Poisson regression and put it into a hierarchal model to increase its 
efficiency and accuracy. 
xtset locationnumber 
panel variable: clinic (unbalanced) 
The xtset command describes the hierarchal nature of the model. All the patients will 
now be nested into their respective clinics when an xtregression is run. 
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xtpoisson total_all_er sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total 
ph2 interaction_five_num_co, nolog 
Random-effects Poisson regression Number of obs = 2991 
Group variable: clinic Number of groups = 56 
Random effects u_i ~ Gamma Obs per group: min = 1 
avg = 53.4 
max = 547 
Wald chi2 (8) = 1130.51 
Log likelihood = -6182.9448 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 











































































/lnalpha | -.9414452 .2269372 -1.386234 -.4966564 
—.
 + 
alpha I .3900637 .08852 .2500151 .608562 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 612.84 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
Note: Even as the model fit improves, the results are robust, but as stated earlier I 
predict there will be a problem with Poisson's accuracy because of the large number of 
0's and overdispersion. 
C.1.5 Negative Binomial Regression 
Next I will test the negative binomial regression 
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nbreg total_all_er sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total ph2 
interaction_f ive_num__co, nolog cluster (clinic) 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 2991 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(8) = 247.64 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4285.7453 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 56 clusters in clinic) 
I 
total all er 
Robust 
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1.036335 .0972022 .8458221 1.226848 
2.329892 3.410462 2.818867 .274 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 4407.24 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
Note: The likelihood ratio test at the bottom of the readout. It tests for 
overdispersion and the usefulness of the model. Because it is significant we can assume 
the presence of over dispersion. Also note both the clinic effect and the interaction effect 
are both supported. 
C.1.6 Fit of Poisson Regression and Negative 
Binomial Regression 
Next, I test the fit of the Poisson regression when compared the negative binomial 
regression. 




Log-Lik Intercept Only 
Log-Lik Full Model 
D 
LR 
Prob > LR 
McFadden's R2 
McFadden's Adj R2 



























Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 0.045 
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AIC 4.345 2.872 1.473 
AIC*n 12996.732 8591.491 4405.242 
BIC -10887.296 -15286.535 4399.238 
BIC . -64.898 
BIC used by Stata 13050.763 8651.524 4399.238 
AIC used by Stata 12996.732 8591.491 4405.242 
Note how the negative binomial distribution is a much better fit than the Poisson 
regression. We can even plot the regressions against the actual and see how much better 
the Negative Binomial performs compared to the Poisson, which was better than OLS. 
The visual verdict (see figures in Chapter 2) and the fit tests both demonstrate the 
negative binomial regression is giving the most accurate reading of our data. The good 
news is that it supports both the interaction effect and the clinic effect, even when 
clustering the data and using robust errors. 
Note: It is not in the hierarchal format. In any data review, it is important to look 
at the data before the calculations begin to get a sense for its accuracy and potency. In 
one tabulated distribution of the data, I got the following results. 
table phase num_como, contents(mean total_all_er freq ) 
num_como 




1.19345 1.69345 2.35385 4.58333 
1,587 336 65 12 
1.12162 1.19481 1.59091 
814 154 22 
2 
1 
The ordinary model regression treats all observations as independent, while the 
hierarchal model correctly accounts for lack of independence. This essentially means the 
effective sample size (number of independent pieces of information) is bigger in the 
ordinary model, so there is greater power. This is a great concern because as the number 
of co-morbidities increases for integrated clinics, our sample size decreases rapidly and 
will not leave enough power for the interaction effect. 
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C.1.7 Hierarchical Negative Binomial Regression 
I will run a hierarchal negative binomial regression. 
xtnbreg total_all_er sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total ph2 
interaction_five_num_co, nolog 
Random-effects negative binomial regression Number of obs = 2991 
Group variable: clinic Number of groups = 56 
Random effects u_i ~ Beta Obs per group: min = 1 
avg = 53.4 
max = 547 
Wald chi2(8) = 297.61 
Log likelihood = -4255.0887 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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/ln_r | 2.264669 .3195515 1.63836 2.890978 
/ln_s I 3.433063 .3352804 2.775925 4.0902 
+ 
r | 9.627938 3.076622 5.14672 18.01092 
s | 30.97136 10.38409 16.05348 59.75186 
Likelihood-ratio test versus pooled: chibar2(01) = 42.47 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
As we expected, the interaction effect becomes insignificant because of the small 
sample size in the hierarchical model for patients with multiple co-morbidities, but the 
model is still pointing in the right direction. A good check to insure the data predicts an 
interaction effect is to model it visually (see the figures in Chapter 2). 
Clearly the lines cross, predicting an interaction effect. The interaction effect is 
even clearer when graphed using fractional and quadratic fitted lines. 
Because when a nonhierarchal model is used the interaction effect remains, I 
would suggest the effect is valid and would be consistent if there were greater power in 
the groups of patients with higher numbers of co-morbidities. 
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One other item to note about the interaction effect is that it seems to be additive 
and not multiplicative. This observation is in important because, "When interaction is 
present for additive models, it is absent for multiplicative model, and vice-versa" 
(Stoddard, 2008). According to Stoddard, OLS is the best way to capture an additive 
effect and logistic and count regressions are best for multiplicative effects. Note how in 
the first regression we tested (OLS), the interaction effect was significant. In linear 
regression, the outcome changes by the amount of the regression coefficient (slope) for 
each one unit increase in the predictor variable. That is the same thing as saying that 
amount is added to the outcome for each one unit change (thus, an additive effect). Since 
I am dealing with an additive effect, an interaction term in this type of model is an 
additive interaction. In a negative binomial model, or logistic regression, or Poisson 
model, the relative risk (RR) or odds ratio is multiplied by itself for each unit increase in 
the predictor variable. So when the odds ratio increases one unit or RR x RR it would be 
assumed to double, RR x RR x RR is a three unit increase. This is where the name 
multiplicative comes from. In this type of model, the regression lines go up in an 
exponential fashion, rather than linearly. If no interaction is present, the ratio of one line 
to the other line is RR at each point on the x axis. Thus, a deviation from this would be 
parallel lines, since the RR pattern is not maintained if the lines are going up. If they were 
flat, than the RR pattern would be maintained (Stoddard 2008). 
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C.1.8 Most Effective Regression 
Repeat the most effective regression and perform the two last tests. 
nbreg total_all_er sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total ph2 
interaction_five_num_co, nolog cluster (clinic) 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 2991 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(8) = 247.64 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4285.7453 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 56 clusters in clinic) 
I Robust 











































































/lnalpha | 1.036335 .0972022 .8458221 1.226848 
+ '• 
alpha | 2.818867 .274 2.329892 3.410462 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 4407.24 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
Note: the negative binomial regression uses maximum likelihood for an estimator 
and because it predicts counts, it shares very few of the assumptions with OLS. Long 
suggests using a Wald test and a Fit test as post estimation techniques after every 
regression. I have already done the fit test. The Wald test follows: 
test mhi_clinics =0 
( 1) [total_all_er]mhi_clinics = 0 
chi2( 1) = 5.52 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0188 
. test interaction_mhi =0 
( 1) [total_all_er]interaction_mhi = 0 
chi2( 1) = 8.58 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0034 
. test mhi_clinics interaction_mhi 
( 1) [total_all_er]mhi_clinics = 0 
( 2) [total_all_er]interaction_mhi = 0 
chi2( 2) = 29.71 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
C.1.9 Collinearity Diagnostics 
Although a test for collinearity not required. I supply the test anyway. 
SQRT In-

































































































Condition Number 9.5372 
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept) 
Det(correlation matrix) 0.5155 
Even with the interaction term, the collinearity is quite low. 
C.1.10 Format Results 
The final step is to express the results in a readily interpretable format. 
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C. 1.10.1 Examination of Hypothesis 1 
listcoef sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total mhi_clinics 
interaction_mhi, percent help 
nbreg (N=2991): Percentage Change in Expected Count 
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b = raw coefficient 
z = z-score for test of b=0 
P>|z| = p-value for z-test 
% = percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
%StdX = percent change in expected count for SD increase in X 
SDofX = standard deviation of X 
Hypothesis 1 is supported with both the main effect and interaction effect. 
The main effect will decrease ER visits by 24% over 3 years, and as co-morbidities 
increase there is an extra additive effect of decreasing ER visits of 23.5%. 
C. 1.10.2 Examination of Hypothesis 2 
The next set of tests was done in exactly the same manner as the first set. For the 
sake of brevity, I will simply state the ending following results. In this set of tests, I 
examine Hypothesis 2 to determine the clinic and interaction effect on visits the PCP. 
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nbreg pcp_total sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total 
mhi_clinics interaction_mhi, nolog cluster(clini)irr 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 2 991 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(8) = 448.01 
Log pseudolikelihood = -9374.5694 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 































































































Note: both the main effect and interaction effect are insignificant. The literature 
supports dropping the interaction effect when it is not significant from the regression 
model as it confuses interpretation (Box, Hunter, & Hunter, 1978). As seen below, 
removing the interaction effect improved the main effect, but it is still insignificant, 
pointing the right way. 
nbreg pcp_total sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total 
mhi_clinics, nolog cluster(clinic)irr 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 2991 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(7) = 391.17 
Log pseudolikelihood = -9375.8411 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 























































































Hypothesis 2 is not supported for either the main effect or the interaction 
effect. 
C. 1.10.3 Examination of Hypothesis 3 
The third set of tests was performed in exactly the same manner as the first set, 
but for the sake of brevity, I will simply state the ending following results. In this set of 
tests, I examine Hypothesis 3 to determine the clinic and interaction effect on visits to 
central psych from patients attending MHI clinics. 
nbreg centeral_psych sex age num_como cm_total insta_total mhi_clinics, 
nolog cluster(clinic)irr 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 2991 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(6) = 55.59 
Log pseudolikelihood = -4078.651 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 












































































I dropped the interaction term because it was insignificant when running through 
the test. 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported for either the main effect or the interaction 
effect. 
C. 1.10.4 Examination of Hypothesis 4 
The fourth set of tests was performed in exactly the same manner as the first set, 
but for the sake of brevity, I will simply state the ending following results. In this set of 
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tests, I examine Hypothesis 4 to determine the clinic and interaction effect on use the use 
of medications by patients. 
. nbreg rx_script_total sex age num_como cm_total insta_total mhi_clinics, 
nolog cluster(clinic) irr 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 2991 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(6) = 902.89 
Log pseudolikelihood = -15418.358 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 56 clusters in clinic) 
I Robust 
rx_script_~l I IRR Std. Err. z P>Iz| [95% Conf. Interval] 
+ 
sex | 1.224219 .0524139 4.73 0.000 1.125682 1.331382 
age I 1.017902 .0015749 11.47 0.000 1.01482 1.020993 
num_como | 1.461431 .0358336 15.47 0.000 1.392859 1.533378 
cm_total I 1.018698 .0273107 0.69 0.490 .9665517 1.073657 
insta_total I 1.040262 .0039985 10.27 0.000 1.032455 1.048129 
mhi_clinics | .9144105 .0548284 -1.49 0.136 .813023 1.028441 
+ : 
/lnalpha I .0310647 .0515643 -.0699994 .1321288 
.
 + 
alpha I 1.031552 .0531912 .9323944 1.141255 
I dropped the interaction term because it was insignificant when it was run 
through the previous set of tests. 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported for either the main effect or the interaction 
effect. I hypothesized MHI patients would have a greater use of Rx than their 
nonintegrated compatriots. While it is impossible to gather any conclusions to 
nonsignificant data, it is interesting to note the sign is negative as if the direction the 
results were leaning towards was the use of fewer medications. 
C.2 The Confirmation Group 
The first set of tests were performed on a homogeneous group of patients all 
insured by Select Health for an entire 3-year period. To confirm the results found in the 
first set of patients, we broadened our sample to include all payer types. The danger with 
including all payer types is a loss of data points because we are no longer drawing from 
the insurance roles. Data are now being drawn from facility and doctor usage, which 
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means the usage of non-IH providers will not be captured. This could be a loss of up to 
40% of the patient's data. This is why the larger sample size could not be used to do the 
original tests, but can only used in a confirmatory and exploratory capacity. The 
regressions are essentially the same except insurance providers are dummy coded into 
three groups. Medicare, all private providers (Blue Cross, Select Health, United, etc.), 
Medicaid, and all self-payers. The comparison group is Medicare patients. Note all the 
similar steps as in the first regression, starting with OLS: 
reg er_all sex age num_como care_num instacare a_psy all_commercial 
medicaid_self mhi_clinic interaction_mhi, cluster (clinic) 
Linear regression Number of obs = 11096 
F( 10, 55) = 19.75 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.1165 
Root MSE = 3.7 658 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 56 clusters in clinic) 
I Robust 
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Only the main effect is significant. 
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poisson er_all sex age num_como care_num instacare a_psy all_commercial 
medicaid_self mhi_clinic interaction_mhi, cluster (clinic)nolog 
Poisson regression Number of obs = 11096 
Wald chi2(10) = 750.83 
Log pseudolikelihood = -25947.11 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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The Poisson is consistent; thus it has the same mean as the negative binomial 
model, but it is less accurate. 
. fitstat, using(nas) force 
Measures of Fit for poisson of er_all 
Model: 
N: 
Log-Lik Intercept Only 
Log-Lik Full Model 
D 
LR 











BIC used by Stata 
AIC used by Stata 
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u i ~ Gamma 
= -25011.908 
























groups = 56 
Obs per group: 
Wald chi2(10) 







min = 2 
avg = 198.1 







num_como I .2907005 .0141232 20.58 0.000 .2630196 .3183814 
care_num | .0369305 .0044093 8.38 0.000 .0282883 .0455726 
instacare I .02253 .0004426 50.90 0.000 .0216624 .0233975 
a_psy | .0135359 .0008014 16.89 0.000 .0119652 .0151067 
all_commer~l | -1.041984 .0252489 -41.27 0.000 -1.091471 -.9924968 
medicaid_s~f | .2019569 .0268754 7.51 0.000 .1492822 .2546317 
mhi_clinic I -.5260134 .1513125 -3.48 0.001 -.8225803 -.2294464 
interactio~i | -.0133252 .0263048 -0.51 0.612 -.0648817 .0382313 
_cons | 2.120774 .0774688 27.38 0.000 1.968938 2.27261 
+ 
/lnalpha I -1.701406 .193133 -2.07994 -1.322872 
+ 
alpha I .1824269 .0352326 .1249377 .2663691 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 1870.40 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
nbreg er_all sex age num_como care_num instacare a_psy all_commercial 
medicaid_self mhi_clinic interaction_mhi, cluster clinic)nolog 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 11096 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(10) = 770.40 
Log pseudolikelihood = -16658.687 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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fitstat, using(nas) force 
Model: 
N: 
Log-Lik Intercept Only 
Log-Lik Full Model 
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Note how the negative binomial scores better than the Poisson by a wide margin. 





































Note how, as in the last dataset, a clear interaction effect is not seen here. 
xtnbreg er_all sex age num_como care_num instacare a_psy all_commercial 
medicaid_self mhi_clinic interaction_mhi,nolog irr 
Random-effects negative binomial regression 
Group variable: clinic 
Random effects u i ~ Beta 
Log likelihood -16862.009 
Number of obs = 
Number of groups = 












er_all | IRR Std. Err. z P>Iz| [95% Conf. Interval] 
+ 
sex | .9972365 .0292927 -0.09 0.925 .9414453 1.056334 
age | .9851658 .0010839 -13.58 0.000 .9830436 .9872925 
num_como I 1.311573 .0318665 11.16 0.000 1.25058 1.375541 
care_num | 1.028362 .0080444 3.58 0.000 1.012715 1.04425 
instacare I 1.017382 .0009162 19.14 0.000 1.015588 1.01918 
a_psy | 1.012265 .0014232 8.67 0.000 1.009479 1.015058 
all_commer~l | .4854279 .0215223 -16.30 0.000 .4450259 .5294979 
medicaid_s~f | 1.144851 .0588079 2.63 0.008 1.035202 1.266114 
mhi_clinic | .7701707 .0390797 -5.15 0.000 .6972615 .8507037 
interaction I 1.003729 .0444298 0.08 0.933 .9203189 1.094699 
+ —; 
/ln_r | 2.09746 .2279297 1.650726 2.544194 
/ln_s I 3.401197 .2313606 2.947739 3.854656 
+ 
r | 8.145451 1.856591 5.210759 12.73296 
s | 30 6.940818 19.0628 47.21236 
Likelihood-ratio test versus pooled: chibar2(01) = 297.79 Prob>=chibar2 = 
0.000 
The hierarchal model supports the normal model with a main effect but no 
interaction effect. 
nbreg er_all sex age num_como care_num instacare a_psy all_commercial 
medicaid_self mhi_clinic, cluster (clinic)nolog ir 
> r 
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Negative binomial regression 
Dispersion = mean 
Log pseudolikelihood = -16659.284 
(Std. Err. 
Number of obs = 11096 
Wald chi2(9) = 762.76 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
adjusted for 56 clusters in clinic) 
1 
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I dropped the interaction effect because it was insignificant. 
. test mhi_clinic 
( 1) [er_all]mhi_clinic = 0 
chi2( 1) = 15.29 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001 









































































































Condition Number 15.3377 
Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept) 
174 
Det(correlation matrix) 0.3087 
listcoef sex age num_como care_num instacare a_psy all_commercial medicaid_self 
mhi_clinic, percent help 
nbreg (N=11096): Percentage Change in Expected Count 
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LR test of alpha=0: . Prob>=LRX2 = 
b = raw coefficient 
z = z-score for test of b=0 
P>Iz| = p-value for z-test 
% = percent change in expected count for unit increase in X 
%StdX = percent change in expected count for SD increase in X 
SDofX = standard deviation of X 
C.2.1 Confirmation Results Against Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis la (testing the confirmation group) is partially supported. The main 
clinics main effect still decreases ER visits by depressed patients, but the interaction 
effect is not significant in this expanded but less complete data set. 
C.2.2 Confirmation Results Against Hypothesis 2 
The second set of tests were performed in exactly the same manner as the first set, 
but for the sake of brevity, I will simply state the ending following results. In this set of 
tests, I examine Hypothesis 2a to determine the clinic and interaction effect on visits to 
see ones PCP. 
nbreg a_pcp sex age num_como care_num instacare a_psy all_commercial 
medicaid_self mhi_clinic interaction_mhi, cluster (clinic)nolog 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 11096 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(10) = 517.89 
Log pseudolikelihood = -36088.517 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 56 clusters in clinic) 
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I Robust 
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Hypothesis 2a (testing the confirmation group) is unsupported for both the main 
and interaction effects. In fact the main effect, while insignificant, points in the positive 
direction. 
Mirroring hypotheses for the central psych and for RX cannot be run because this 
second data set lacks complete data on out of network psychiatrists and RX fulfillment at 
non-IH facilities, but we have no reason to believe the results would be different. 
C.2.3 Another Test to Exactly Match Clinic Demographics 
to Ensure Accuracy 
In one of my discussions with researchers at IH, the concern was brought up that 
the demographics of the clinics might be a deciding factor in the results. To be 
conservative we decided to control for demographics by matching clinics. In an earlier 
study with a separate group of data, IH researchers had matched four non-MHI clinics to 
four MHI clinics by size, insurance mix of patients, rural versus urban, and size of doctor 
staff. Using the data set from the Select Health draw, I selected the four non-MHI clinics 
and the four MHI clinics singled out by IH in their previous study. The sample size 
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dropped from 2,991 to 589, which offers plenty of power except for the interaction effect. 
I used the same process to check results and received the following results for 
Hypotheses 1-4. 
nbreg total_all_er sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total 
mhi_clinics interaction_mhi, nolog cluster (clinic)irr 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 589 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(5) = 
Log pseudolikelihood = -782.00687 Prob > chi2 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 8 clusters in clinic) 
1 
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The main effect for ERs is still significant and interaction effect is approaching 
significance. 
nbreg pcp_total sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total 
mhi_clinics, nolog cluster(clinic)irr 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 589 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(5) = 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1807.5731 Prob > chi2 























































































The main effect for PCP visits is significant as predicted, but the interaction effect 
was dropped because it was insignificant. 
nbreg centeral_psych sex age num_como cm_total insta_total mhi_clinics 
interaction_mhi, nolog cluster(clinic)irr 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 589 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(5) = 
Log pseudolikelihood = -721.53275 Prob > chi2 






















































































Both the main effect and interaction effect are insignificant for central psych uses. 
nbreg rx_script_total sex age num_como cm_total de_outpsy_total insta_total 
mhi_clinics, nolog cluster(clinic)irr 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 589 
Dispersion = mean Wald chi2(5) = 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3028.7412 Prob > chi2 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 8 clusters in clinic) 



















































































In the larger test sample the main effect was also negative, but insignificant. This 
smaller sample lends support to the supposition that it could actually be negative. 
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These more conservative retests are actually stronger than the original results 
because they also demonstrate a main effect for PCP usage at the clinic level. This is 
encouraging that the results strengthen even when the populations and demographics at 
individual level clinics are strictly matched. 
C.3 Test Two: Testing the Cascade Model 
Because the mental health resources, even within the MHI clinics, constitute a 
scarce resource, I hypothesized that those clinics who more efficiently sorted patients to 
the proper care would perform better. Because primary care services a wide variety of 
patients, physicians' ability to direct patients into appropriate care pathways is a vital 
skill. Studies have demonstrated MHI-type programs increase access for patients to care, 
but other studies have shown that more care does not equal better care (Gawande, 2009). 
Often better care results are found in areas where less is spent on healthcare (Gawande, 
2009); thus, to insure medical benefit to patients when access to care is increased, 
medical staff must be sufficiently trained to direct the correct patients towards these 
resources and the incorrect patients away from them. 
The goal of the IH's cascade tool is to properly segregate customers into medical 
pathways so as to not over serve or under serve patients. The difficulty with this study, 
even before implementation, has always been a lack of data. For example, the only 
available data I could obtain from medical records were PHQ9 scores (a validated 
instrument to test the severity of depression) and the number of co-morbidities a patient 
had. The cascade model actually triggers off those two data points and the following six 
data points: family style, sleep patterns, mental health co-morbidities, medical co-
morbidities in control or out of control, suicidal tendencies and chemical dependency. 
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Additionally, there are also very few patient PHQ9's coded in the system. This means 
patients were most likely given mental health packets, but the data were never coded into 
the medical record from the paper copy recorded in the clinic. Out of the larger cohort of 
11,096 patients, only 2,276 actually have at least one coded PHQ9 in their medical 
record. Despite not having full data, I believed the partial markers would still be 
sufficient to separate the better clinics from the poorer clinics by the way they sorted 
patients. 
I sorted patients into four categories (as prescribed by IH's clinicians) according 
to their score on the PHQ9 and the presence of co-morbidity. Because it was necessary to 
have a PHQ9 for the patients to be sorted, the majority of patients in the sample were 
from the MHI patient group, where the packets are used most regularly. This was 
expected. The plan was to use this method to differentiate between the performances in 
these clinics. I sorted the patients as follows: 
Remission = PHQ9 score of 0-9 and no co-morbidities 
Mild = PHQ9 score of 10-14 and no co-morbidities/PHQ9 0-9 and co-
morbidities 
Moderate = PHQ9 score of 15-19 and no co-morbidities/PHQ9 10-14 and co-
morbidities 
Severe = PHQ9 score of 20-30/PHQ9 15-19 and co-morbidities 
After my initial results were completed, the patients were sorted with a number of 
different permutations, including the dropping of co-morbidities, but even with more 
conservative sorting techniques, the results stayed consistent. Table 10 describes the 
results across all clinics: 
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It is easy to see from the table how when I split the data out between clinics, it 
quickly becomes statistically insignificant. Appropriate care is defined as receiving 
neither too much nor too little care. For example, if a patient in remission had a mental 
health inpatient stay, the patient received too much care for the severity of their 
condition. And if a severe patient did not visit a mental health specialist, the patient 
received too little care. I hoped to see separation between clinics in the way they treated 
moderate and severe patients because care for these patients required the activation of the 
entire MHI team. Unfortunately, when I separated the 39 correctly-seen patients into their 
respective clinics, the numbers per clinic became so small as to remain statistically 
indistinguishable. 
When I shared these results with the MHI team at IH, these results quickly 
became the most important results from my entire study for their work, and the results 
have prompted detailed searching through medical records and spurred interviews with 
physicians and care managers at the clinics. While the team is continuing to examine the 
results, so far they have determined the five following items are all at least partial causes 
of the results. 
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1. The two data points I used to sort the patients are insufficient, thus giving an 
inaccurate picture. Some doctors do not rely on the PHQ9 to sort patients; they feel other 
data points are more accurate and important for sorting patients into treatment pathways, 
such as the family stability score. 
2. While these clinics have embraced the MHI program, the way individual clinics 
and physicians implement the program varies significantly. 
3. The process for capturing the data electronically at the clinics needs drastic 
improvement if further studies are going to be made using only the electronic medical 
record. In other words, many of the happenings at the clinic are not recorded 
electronically, and my study failed to capture the paper trail or other nonrecorded items. 
4. There is a great deal of variation in the way care managers at different clinics 
define their responsibilities and in the criteria physicians use to refer patients to their 
care. This variation is not all negative; most of it derives from the clinic's individual 
characteristics. 
5. My study was also unable to capture patients' unwillingness to follow 
suggested guidelines. For example, if a physician referred a patient to a mental health 
specialist and the patient chose not to meet the specialist, my study would have shown the 
patients as having received inappropriate care. 
One of the dangers of using secondary data is finding the data incomplete or 
insufficient to answer the study question. The data I used were the best IH had in its 
medical records, but there were both incomplete and insufficient to enable me to 
statistically rank the clinics by performance. 
APPENDIX D 
UNLEASHING THE POWER OF STORYTELLING TO 
BRING CONCEPTS FROM SERVICE MANAGEMENT 
RESEARCH INTO THE MINDS AND MEMORIES 
OF OUR STUDENTS 
D.l Abstract 
As we teach, most of us tell stories to illustrate our points. Storytelling brings 
concepts straight into the hearts, minds, and memories of our students as few other tools 
in the arsenal of teaching techniques can, yet often even when we tell a fascinating story, 
we miss the opportunity to facilitate real learning in our students. By making clear to our 
students a story's objective, context, and applicability, we enhance our teaching 
effectiveness. Creating succinct process-level objectives from service management 
typologies, which are suitable for storytelling, can be difficult, so to facilitate this 
process, we present a technique for creating process-level objectives from service 
typologies using theory development. Being a prepared storyteller is not enough; we must 
also use tools to involve our students in the storytelling process. We must combine our 
prepared storytelling with bidirectional storytelling from our students to capture fully the 
learning power of storytelling. 
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D.2 Introduction 
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times" (The Tale of Two Cities 
(Dickens, 2003)). "All Children, except one, grow up." (Peter Pan (Barrie, 2003)). "Call 
me Ishmael" (Moby-Dick (Melville, 2002)). Just as the first lines of these novels have 
imprinted themselves on the consciousness of our society, so too do good stories make an 
indelible impression upon the memories of our students. 
For example, during a rather boring lecture in a required business class outside 
my undergraduate major, the professor droned on about disparate topics, but stopped on 
the topic of lifelong learning to tell the following story: 
A new regional manager of a large retail chain took notice of one of the 
stores he visited during his introductory tour because it stood out above 
and beyond all the other stores in appearance and performance. The end-
caps, the specials, and the in-store displays looked as though they had 
jumped straight off the page of a marketing campaign in a high-end 
magazine. The area manager's respect deepened as he realized the 
manager of this store was the only one in the region without a college 
degree; the store manager's management training had come entirely at the 
hands of the U.S. Marine Core. After touring the store, the area manager 
made a pilgrimage to the store manager's office at the back of the store, 
and he confronted the store manager. "How did you learn to manage a 
retail operation like this in the Marines?" The store manager did not reply; 
he simply went to his desk and opened its bottom drawer. The drawer was 
filled with industry-leading retail management magazines. The store 
manager simply said, "Everything I know I learned from these 
magazines." 
Three years after graduation, I received a promotion from internal auditor to manager of 
transportation, and to say I knew nothing about trucking would be an understatement, but, 
remembering my professor's narrative, I filled my office drawer with industry-leading 
trucking magazines. In less than a year, the unit had turned from a loss to a profit, and I 
became the company's expert in trucking-related issues. Most of us can likely cite similar 
stories that have formed our education and shaped our decisions. By sharing with our 
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students the stories that impressed us, we offer them a vivid way to remember the lessons 
we teach. 
Storytelling demonstrated its effectiveness as a vehicle for teaching operations 
concepts when Goldratt's book The Goal (1986) became a runaway bestseller. At the 
time of its publication, The Goal was a novelty because of its ability to teach the theory 
of constraints while telling the story of how Alex learned how to increase throughput, 
save his factory, and resurrect the love in his marriage all in the same novel. Since The 
Goal, other authors have also used storytelling with great success: examples include 
Leadership and Self-Deception (Institute, 2002), If You Want it Done Right, You Don't 
Have to Do it Yourself. (Genett, 2003), and most recently, The Gold Mine (Balle' & 
Balle1,2005), which was written to teach the principles of lean management. These books 
all take the approach of using a novel to teach basic business and human management 
principles. The story is the vehicle for making what might be a mundane subject 
meaningful for the reader. 
But while stories can easily capture a class's attention, sometimes they do little 
more than entertain: Storytelling can be simply fascinating or it can rise to the level of 
powerful teaching. By using storytelling effectively, service management researchers can 
unlock the pathway to the minds and hearts of students (Harris, 2000). In the first section 
of this article we will highlight the three essential principles of stories required to produce 
learning within students. In the penultimate section we will describe a technique for 
finding teaching objectives in the service management literature, and we will demonstrate 
how to go from teaching objectives to storytelling. Finally, we emphasize that true 
leaning is based in the students, and to achieve the full purpose of learning from 
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storytelling it must be bidirectional, or in other words the students must also tell stories to 
D.3 How to Use Storytelling in Teaching Services 
Many key concepts are lost on students when they are not illustrated by a story. 
Take, for example, one of the least interesting, simplest, and yet exquisitely powerful 
quality tools: the lowly and simple checklist. The checklist can increase process control 
and improve quality in almost any environment that might confront our students upon 
graduation. Additionally, it is virtually costless and easy to implement, yet many 
managers fail to use this powerful tool because they fail to see how it will solve their 
problems or improve their systems. A teacher trying to share this simple concept could 
show a checklist on a power point slide or recommend its usefulness in a lecture, and 
students would likely forget it before they leave the room. But use a story/narrative , and 
they might never be able to forget it. 
On October 30, 1935, at Wright Air Field in Dayton, Ohio, the U.S. Army 
Air Corps held a flight competition for airplane manufacturers vying to 
build its next-generation long-range bomber. It wasn't supposed to be 
much of a competition. In early evaluations, the Boeing Corporation's 
gleaming aluminum-alloy Model 299 had trounced the designs of Martin 
and Douglas. Boeing's plane could carry five times as many bombs as the 
Army had requested; it could fly faster than previous bombers, and almost 
twice as far. A Seattle newspaperman who had glimpsed the plane called it 
the "flying fortress," and the name stuck. The flight "competition," 
according to the military historian Phillip Meilinger, was regarded as a 
mere formality. The Army planned to order at least sixty-five of the 
aircraft. 
A small crowd of Army brass and manufacturing executives 
watched as the Model 299 test plane taxied onto the runway. It was sleek 
and impressive, with a hundred-and-three-foot wingspan and four engines 
jutting out from the wings, rather than the usual two. The plane roared 
down the tarmac, lifted off smoothly, and climbed sharply to three 
hundred feet. Then it stalled, turned on one wing, and crashed in a fiery 
explosion. Two of the five crew members died, including the pilot, Major 
PloyerP.Hill. 
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An investigation revealed that nothing mechanical had gone 
wrong. The crash had been due to "pilot error," the report said. 
Substantially more complex than previous aircraft, the new plane required 
the pilot to attend to the four engines, a retractable landing gear, new wing 
flaps, electric trim tabs that needed adjustment to maintain control at 
different airspeeds, and constant-speed propellers whose pitch had to be 
regulated with hydraulic controls, among other features. While doing all 
this, Hill had forgotten to release a new locking mechanism on the 
elevator and rudder controls. The Boeing model was deemed, as a 
newspaper put it, "too much airplane for one man to fly." The Army Air 
Corps declared Douglas's smaller design the winner. Boeing nearly went 
bankrupt. 
Still, the Army purchased a few aircraft from Boeing as test planes, 
and some insiders remained convinced that the aircraft was flyable. So a 
group of test pilots got together and considered what to do. 
They could have required Model 299 pilots to undergo more 
training. But it was hard to imagine having more experience and expertise 
than Major Hill, who had been the U.S. Army Air Corps' chief of flight 
testing. Instead, they came up with an ingeniously simple approach: they 
created a pilot's checklist, with step-by-step checks for takeoff, flight, 
landing, and taxiing. Its mere existence indicated how far aeronautics had 
advanced. In the early years of flight, getting an aircraft into the air might 
have been nerve-racking, but it was hardly complex. Using a checklist for 
takeoff would no more have occurred to a pilot than to a driver backing a 
car out of the garage. But this new plane was too complicated to be left to 
the memory of any pilot, however expert. 
With the checklist in hand, the pilots went on to fly the Model 299 
a total of 1.8 million miles without one accident. The Army ultimately 
ordered almost thirteen thousand of the aircraft, which it dubbed the B-17. 
And, because flying the behemoth was now possible, the Army gained a 
decisive air advantage in the Second World War which enabled its 
devastating bombing campaign across Nazi Germany. (Gawande, 2007, p. 
89) 
The idea of a simple operations tool saving a major company like Boeing and giving a 
strategic advantage to allied forces in World War II is intoxicating, but despite the power 
and entertainment value in this story, it is still not enough to promote change and 
checklist use within our students. Without a teacher to give framework to the narrative, 
some students would simply be fascinated by the military history presented; other 
students would assume the pilots were missing the obvious and discount the checklist; 
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and finally others might conclude that the checklist was a neat trick, but has no 
applicability to the circumstances they face. This is where the power of focus and the 
power of a well-prepared teacher can take a fascinating narrative and turn it into a 
learning opportunity. As we go through this article, we explore the concepts that can raise 
this story from the level of simply being fascinating to the level of memorable teaching. 
D.3.1 Release the Power of Storytelling Through 
Objective, Context, and Applicability 
Storytelling must have an objective to rise above the level of simply being 
fascinating. Before the storytelling begins, a teacher should start with a teaching 
objective. For example, Abraham Lincoln has gained mythical status in the United States 
partially because of his ability to communicate. One of his favorite communication 
modes was storytelling. His stories were not simply entertaining tales of small towns in 
Minnesota with strong women, good looking men, and above-average children; they 
became legendary and memorable because they had specific teaching objectives. 
Abraham Lincoln had no love for favor seekers, especially when they took 
his time away from the duties of the presidency during the Civil War. On 
one occasion, he gathered together a number of would-be office-holders 
and told them this story: 
"There was once a King who wished to go out hunting, so he asked 
his weather minister if it was going to rain. The minister assured him that 
it would not. On the way to the woods, the King passed a farmer who was 
working the land with his donkey. The farmer warned the King that it 
would rain soon, but the King just laughed and continued on. A few 
minutes later it was pouring, and the King and his companions were 
soaked to their skin. Upon return to the castle, the King dismissed his 
weather minister and sent for the farmer. He asked the man how he knew 
it was going to rain. 
'"It was not me, your Majesty. It was my donkey. He always 
droops one ear when it is going to rain.' 
"So the King bought the donkey from the farmer and gave him the 
position of weather minister at court. This was where the King made his 
mistake. 
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'"How was that?' asked several people in the audience. 
'"Because ever since then,' Lincoln continued, 'every jackass 
wants an office. Gentlemen, leave your credentials and when the war is 
over you'll hear from me' (Lincoln, 1862). 
At the conclusion of this story, Abraham Lincoln's audience was left with no 
doubt about his feelings in regard to their attempts to petition him for an appointed office. 
In this story, President Lincoln demonstrates how we begin the story selection process by 
first being clear about what our teaching objective is. We lose our audience, or at least 
our ability to teach our audience could be described as tenable if we are unsure of our 
own objective in telling a story. 
Next in importance to having a firm objective in good storytelling is context, 
which can be defined the story's setting having the ability to give the audience an 
experience they can personally relate to their own lives or circumstances. Note how in the 
previous story Abraham Lincoln used the context of a king making political appointments 
to carry his message to the presidential office-seekers. The context clearly set the stage 
for the listeners who were hoping for a political appointment. By using the skill of 
context development we can convey our objectives as clearly as President Lincoln. One 
of the major roadblocks to teaching services comes from OM's roots in manufacturing, 
which is a foreign environment for most of our students; thus we can exponentially 
increase our teaching ability with storytelling as we take ideas from manufacturing and 
contextually encapsulate our stories in service processes. 
For an example of the power of context and for a lead into our third principle of 
storytelling for teaching, we need no further than The Goal. The Goal's sequels—// 's Not 
Luck (Goldratt, 1994), The Critical Chain (Goldratt, 1997), and Necessary But Not 
Sufficient (Goldratt, Ptak, & Schragenheim, 2000)—are similar, story-based management 
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novels, but combined their sales have paled in comparison to The Goal. The Goal has two 
advantages over its sequels: context and applicability. 
First, context: The Goal plays out not only in a factory, but also in cub-scout hike 
with Herbie, a particularly slow cub scout. Herbie's story has been vital to the success of 
The Goal because it deliverers a context with which everyone can relate: Even those who 
have never been in a factory can relate to Herbie. In a very subtle way, Herbie releases 
the power of context to all the readers unfamiliar with factories and has contributed to the 
book's runaway success. In contrast, Necessary But Not Sufficient attempts to showcase 
the power of combining the theory of constraints with ERP software, but the entire book 
is written in the context of the ERP installers, thus making it less than helpful to those 
having the software installed, which group comprises the largest population that might 
find the book relevant. 
Second, applicability: The Goal not only tells a story, but also succinctly 
summarizes the learning that is to be taken away and how that learning can be directly 
applied. Goldratt's other books are good, but they leave the reader often wondering what 
the central point of the book was, or how to apply the learning obtained in the book. The 
Goal, on the other hand, specifically shows the reader the process for finding a bottleneck 
elevating the bottleneck once it is found. Applicability anchors The Goal in minds and 
hearts of its readers (it is for this reason that we never teach an introductory operations 
class without The Goal). It's Not Luck in contrast, introduces Goldratt's revolutionary 
"Evaporating Cloud" thinking technique, but its explanation about how to apply or use it 
effectively is scarce at best. Thus the book, while good, is very forgettable. 
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Other excellent examples in management literature of using context and 
applicability in storytelling are Good to Great (Collins, 2001) and The Toyota Way 
(Liker, 2004). They use stories like the building of the first Lexus, the creation of the 
Prius, and the rise of Walgreens to teach very specific and simple ideas. Until one reads 
the story of the ubiquitous Walgreens chain taking advantage of the Internet more 
effectively than its dot-com competitors, one cannot really understand how the "Crawl, 
Walk, Run" principle applies to Collins' wider "Hedgehog" concept. 
On July 28, 1999, drugstore.com—one of the first Internet pharmacies— 
sold shares of its stock to the public. Within seconds of the opening bell, 
the stock multiplied nearly threefold to $65 per share. Four weeks later, 
the stock closed as high as $69, creating a market valuation of over $3.5 
billion. Not bad for an enterprise that had sold products for less than nine 
months, had fewer than 500 employees, offered no hope of investor 
dividends for years (if not decades), and deliberately planned to lose 
hundreds of millions of dollars before turning a single dollar of profit.... 
At the high point of this frenzy, drugstore.com issued its challenge 
to Walgreens. At first, Walgreens' stock suffered from the invasion of the 
dotcoms, losing over 40 percent of its price in the months leading up to the 
drugstore.com public offering. Wrote Forbes in October 1999: "Investors 
seem to think the Web race will be won by competitors who hit the ground 
running—companies like drugstore.com, which trades at 398 times 
revenue, rather than Walgreen, trading at 1.4 times revenue." Analysts 
downgraded Walgreens' stock, and the pressure on Walgreens to react to 
the Internet threat increased as nearly $15 billion in market value 
evaporated. 
Walgreens' response in the midst of this frenzy? 
"We're a crawl, walk, run company," Dan Jorndt told Forbes in 
describing his deliberate, methodical approach to the Internet. Instead of 
reacting like Chicken Little, Walgreens executives did something quite 
unusual for the times. They decided to pause and reflect. They decided to 
use their brains. They decided to think! 
Slow at first (crawl), Walgreens began experimenting with a Web 
site while engaging in intense internal dialogue and debate about its 
implications, within the context of its own peculiar Hedgehog Concept. 
"How will the Internet connect to our convenience concept? How can we 
tie it to our economic denominator of cash flow per customer visit? How 
can we use the Web to enhance what we do better than any other company 
in the world and in a way that we're passionate about?".... 
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Then a little faster (walk), Walgreens began to find ways to tie the 
Internet directly to its sophisticated inventory-and-distribution model 
and—ultimately—its convenience concept. Fill your prescription on-line, 
pop into your car and go to your local Walgreens drive-through (in 
whatever city you happen to be in at the moment), zoom past the window 
with hardly a moment's pause picking up your bottle of whatever. Or have 
it shipped to you, if that's more convenient. There was no manic lurching 
about, no hype, no bravado—just calm, deliberate pursuit of 
understanding, followed by clam, deliberate steps forward. 
Then, finally (run!), Walgreens bet big, launching an Internet site 
as sophisticated and well designed as most pure dot-coms.... Precisely one 
year after the Forbes article, Walgreens had figured out how to harness the 
Internet to accelerate momentum, making it just that much more 
unstoppable.... From its low point in 1999 at the depths of the dot-com 
scare, Walgreens' stock price nearly doubled within a year. 
And what of drugstore.com? Continuing to accumulate massive 
losses, it announced a layoff to conserve cash.... It has lost nearly all of its 
initial value. While Walgreens went from crawl to walk to run, 
drugstore.com went from run to walk to crawl. (Collins, 2001, pp. 144-
146) 
Jim Collins's use of storytelling trumps Goldratt's later books because he uses the 
narrative to highlight the principle being taught and to give it context, but then 
thoroughly explains the principle and displays its application so that the reader is not lost 
in the story. For example, Collins objective is to demonstrate how having a simple 
strategy, a "Hedgehog Concept," guided one of his sample "Good to Great Companies," 
Walgreens (which is also the context), during a turbulent technological revolution. In the 
paragraph describing Walgreens' crawl phase, Walgreens' executives ask specific 
questions about how the internet will relate to their hedgehog concept: "How will the 
Internet connect to our convenience concept? How can we tie it to our economic 
denominator of cash flow per customer visit?" In this way, Jim weaves his objective into 
the story's fabric. Finally, Jim demonstrates applicability of the hedgehog concept by 
using Walgreens' crawl, walk, run principle as an example for how the hedgehog concept 
can be applied to other industries, and just in case a reader misses the application portion 
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of the story, he summarizes the learning at the end of each chapter. We encourage the 
reader to read Good to Great and learn from Jim Collins's style. 
D.4 What to Teach: Reaching Our Students With 
Service Management Research Through Stories 
Boje (1991a) highlighted that all good stories have three points in common: 
context, story parts, and relevance to the readings. (We highly recommend this article to 
all who would like to become better at the art of storytelling, and who would like to 
become better at teaching the art of storytelling to their students.) We have hit upon 
context and upon relevance (applicability). Intuitively, it is simple to see their importance 
in storytelling, yet many times we have a hard time making them fit with the "story 
parts." Story parts are the details of the story that allow the objective of the story to come 
out and impress the minds of our students. To be able to get the story parts right, we ask 
the following question, "How can we bring service management research into the 
classroom through succinct objectives?" 
Powerful books like Good to Great, The Toyota Way, and The Goal narrow large 
amounts of information into clear and concise points. Collins (2001) says good to great 
companies have a "hedgehog concept," a simple concept that drives their corporate 
vision. Likewise, effective stories narrow down service management concepts to a 
process level in a context that students can understand them and achieve applicability. 
While the previously told story about the checklist saving the B17 program is illustrative, 
it is incomplete until we tie objectives and application of the story to service management 
principles on a level our students can understand. And we can only do this if we are very 
granular in the way we interpret service management principles to our students. 
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Remember the old saying: "Don't be so clear that people can understand: be so clear that 
they cannot misunderstand." 
D.4.1 Granularizing Service Typologies 
To tell a story with teaching potential, we need to start with a goal to help our 
students understand service management's granular principles. When succinct and 
granular principles such as a "bottleneck," a "hedgehog concept," or the "bullwhip 
effect" are identified, teaching objectives become clear because the principles can be 
used to distinguish between similar processes in the same industry. For example, the 
bottleneck principle can be used to explain why the service process at sandwich stand A 
can produce more sandwiches than the service process at sandwich stand B. Two recent 
examples of articles that have succeeded in bringing service ideas down to a succinct and 
granular level have been (Frei, 2006) and (DeHoratius & Raman, 2008). For example, 
Frei (2006) granularizes customer induced variation into five distinct types: arrival, 
request, capability, effort, and subjective preference variability; she then demonstrates 
how each type of variability affects services on the process level. She tells the following 
story to illustrate how Starbucks institutionalized the control of customer induced 
capability variability: 
Starbucks provides an excellent example of the deft handling of capability 
variability. The coffee shop chain allows customers to choose among 
many permutations of sizes, flavors, and preparation techniques in its 
beverages. In the interests of filling orders accurately and efficiently, 
Starbucks trains its counter clerks to call out orders to beverage makers in 
a particular sequence. It is all better when the customers themselves can 
do so. Therefore, Starbucks attempts to teach customers its ordering 
protocol in at least two ways. It produces a "guide to ordering" pamphlet 
for customers to peruse, and it instructs clerks to repeat the order to the 
customer not in the way it was presented but in the correct way. The tone 
is not one of rebuke, but nevertheless most customers learn to avoid the 
implied correction by stating their order in the way that helps Starbucks's 
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operations-with no hit to the service experience. Indeed, for some 
customers, getting the order right is an aspiration, a small victory on the 
way to the office. It's a clever solution, achieving an uncompromised 
reduction of variability, (p. 97) 
Frei's successful teaching in this story lies in her ability to take a service 
management principle down to the process level. At this level, the principle can be 
processed and compared by companies in the same industry. Unfortunately, because 
service management literature is fairly new, the majority of our research is linked to high-
level typologies. 
Typologies usually do not make process to process comparisons, but instead 
compare processes across industry. Lovelock (1983), for example, uses a network of four 
2 x 2 matrices to segment services between industries such as healthcare and banking 
because healthcare is tangible and done to people while banking is intangible and done to 
things. Such high-level comparisons are common to fields in their infancy; the physical 
sciences also began with categorizations of typologies because until one animal or one 
process can be separated from another for systematic reasons, it is difficult if not 
impossible for learning to begin. As it grows increasingly sophisticated, science allows us 
to become more and more specific, or granular. For example, the first segregation or 
typology of animals one learns about in grammar school science divides animals into 
groups of fish, fowls, mammals, amphibians, and reptiles. While these categorizations 
start learning on a base level, they do little to help on the granular level. This typology 
teaches that both whales and squirrels are mammals, but the typology does little to help in 
understanding the behavior of either creature. It is only through the progression of 
science that useful specificity is eventually gained. 
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The beginning of service sciences started in a similar manner with high-level 
typologies that set the base for learning. For example, Chase (1978), who created one of 
the earliest typologies, focused on how the amount of customer contact in a service either 
increases or decreases the efficiency of the service process. In the article Chase 
categorizes hotels and healthcare as both being high contact services. Again this is useful 
at the 50-foot level, but like the classification of whales and squirrels as mammals, it does 
little to explain process differences between surgery and staying a night at the Marriott. 
As service science has progressed, successive typologies have been produced in 
the effort to become increasingly granular on the process level. (Our purpose is not to list 
and detail all the many useful service typologies that have been presented over the past 3 
decades, but to demonstrate a method for granularizing the concepts to create clear and 
concise objectives for storytelling. We encourage readers to examine Cook, Goh and 
Chung's (1999) extensive and thoughtful article for a full review of service typologies.) 
While successive typologies have incrementally contributed to our understanding of 
service management, many still contain the same flaw: They tend to group industries 
using wide swaths. Verma and Young (2000) suggest that groupings such as 
Schmenner's (1986) where all airlines, trucking, and hotels are service factories; all 
hospitals and repair services are service shops; all retail businesses are mass service; 
whereas all doctors, lawyers, accountants and architects are professional service 
providers are fine for theoretical development, but are too broad for practical application. 
Verma and Young (2000) go on to demonstrate that there are distinct service strategies 
and groupings even within a single low contact industry such as car repair. Because 
operations is process oriented, we all inherently understand the need for our research to 
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become more relevant on the process level, but our typologies for the most part are not 
granular enough yet to focus on process differences in a single industry, and without 
succinct process level principles it is difficult to create clear objectives that give 
storytelling its power. The challenge for teaching services through storytelling is to take 
the higher-level comparisons across industries and bring them down to the more granular 
level of comparing services across service processes so that we can have clear objectives 
to inform our storytelling. 
In the next section we demonstrate the process of granularizing a typology and 
using it to teach storytelling in one of our healthcare management classes. 
D.4.2 Using Theory Building Theory to Draw Out 
the "Objective" in the Typology 
As editor of AMR, Whetten (1989) proposed the building blocks of theory 
development as "what," "how," "why," and "who, where, when." We have co-opted the 
theory building blocks to create tools for transforming across industry comparisons found 
in typologies to the across process level comparisons useful in generating succinct 
objectives. Each of Whetten's questions can be used as a key to the next step in creating 
clear objectives. We used this process to examine all the service process typologies found 
in (Cook et al., 1999), and in doing so we have drawn out a number of endogenous and 
exogenous factors that increase or decrease complexity in managing services at the 
process level, but for brevity we will demonstrate the process on a single paper. 
We will demonstrate our process using (Shostack, 1987). We would like to note 
that this process is one we found useful, but certainly not the only useful process 
available for drawing out objectives in the service management literature. Some research 
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such as (DeHoratius & Raman, 2008; Frei, 2006) may already be granular enough to use 
in storytelling at publication, and other papers will contain parts that are granular and 
parts that are not. The important item to remember is that when principles are granular 
they allow for clear objectives and better storytelling. 
D.4.2.1 "What" are the Main Constructs? 
Every typology has anchoring constructs that create the delineation between high 
level service process groupings. We propose the first step to take in creating granular 
process steps is to identify the primary constructs by definition. Whetten (1989) labels the 
primary constructs the "What" of theory building. We identified Shostack's (1987) two 
most prominent constructs as complexity and divergence. They are defined as follows: 
Complexity is defined as "the number and intricacy of the steps in a process. Complex 
procedures have a lot of steps, and may include a lot of process branches. A process 
branch is a rule that changes the procedure based on a condition" (Sampson, 2001, p. 85). 
Divergence is defined as unknown "nature of the steps: divergent procedures have steps 
that can be handled any number of ways depending on the circumstances of production" 
(Sampson, 2001, p. 85). 
D.4.2.2 "How" Could the Constructs Be Used to Differentiate 
Between Different Service Processes? 
Once the main constructs are succinctly listed and defined, the next step requires 
the drivers of the constructs to be listed. In or around the definitions of the constructs 
authors usually provide the drivers of the constructs; the drivers are the characteristics 
that either increase or decrease the constructs' potency. The drivers provide the key to 
unlocking the "How" or more granular aspects of the service process. For example, in the 
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complexity definition, Shostack lists an increased number of steps and branches as the 
leading cause to increased complexity, while divergence is increased by the unknown 
nature of the processes steps. We have taken literary license and labeled each driver as a 
type of complexity. 
After identifying the drivers, we define them by demonstrating "how" the drivers 
will either increase or decrease process complexity. A succinct "how" definition 
facilitates the granularization of service management principles and the creation of 
objectives. 
Step Complexity: the number of steps in a process. 
Path Complexity: the number of paths or branches a service can follow. 
Definitional Complexity: how definable a service's steps and paths are before the 
service process begins. 
D.4.2.3 "Why" Would Change in These Drivers Be Important in 
Service Process Management? 
Tight "how" statements give rise to "why" statements; and why statements create 
delineation between service processes on the process level. For example, heart bypass 
surgery has many steps and thus is high in step complexity, but the steps are definable 
and can be consistently executed by a well-trained staff. On the other hand, treating 
depression might have less step complexity, but it has exponentially more definitional 
complexity because of the ambiguity in treatment steps caused by a lack of definition in 
the steps of care. Patients' backgrounds and chemistry are highly variable, which causes 
their responses to different therapies to be highly variable. The "why" statement's power 
of delineation finalizes a well thought out objective. 
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Writing a "why" statement requires the contrasting of each "how" statement in a 
measurable way. The "why" statement allows the drivers to delineate between service 
processes on a granular level. The "why" statement asks, why does measurably changing 
this driver affect the service process? The "why" statement is not a question; it is a 
statement that demonstrates the application of the "how" statement and in so doing 
answers the question "why" is this important. To insure we are granular enough we add 
to the "why" statement the sandwich shop statement because "why" statements that can 
be understood in the context of a sandwich shop exemplify objectives that are clear and 
comprehendible. Following are some "why" statements. 
Step Complexity. The number of steps in a process. (Dave's wound was more 
complex than Steve's because it required four stitches to Steve's three stitches. / Dave's 
sandwich was more complex to fix than Steve's because he required three different types 
of cheese to Steve's singular choice.) 
Path Complexity. The number of paths or branches a service can follow. (All 
withdrawals from an ATM must be in denominations of $20, thus there is only one 
pathway to withdraw $100. But when using a teller there are an almost unlimited amount 
of pathways or branches that could be used to satisfy the request to withdraw $100. / 
Subway's sandwich process is more complex than Quiznos' because its menu is larger, 
and thus customer choices can direct servers down a larger variety of pathways.) 
Definitional Complexity. How definable a service's steps and paths are before 
the service process begins. (Surgeons in the 21st century confront less definitional 
complexity than earlier surgeons because imaging technology has decreased the number 
of unknowns a surgeon confronts before operating on a patient. / At Dave's "your way 
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sandwich shop," a customer is promised the sandwich of her choice made any way she 
likes it. Dave's servers must have the ability to respond to a number of unknown requests 
and are paid more because they experience more definitional complexity than Subway's 
servers, who are trained specifically on all 15 types of sandwiches the menu specifies.) 
D.4.2.4 "Who, Where, When" - Who Else Uses These Principles, 
Where and Why? 
The process of writing the "why" statement completes the process of creating an 
objective usable in storytelling, but understanding increases as one also asks the 
questions "who, where, and when." Whetten (1989) uses the first three questions (what, 
how, why) to demonstrate the building of a theory. He further explains the last three 
questions (who, where, when) set boundaries around the theory explaining when or when 
not it might be applicable. 
We have found asking the "who, where, and when" questions increases our 
classroom readiness because they increase our understanding of the objective's 
boundaries; we ask questions such as: 
When might allowing increased definitional complexity increase customer 
service? 
Where are the boundaries of human capacity to efficiently handle increased path 
complexity and how might technology assist in reshaping these boundaries? 
And who else uses these underlying principles in their typologies? 
For example, treating both the heart bypass patient and the depressed patient 
requires customization and high contact, two important parts of previous typologies 
(Chase, 1978; Lovelock, 1983; Schmenner, 1986), yet it seems clear on the granular level 
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the source of their complexity differs significantly because of known and unknown 
processes steps. 
D.4.3 Taking Objectives From the Research and Using Them 
in Storytelling 
Researchers in education frequently highlight the value of clear objectives 
(McKeachie & Svinicki, 2006). Most educators try to follow this advice by using clear 
objectives in their course syllabi; popular OM textbooks are extending this practice by 
starting each discussion by detailing distinct learning objectives before beginning of each 
chapter (Jacobs & Chase, 2008; Russel & Taylor, 2009). Likewise, to enhance student 
learning, teachers should state clear objects obtained from their research before they 
begin storytelling. 
D.4.3.1 Examples of Presenting Objectives to Students 
For example, we would take the objectives we previously drew out of the service 
management research and present them to our class in a power point format: 
Step Complexity. The number of steps in a process. (Dave's wound was more 
complex than Steve's because it required four stitches to Steve's three stitches.) 
Path Complexity. The number of paths or branches a service can follow. (All 
withdrawals from an ATM must be in denominations of $20, thus there is only one 
pathway to withdraw $100. But when using a teller there are an almost unlimited amount 
of pathways or branches that could be used to satisfy the request to withdraw $100.) 
Definitional Complexity. How definable a service's steps and paths are before 
the service process begins. (Surgeons in the 21st century confront less definitional 
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complexity than earlier surgeons because imaging technology has decreased the number 
of unknowns a surgeon confronts before operating on a patient.) 
D.4.3.2 Teaching With Objectives 
Once the classroom clearly understands the objectives, we turn the power point 
off and begin the storytelling portion of the lesson. As stated in the first section, once the 
objective is clearly understood a narrative needs to be chosen from within service 
management that has sufficient context and applicability to enhance learning within our 
students. In The Goal, Goldratt uses the stories of the plant and of Herbie to teach one 
objective; likewise it may take multiple stories to cover the needed objectives or provide 
the needed context or applicability. 
In one of our lectures on healthcare management, we chose to share the following 
story to convey the previous three complexity objectives. Notice how this story's context 
can be grasped by both medical and nonmedical students; additionally, notice how the 
application of the solution directly addresses step, path, and definitional complexity on 
the process level. 
In 2001, though, a critical-care specialist at Johns Hopkins Hospital named 
Peter Pronovost decided to give checklists a try. He didn't attempt to make 
the checklist cover everything; he designed it to tackle just one problem: 
line infections. On a sheet of plain paper, he plotted out the steps to take in 
order to avoid infections when putting a line in. Doctors are supposed to 
(1) wash their hands with soap, (2) clean the patient's skin with 
chlorhexidine antiseptic, (3) put sterile drapes over the entire patient, (4) 
wear a sterile mask, hat, gown, and gloves, and (5) put a sterile dressing 
over the catheter site once the line is in. Check, check, check, check, 
check. These steps are no-brainers; they have been known and taught for 
years. So it seemed silly to make a checklist just for them. Still, Pronovost 
asked the nurses in his I.C.U. to observe the doctors for a month as they 
put lines into patients, and record how often they completed each step. In 
more than a third of patients, they skipped at least one. 
The next month, he and his team persuaded the hospital 
administration to authorize nurses to stop doctors if they saw them 
skipping a step on the checklist; nurses were also to ask them each day 
whether any lines ought to be removed, so as not to leave them in longer 
than necessary. This was revolutionary. Nurses have always had their 
ways of nudging a doctor into doing the right thing, ranging from the 
gentle reminder ("Um, did you forget to put on your mask, doctor?") to 
more forceful methods (I've had a nurse body check me when she thought 
I hadn't put enough drapes on a patient). But many nurses aren't sure 
whether this is their place, or whether a given step is worth a 
confrontation. (Does it really matter whether a patient's legs are draped for 
a line going into the chest?) The new rule made it clear: if doctors didn't 
follow every step on the checklist, the nurses would have backup from the 
administration to intervene. 
Pronovost and his colleagues monitored what happened for a year 
afterward. The results were so dramatic that they weren't sure whether to 
believe them: the ten-day line-infection rate went from eleven per cent to 
zero. So they followed patients for fifteen more months. Only two line 
infections occurred during the entire period. They calculated that, in this 
one hospital, the checklist had prevented forty-three infections and eight 
deaths, and saved two million dollars in costs. 
Pronovost recruited some more colleagues, and they made some 
more checklists. One aimed to insure that nurses observe patients for pain 
at least once every four hours and provide timely pain medication. This 
reduced the likelihood of a patient's experiencing untreated pain from 
forty-one per cent to three per cent. They tested a checklist for patients on 
mechanical ventilation, making sure that, for instance, the head of each 
patient's bed was propped up at least thirty degrees so that oral secretions 
couldn't go into the windpipe, and antacid medication was given to 
prevent stomach ulcers. The proportion of patients who didn't receive the 
recommended care dropped from seventy per cent to four per cent; the 
occurrence of pneumonias fell by a quarter; and twenty-one fewer patients 
died than in the previous year. The researchers found that simply having 
the doctors and nurses in the I.C.U. make their own checklists for what 
they thought should be done each day improved the consistency of care to 
the point that, within a few weeks, the average length of patient stay in 
intensive care dropped by half. 
The checklists provided two main benefits, Pronovost observed. 
First, they helped with memory recall, especially with mundane matters 
that are easily overlooked in patients undergoing more drastic events. 
(When you're worrying about what treatment to give a woman who won't 
stop seizing, it's hard to remember to make sure that the head of her bed is 
in the right position.) A second effect was to make explicit the minimum, 
expected steps in complex processes. Pronovost was surprised to discover 
how often even experienced personnel failed to grasp the importance of 
certain precautions. In a survey of I.C.U. staff taken before introducing the 
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ventilator checklists, he found that half hadn't realized that there was 
evidence strongly supporting giving ventilated patients antacid 
medication. Checklists established a higher standard of baseline 
performance. (Gawande, 2007, pp. 90-91) 
By starting with clear process level objectives, and by providing context 
(healthcare management), and by using a story that applies directly to the objectives, we 
set the stage for dramatic learning in our students. Notice how the objectives, our context, 
and the applicability of principles enhance the learning power of this narrative when 
compared to the previous story of checklist use by B17 pilots. First students will 
understand why a check list is needed (to control, step, path, and definitional 
complexity), second they see its applicability to even highly trained service providers, 
and finally they will see its value in the operating room as well as in mundane tasks. 
At this point our students' hearts, minds, and memories have been opened because 
of our careful preparation; now we need to fill them using bidirectional storytelling. By 
encouraging our students to tell stories to us and their classmates, we complete the 
learning process. 
D.5 The Student's Role: Using Bi-Directional 
Storytelling to Draw Out Applicability 
and Relevance From the Hearts 
and Minds of Our Students 
D.5.1 Why Bidirectional Storytelling Is Important 
Oftentimes as teachers we put the majority of our effort into preparing what the 
students will receive from us, and thus consequently we spend very little time considering 
what our students will do in the classroom (Packer 1996). Steven Covey, one of the most 
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well known management consultants, always teaches the students of his seminars to 
return home and teach the principles they have learned during the seminar to others 
because he knows that through the process of teaching the material to others his students 
will begin to internalize the material. Boje's (1991b) research confirms Covey's approach 
as it demonstrates storytelling is a vital skill for managers to possess if they want to 
communicate effectively and generate results. Additionally, research has shown that the 
act of storytelling itself is a powerful pedagogical tool (Jones, 2001). Like Steven Covey, 
we want to enhance the teaching power of our storytelling and to do so we need to 
encourage our students tell us and their classmates stories. In other words, after our 
stories are told to the students in one direction and their stories come back to us in the 
opposite direction, we create the dynamic we label bidirectional storytelling. 
As our students tell stories, the objectives, context, and application of our original 
story all become internalized on a level that listening can never reach. Confucius' remark 
on doing applies here: "I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand" 
(Confucius, 2009). 
Service management has a clear advantage over other OM topics because unlike 
high-tech manufacturing, supply chain design, project management, or product design, 
services are something everyone has had experiences with. (This is why one colleague 
mentioned that the international business trips popular in executive education almost 
exclusively visit manufacturing sites and rarely visit service sites because everyone has 
experienced a service.) Thus we can be confident that almost every student will have a 
story to tell about services as either a service customer or service producer. 
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We use the following three techniques to draw storytelling out of our students: 
questioning for large groups, structured sharing for small groups, and small stakes writing 
for individual work. 
D.5.2 Using the Structure of Questions to Engage 
Large Groups in Bidirectional Storytelling 
Either directly after the conclusion of the narrative or directly after a summation 
of the story's main takeaway s, the professor should generate large group discussion about 
the story in the form of three types of interpretation questions: search, analyze, and apply. 
Solomon, Rosenburg, and Bezdek (1964) were some of the pioneers who proved that 
teachers who used interpretation questions produced gains in student comprehension 
(McKeachie & Svinicki, 2006). Interpretation questions engage students on a deeper 
level. We suggest that this question-asking segment take no longer than 5 or 10 minutes 
to keep the class flowing smoothly. 
D.5.2.1 Search Questions 
Search questions ask students to participate in storytelling by asking them to 
search their memories for stories to share. Search questions help students to connect with 
the story as they realize their experiences have elements in common to the service 
processes in the story. Examples of search questions used in teaching the previous story 
include: 
Describe to me a time when you experienced a drastically different level of 
service from one visit to the next at same venue or drastically different level of service 
when compared to that of a friend or relative who visited the same venue? - Follow up 
question: What role did definitional complexity play in the varying service levels? 
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Tell us of a time when you or a relative were subject to a medical error? - Follow 
up: Was the error related to one of these three complexities, and could a check list or 
mistake proofing device have prevented the error? 
D.5.2.2 Analyze Questions 
Analyze questions cause students to examine the story itself and confront the 
actions of its participants by asking why they took the actions they did and what the 
consequences were. Examples of analyze questions used in teaching the previous story 
include: 
Why did Dr. Provonost have the nurses simply measure the process for the first 
month of the implementation? - Follow up question: How would creating measurements 
of results change the service processes where you currently work? 
Why was it important for Dr. Provonost to seek the administration's approval for 
nurses to stop doctors who missed a step in the central line insertion process? - Follow 
up: Can anyone share with the class an experience where a nurse or other front line 
employee was in a better position to control quality than higher skilled employees such as 
doctors? 
D.5.2.3 Apply Questions 
Apply questions require students to make connections between the current class 
material and material taught on previous occasions. As students synthesize the class 
material, they begin to see how the material connects between class periods and they 
form new stories in their minds. Examples of apply questions used in teaching the 
previous story include: 
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Remembering our previous discussion on the seven forms of waste (Rother & 
Shook, 1999), what forms of waste did the simple checklist prevent? - Follow up 
question: Describe a current service process you are a part of and tell us who in that 
process should be the owner of the checklist and why? 
From queuing theory, we learn variability increases the length of time spent in a 
line. What effect would you expect Dr. Provonost's list to have on ICU's throughput and 
why? - Follow up question: Describe a situation where you felt you experienced a service 
script, in your opinion did the service script increase or decrease process throughput? 
D.5.3 Structured Small Group Sharing for Bidirectional Storytelling 
Certain students often tend to monopolize conversations in large classroom 
settings, cutting down on the participation level for large sections of the classroom; 
having students meet in small groups facilitates participation in storytelling by the entire 
class. We have found small group breakout sessions increase not only the number who 
can participate, but also (when they are structured) the quality of the participation. Unless 
the class is populated by highly motivated executive education students, most students 
will need structure and a time limit to encourage readiness and to facilitate storytelling. 
Our approach consists of telling the student they have 5 to 7 minutes to share 
stories amongst themselves. The students break into groups of three or four grouped by 
where they are sitting in the classroom. Next we project questions (similar to the ones 
asked in the previous section) in the front of the classroom. We ask each student to 
respond to one of the questions and share experiences with others in the group. We warn 
students that at the end of the 5- to 7-minute period certain groups will be called upon to 
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share their stories. The time limit, in addition to the thought of sharing stories with the 
entire class, creates an animated environment of abundant storytelling. 
Small group sharing creates the opportunity for the majority of students to share 
stories and creates an environment that allows students to engage each other and 
experience dynamic learning. 
D.5.4 Low-Stakes Writing for Bidirectional Storytelling 
Low-stakes writing consists of short papers written for the students' benefit and 
usually not graded (Elbow & Sorcinelli, 2006). We like this third option because it 
requires all students to participate in the storytelling process. While we usually do not 
grade these papers for content, often they are graded for submission. Low-stakes writing 
encourages thoughtful application of the objective principles without exponentially 
increasing the workload of the professor. Below we provide an example of a low-stakes 
writing assignment linked to the previous story; notice how we link the search, analyze, 
and apply questions to the assignment. 
Using checklists in hospitals is similar to the science behind standard work at 
Toyota (Liker, 2004). At Toyota, standard work procedures for each process are so 
detailed they even describe the order for which bolts are to put into seats (S. Spear & 
Bowen, 1999). Standard work, which manages step complexity and eliminates path and 
definitional complexity, is the basis for all quality improvement at Toyota. Describe on 
one page one service process you were involved in as a provider and one service process 
you were involved in as a customer that was plagued by one or all of the three 
complexities (step, path, definitional). Next using the concepts of standard work and 
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checklists detail how using these tools could have been used in these processes to 
improve their consistency and quality. 
D.5.5 Summary of Bidirectional Storytelling 
Bidirectional storytelling derives its importance from its engagement of the 
students, and not from specific methods we have presented as recommendations. We are 
not suggesting that every story told in class needs to be followed up by a certain amount 
of questions, group activities, or writing assignments, but we are highlighting the 
importance of involving students in the storytelling process to increase their learning and 
to enliven the classroom environment. 
D.6 Conclusion 
In this article, we purposefully do not focus on the delivery of the story itself, but 
rather on how to make storytelling more powerful, which requires the use objectives, 
application, and context. We have also demonstrated how to derive objectives from 
service management typologies using Whetten's (1989) theory building method, and how 
to then combine those objectives with context and application to open the minds and 
hearts of students. And finally, we described tools for encouraging students to participate 
in bidirectional storytelling. 
We purposefully embedded storytelling within the text of this article; our 
objective in doing so was to facilitate the article's teachability. Each story had an 
objective, which facilitated learning within that section of the article. We encourage you 
to do the same in your teaching. Use stories to highlight objectives using context and 
applicability to increase learning. 
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We have taken two different approaches to increasing the storytelling in our 
classes, and each approach seems equally effective. One approach consists of finding 
stories first and then marrying them to objectives. In the search for stories we have found 
The Harvard Business Review, The Wall Street Journal, and Business Week Magazine to 
be excellent sources of material, but often our most powerful stories have been personal 
stories. Students are eager to learn more about their teachers, and by sharing personal 
experiences with services we humanize ourselves to our students. The second approach 
starts with objectives, and then moves towards finding stories to accompany the 
objectives. Objectives of service management are abundant in our literature, and when 
they seem obscured we recommend using the theory questions posited by Whetten (1988) 
to draw them out. As long as the objectives and the stories finally merge, we have found 
it matters little which one is collected first. 
The Ute Indians used to choose their best story teller as their chief (Boje 1991a). 
They valued storytelling as medium for communicating the traditions and knowledge of 
the tribe; likewise, as we prepare and become more effective storytellers we will also 
better communicate the traditions and knowledge of the service management sector. 
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